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The aim of the international standards of corporate governance module is 
to equip students with the knowledge and key skills necessary to act as 
adviser to governing authorities across the private, public and voluntary 
sectors. The course will include all aspects of the governance obligations of 
organizations, covering not only legal duties, but also applicable and 
recommended standards of best practice. 
The task of learning is to enable the development of a sound 
understanding of corporate governance law and practice in a national and 
international context. It will also enable students to support the development 
of good governance and stakeholder dialogue throughout the organization, 
irrespective of sector, being aware of legal obligations and best practice. 
On successful completion of this module, students will be able to:  
• appraise the frameworks underlying governance law and practice in a 
national and international context; 
• distinguish between and compare the legal obligations for governance 
and recommended best practice; 
• advise on governance issues across all sectors, ensuring that the pursuit 
of strategic objectives is in line with regulatory developments and 
developments in best practice; 
• analyze and evaluate situations in which governance problems arise and 
provide recommendations for solutions; 
• assess the relationship between governance and performance within 
organizations; 
• compare the responsibilities of organizations to different stakeholder 
groups, and advise on issues of ethical conduct and the application of 





















INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS  




 Corporate Governance: The Principles and Standards 
 The Role of Stakeholders and Ethical Behavior in 
Corporate Governance  
 Board of Directors: Functions and Responsibilities 
 The Role of Audit and Regulation 
 The Essence of Remuneration and Establishment of 
Remuneration Committee 
 The Influence of Globalizationon Changes in Corporate 
































Henry Ford once said thata great business is really too big to be human. 
Indeed, that is the purpose of the corporate structure, to transcend the ability 
and lifespan of any individual. It is also the challenge of the corporation 
(Monks & Minow, 2011, p. 4). 
The most significant forces governing the direction of corporations and 
trying to reduce agency costs and maximize sustainable value creation 
areinternal and structural ones, namely management, shareholders, boards of 
directors (Monks & Minow, 2011). 
The concept of governance is not a new one but nowadays we hear words 
as corporate governance, organizationalgovernance or good governance 
frequently.  
The term corporate governance first appeared in 1962 in a book by 
Richard Eells of Columbia University. 
Actually corporate governance (or as defined in ISO 2600:2010 
“organizational governance”) is “the system of rules, practices and processes 
that directs and controls an organization” (European Commite for 
Standartization, 2010).  
 
Note 
ISO 26000 (Guidance on Social Responcibility) is the international 
standard intended to assist organizations in assessing effectively and 
addressing social responsibilities while respecting cultural, societal, 
environmental, and legal differences and economic development conditions. 
 
In essence, corporate governance involves balancing the interests of an 
organization’s many stakeholders, such as shareholders, management, 
customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community (ASQ, n.d.). 
According to ISO 26000 organizational or corporate governance can include 
both formal governance arrangements and informal arrangements (European 
Commite for Standartization, 2010).  
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Formal governance arrangements are based on established structures and 
processes.  
Informal governance arrangements stem from the culture and values of 
the organization and are often influenced by the leaders of the organization. 
 
Organizational governance is the main function of any kind of 
organization, as it is the basis for decision making within the organization 
(European Commite for Standartization, 2010). 
Corporate governance can be regarded as a synergy-driven environment 
based on high moral values, ethics, and trust. It has gained tremendous 
importance in recent years. There is a considerable body of literature which 
considers the components of a good system of governance and a variety of 
frameworks exist or have been proposed. 
 
Note 
According to the UK Code 1992 published by the Cadbury Committee 
“corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors 
and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, 
supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on 
their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the 
shareholders in general meeting.” 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term 
success of the company” (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 
 
Supra-national authorities such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank designed their 
own principles of corpotate governance ‘to assist governments in their efforts 
to evaluate and improve their frameworks for corporate governance, and 
provide guidance for regulators and, more broadly, participants in financial 
markets’ (Kirkpatrick, 2004).  
 
Note 
“The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to 
address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation.  








governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate 
governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing 
population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can 
compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify 
good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies. 
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The European Union takes part in the work 
of the OECD.  
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s 
statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental 
issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its 
members”(OECD, 2015, p.57). 
 
This type of self-regulation was chosen above a set of legal standards. 
Standards reflect agreement between governments on the best policies or 
practices in a specific field. Some OECD standards are legally binding, e.g. 




OECD developed over 450 international standarts, including conventions, 
recommendations, decisions, and declarations over thw past 55 yers. 
Currentty, more than 250 legal instruments are in force, some relating to 
multiple sectoral areas (OECD, 2019c). 
 
In the OECD, standards are developed at the request of Member countries, 
agreed on by consensus, and developed through a rigorous evidence-based 
process of negotiation led by expert committees, and involving a variety of 
stakeholders (OECD, 2019c). 
 
Note 
Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2015) is one of the twelve 
Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems developed by international 
financial institutions to promote transparent and efficient capital markets and 
sound corporate governance practices. Besides the former they include:  
1. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies (IMF, 1999); 
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2. Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (IMF, 2007); 
3. Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemination 
System (IMF, 2021); 
4. Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems (Leroy,A.-M., &Grandolini,G.M., 2016); 
5. Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2015); 
6. International Accounting Standards (IAS Plus, n.d.); 
7. International Standards on Auditing(IAASB, n.d.); 
8. Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSS, 
2001) and Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (CPSS-
IOSCO, 2001); 
9. International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (FATF, 2012-2020); 
10. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2012); 
11. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO, 2017); 
12. Insurance Core Principles (IAIS, 2018). 
Given somemajor corporate scandals at the financial markets concerning 
investors, the issure of their protection became crucial to most companies. 
According to European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
“successful implementation of international standards strengthens domestic 
financial systems and encourages sound regulation and supervision, greater 




A corporate scandal can have a dramatic effect on a company’s bottom 
line. The top 10 of the biggest corporate scandals of recent times ranked 
according to notoriety are: 
1. Enron 
2. Volkswagen 





8. Valeant Pharmaceuticals 
9. Kobe Steel 
10. Equifax 
 
As defined in the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance, “the 








transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term 
investment, financial stability and business integrity, thereby supporting 
stronger growth and more inclusive societies” (OECD, 2015). 
In practice there are some basic principles of good corporate governance. 
“Companies that embrace the tenets of good governance, including 
accountability, transparency and sustainability, are more likely to engender 
investor confidence and achieve long-term sustainable business 
performance” (Monetary authority of Sinagapure, 2018). All these principles 
are related with the corporate social responsibility of company. 
In accordance with the ISO 26000 there are seven key principles of social 
responsibility, such as: 
 “Accountability 
 Transparency 
 Ethical behavior 
 Respect for stakeholder interests 
 Respect for the rule of law 
 Respect for international norms of behavior 
 Respect for human rights” (European Commite for Standartization, 
2010). 
According to the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance 
(OECD, 2015) “the corporate governance framework should promote 
transparent and fair markets, and the efficient allocation of resources. It 
should be consistent with the rule of law and support effective supervision 
and enforcement. In order to achieve this task it is suggested that: 
A.The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view 
to its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the 
incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of transparent 
and well-functioning markets; 
B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance 
practices should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and 
enforceable; 
C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities should be 
clearly articulated and designed to serve the public interest. 
D. Stock market regulation should support effective corporate 
governance; 
E. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and 
objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent and 
fully explained; 
F. Cross-border co-operation should be enhanced, including through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements for exchange of information.” 
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Moreover, “the corporate governance framework should protect and 
facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders”. 
“All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. In order to achieve this task it is suggested that: 
A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to:  
1) secure methods of ownership registration;  
2) convey or transfer shares;  
3) obtain relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely 
and regular basis;  
4) participate and vote in general shareholder meetings;  
5) elect and remove members of the board;  
6) share in the profits of the corporation.  
B. Shareholders should be sufficiently informed about, and have the right 
to approve or participate in, decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes such as:  
1) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar 
governing documents of the company;  
2) the authorisation of additional shares;  
3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially 
all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings:  
1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely 
information concerning the date, location and agenda of general 
meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding the issues 
to be decided at the meeting.  
2. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should 
allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures 
should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the 
board, including questions relating to the annual external audit, to 
place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose 
resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations. 
4. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance 
decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, 
should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views 
known, including through votes at shareholder meetings, on the 
remuneration of board members and/or key executives, as applicable. 








and employees should be subject to shareholder approval. 
5. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal 
effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia. 
6. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
D. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed 
to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights 
as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
E. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain 
a degree of influence or control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed, namely: 
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. 
All investors should be able to obtain information about the rights 
attached to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any 
changes in economic or voting rights should be subject to approval by 
those classes of shares which are negatively affected. 
2. The disclosure of capital structures and control arrangements should 
be required. 
F. Related-party transactions should be approved and conducted in a 
manner that ensures proper management of conflict of interest and protects 
the interest of the company and its shareholders, namely: 
1. Conflicts of interest inherent in related-party transactions should be 
addressed. 
2. Members of the board and key executives should be required to 
disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of 
third parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter 
directly affecting the corporation. 
F. Related-party transactions should be approved and conducted in a 
manner that ensures proper management of conflict of interest and protects 
the interest of the company and its shareholders, namely: 
1. Conflicts of interest inherent in related-party transactions should be 
addressed. 
2. Members of the board and key executives should be required to 
disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of 
third parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter 
directly affecting the corporation. 
G. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or 
in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, 
and should have effective means of redress. Abusive self-dealing should be 
prohibited. 
H. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an 
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efficient and transparent manner, namely: 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as 
mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should 
be clearly articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their 
rights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices 
and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders 
according to their class.  
2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and 
the board from accountability.” 
Furthermore, according to the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate 
Governance (OECD, 2015) “the corporate governance framework should 
provide sound incentives throughout the investment chain and provide for 
stock markets to function in a way that contributes to good corporate 
governance.” In order to achieve this task it is suggested that: 
“A. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose 
their corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their 
investments, including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on 
the use of their voting rights. 
B. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in line with the 
directions of the beneficial owner of the shares. 
C. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose 
how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of 
key ownership rights regarding their investments. 
D. The corporate governance framework should require that proxy 
advisors, analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others that provide analysis 
or advice relevant to decisions by investors, disclose and minimise conflicts 
of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
E. Insider trading and market manipulation should be prohibited and the 
applicable rules enforced. 
F. For companies who are listed in a jurisdiction other than their 
jurisdiction of incorporation, the applicable corporate governance laws and 
regulations should be clearly disclosed. In the case of cross listings, the 
criteria and procedure for recognising the listing requirements of the primary 
listing should be transparent and documented. 
G. Stock markets should provide fair and efficient price discovery as a 
means to help promote effective corporate governance.” 
In addition the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 
2015) assume that “the corporate governance framework should recognise 
the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements 








creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises” 
(in more detale see chapter 3). In order to achieve this task it is suggested 
that: 
“A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through 
mutual agreements are to be respected. 
B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
C. Mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to 
develop. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, 
they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a 
timely and regular basis. 
E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative 
bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or 
unethical practices to the board and to the competent public authorities and 
their rights should not be compromised for doing this. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of 
creditor rights.” 
Additionally,the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance 
(OECD, 2015) state that “the corporate governance framework should ensure 
that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding 
the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, 
and governance of the company.” In order to achieve this task it is suggested 
that: 
“A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information 
on:  
1) the financial and operating results of the company; 
2) company objectives and non-financial information; 
3) major share ownership, including beneficial owners, and voting rights 
4) remuneration of members of the board and key executives; 
5) information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded 
as independent by the board; 
6) related party transactions; 
7) foreseeable risk factors; 
8) issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; 
9) governance structures and policies, including the content of any 
corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is 
implemented. 
B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 




quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial reporting. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent 
and qualified, auditor in accordance with high-quality auditing standards in 
order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial 
position and performance of the company in all material respects. 
D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a 
duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the 
audit. 
E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, 
timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.” 
Furthermore, according to the G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate 
Governance (OECD, 2015) “the corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of 
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and 
the shareholders” (see chapter 3). In order to achieve this task it is suggested 
that: 
“A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, 
with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders. 
B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups 
differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly 
C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into 
account the interests of stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including:  
1) reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk 
management policies and procedures, annual budgets and business plans; 
setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and 
divestitures; 
2) monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices 
and making changes as needed; 
3) selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing 
key executives and overseeing succession planning; 
4) aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term 
interests of the company and its shareholders; 
5) ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election 
process; 
6) monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of 








7) ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate 
systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, 
financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant 
standards; 
8) overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement 
on corporate affairs, namely: 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-
executive board members capable of exercising independent 
judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. 
Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of 
financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party 
transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and 
board remuneration. 
2. Boards should consider setting up specialised committees to support 
the full board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to 
audit, and, depending upon the company’s size and risk profile, also 
in respect to risk management and remuneration. When committees of 
the board are established, their mandate, composition and working 
procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
3. Boards should regularly carry out evaluations to appraise their 
performance and assess whether they possess the right mix of 
background and competences. 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have 
access to accurate, relevant and timely information 
G. When employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms 
should be developed to facilitate access to information and training for 
employee representatives, so that this representation is exercised effectively 
and best contributes to the enhancement of board skills, information and 
independence.” 
The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015)“are 
intended to be concise, understandable and accessible to the international 
community. On the basis of the Principles, it is the role of government, semi-
government or private sector initiatives to assess the quality of the corporate 
governance framework and develop more detailed mandatory or voluntary 
provisions that can take into account country-specific economic, legal, and 
cultural differences.” 
The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015) 
“focus on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-financial. To the 
extent they are deemed applicable, they might also be a useful tool to improve 
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corporate governance in companies whose shares are not publicly traded. 
While some of the Principles may be more appropriate for larger than for 
smaller companies, policymakers may wish to raise awareness of good 
corporate governance for all companies, including smaller and unlisted 
companies.  
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance are determined.  
The Principles do not intend to prejudice or second-guess the business 
judgment of individual market participants, board members and company 
officials. What works in one company or for one group of investors may not 
necessarily be generally applicable to all of business or of systemic economic 
importance” (OECD, 2015).  
“The Principles recognise the interests of employees and other 
stakeholders and their important role in contributing to the long-term success 
and performance of the company.  
Other factors relevant to a company’s decision-making processes, such as 
environmental, anti-corruption or ethical concerns, are considered in the 
Principles but are treated more explicitly in a number of other instruments 
including  
1) the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,  
2) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions,  
3) he UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,  
4) and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, which are referenced in the Principles” (OECD, 2015).  
The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015)“are 
developed with an understanding that corporate governance policies have an 
important role to play in achieving broader economic objectives with respect 
to investor confidence, capital formation and allocation.  
The quality of corporate governance affects the cost for corporations to 
access capital for growth and the confidence with which those that provide 
capital – directly or indirectly – can participate and share in their value-
creation on fair and equitable terms. Together, the body of corporate 
governance rules and practices therefore provides a framework that helps to 
bridge the gap between household savings and investment in the real 
economy. As a consequence, good corporate governance will reassure 
shareholders and other stakeholders that their rights are protected and make 








access to the capital market. This is of significant importance in today’s 
globalised capital markets” (OECD, 2015).  
“International flows of capital enable companies to access financing from 
a much larger pool of investors. If companies and countries are to reap the 
full benefits of the global capital market, and if they are to attract long-term 
“patient” capital, corporate governance arrangements must be credible, well 
understood across borders and adhere to internationally accepted principles. 
Even if corporations do not rely primarily on foreign sources of capital, a 
credible corporate governance framework, supported by effective supervision 
and enforcement mechanisms, will help improve the confidence of domestic 
investors, reduce the cost of capital, underpin the good functioning of 
financial markets, and ultimately induce more stable sources of financing” 
(OECD, 2015). 
It should be noted that another node of legislative corporate governance 




The UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 (published in April 2016) 
applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 17 June 2016 and applies 
“to all companies with a Premium listing of equity shares regardless of 
whether they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere” (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016). 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 (published in July 2018) 
applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019. At the 
heart of this Code is an updated set of Principles that emphasise the value of 
good corporate governance to long-term sustainable success (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2018). It places greater emphasis on relationships 
between companies, shareholders and stakeholders, as well as promotes the 
importance of establishing a corporate culture aligned with the company 
purpose, business strategy, promotes integrity and values diversity (Financial 





1. What is meant by corporate governance? 
2. What are the reasons to implement corporate governance? 
3. What is the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility? 
4. What are the 4 principles of corporate governance? 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 




5. What does the rule of law mean? 
6. Explain transparency. 
7. What is meant by stewardship? 
8. Why will good governance mechanisms create competitive advantage? 
 
Questions to discuss 
 
1. Why it is management, shareholders, boards of directors that are the most 
significant forces of corporate governance? 
2. What is the prominenceand importance of social responsibility?  
3. Clarify the essence ofcorporate governance as an environment of trust, 
ethics, moral values and confidence. 






1.1. Consider and discuss Case “Suzano” (OECD, 2006, pp. 70-77).  
Analyze according to the following scheme: 
1) a brief description of the company (where, by whom, when founded; 
in which sector of the economy it operates; what market share it owns). 
2) prerequisites, or what prompted the company to implement corporate 
governance standards. 
3) what is the essence of the chosen model of corporate governance. 
4) what results were achieved. 
5) what are the prospects for the studied company. 
 
1.2. Consider and discuss Case “Embraer” (OECD, 2006, pp. 30-37). 
Analyze according to the aforesaid scheme. 
 
Case 1.1. Variations on comply-or-explain reporting on corporate 
governance codes 
A few countries have developed unique systems for promoting 
implementation of national corporate governance codes that do not hew 
strictly to usual comply-or-explain systems. For example, in Costa Rica, the 
National Council of Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF) 
Corporate Governance Regulation is mandatory to implement but based on a 
"comply and explain" rule, unlike the more common model followed in other 
countries under which the company may choose not to comply but must 








mandatory, it also suggests that companies may apply the principle of 
proportionality, meaning that in practice there remains some flexibility in 
how the code is applied. Listed companies are nevertheless mandated under 
the national code to establish and disclose their own codes and additional 
information consistent with the disclosure and transparency 
recommendations of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. In 
Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance follows an “apply 
or explain an alternative” approach, where companies that are not applying 
the practices prescribed by the Code must provide an explanation for the 
departure, and disclose an alternative practice that meets the intended 
outcome of the principles of the Code. In addition, large companies (as 
defined in the Code) departing from a recommended practice in the Code are 
required to disclose measures to be taken by the company to adopt the 
practice and the time frame for their adoption. The disclosure requirements 
are mandated in the Listing Requirements, which apply to all Code practices, 
and to all listed companies. Mexico provides an example of a mixed approach 
involving binding and voluntary code recommendations. In 2005, its 
securities market law incorporated a minimum framework of the practices 
and principles of sound corporate governance for listed companies contained 
in the Code of Principles and Best Practices in Corporate Governance. That 
is, while the Code itself is not binding, many of the practices previously 
recommended in it have become binding by Law. Moreover, Stock Exchange 
listing rules require listed companies to disclose their degree of adherence to 
the Code both to the Stock Exchange in which their stock is traded, and to 
investors. Stock Exchange listing rules also require issuing companies to be 


















In some European countries, the rights of stakeholdersare enshrined in 
company law or other related legislation, such as codetermination and 
employment-protection legislation. In Germany, for example, a 1976 
lawmandated that worker representatives hold seats on theboards of all 
companies employing over 500 people.Proponents of codetermination argue 
that it leads toreductions in management-labor conflict by means 
ofimproving and systematizing communication channels. 
By contrast, companies in other countries have a tradition of focusing 
more narrowly on the interests of shareholders. However, regardless of legal 
obligations, the governance framework should take into accountthe interests 
of stakeholders. The risks to the companyof insufficiently incorporating the 
stakeholder perspective into governance arrangements could be considerable. 
Consequently, well-governed companies in Europemake an effort to establish 
and maintain dialogue andconstructive engagement with relevant 
stakeholders (International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, 2015). 
Stakeholders are such groups or individuals without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist and who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives. 
We can see from these definitions that many people can be a stakeholder 
to an organization. The most common groups who we consider to be 
stakeholders include: managers, employees, customers, investors, 
shareholders, suppliers. There are some more generic groups who are often 
included: government, society, the local community. 
The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015) state 
that the corporate governance framework should recognise the rights 
ofstakeholders (see chapter 1). 
A key aspect of corporate governance is “concerned with ensuring the 
flowof external capital to companies both in the form of equity and credit” 
(OECD, 2015). Corporategovernance is also “concerned with finding ways 
to encourage the variousstakeholders in the firm to undertake economically 
optimal levels of investmentin firm-specific human and physical capital”. 
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The competitiveness and ultimatesuccess of a corporation is the result of 
teamwork that embodies contributionsfrom a range of different resource 
providers including investors, employees, creditors, customers and suppliers, 
and other stakeholders. Corporations should recognise that the contributions 
of stakeholders constitute a valuable resource forbuilding competitive and 
profitable companies. It is, therefore, in the long-terminterest of corporations 
to foster wealth-creating co-operation amongstakeholders. The governance 
framework should recognise “the interests of stakeholders and their 
contribution to the long-term success of the corporation” (OECD, 2015). 
 
Example 
In the UK a regulator has regulated utility industries since privatization 
and thus the regulator is a stakeholder of these organizations. Similarly, 
certain industries are more environmentally, politically or socially sensitive 
than others and therefore attract more attention from these stakeholder 
groups, and again the water or nuclear industries provide examples here 
(Crowther & Seifi, 2011). 
 
 









The rights of stakeholders are “often established by law (e.g. labour, 
business, commercial, environmental, and insolvency laws) or by 
contractualrelations that companies must respect. Nevertheless, even in areas 
wherestakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make 
additionalcommitments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate 
reputation andcorporate performance often requires the recognition of 
broader interests. Formultinational enterprises, this may in some jurisdictions 
be achieved bycompanies using the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises for duediligence procedures that address the impact of such 
commitments” (OECD, 2015). 
The legal framework and process should be transparent and not impede 
the ability of stakeholders to communicate and to obtain redress for the 
violation of rights. 
The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of 
creditor rights. 
Creditors are a key stakeholder and the terms, volume and type of credit 
extended to firms will depend importantly on their rights and on their 
enforceability. Companies with a good corporate governance record are often 
able to borrow larger sums and on more favourable terms than those with 
poor records or which operate in less transparent markets. The framework for 
corporate insolvency varies widely across countries. In some countries, when 
companies are nearing insolvency; the legislative framework imposes a duty 
on directors to act in the interests of creditors, who might therefore play a 
prominent role in the governance of the company. Other countries have 
mechanisms which encourage the debtor to reveal timely information about 
the company’s difficulties so that a consensual solution can be found between 
the debtor and its creditors. 
Creditor rights also vary, ranging from secured bond holders to unsecured 
creditors. Insolvency procedures usually require efficient mechanisms for 
reconciling the interests of different classes of creditors. In many jurisdictions 
provision is made for special rights such as through “debtor in possession” 
financing which provides incentives/protection for new funds made available 
to the enterprise in bankruptcy (OECD, 2015). 
Ethics shows a corporation how to behave properly in all its business and 
operations. However, business ethics is characterized by conflicts of interests. 
Businesses attempt to maximize profits as a primary goal on one hand while 
they face issues of social responsibility and social service on the other. Ethics 
is the set of rules prescribing what is good or evil, or what is right or wrong 
for people. In other words, ethics is the values that form the basis of human 
relations, and the quality and essence of being morally good or evil, or right 
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or wrong. Business Ethics means honesty, confidence, respect and fair acting 
in all circumstances. However, such values as honesty, respect and 
confidence are rather general concepts without definite boundaries. Ethics 
can also be defined as overall fundamental principles and practices for 
improving the level of wellbeing of humanity (Crowther & Seifi, 2011, p. 
58). 
Ethics is the natural and structural process of acting in line with moral 
judgments, standards and rules. Being a concrete and subjective concept, 
business ethics can be discussed with differing approaches and in varying 
degrees of importance in different fields. Indeed, it is highly difficult to define 
ethics and identify its limits and criteria. Accordingly, there are difficulties in 
discussing this concept in literature, as it is ubiquitous in business life, at the 
business level, and in human life. According to what, how, how much and for 
whom ethics is or should be are important questions. It is not always easy to 
find answers to these questions (Aras & Crowther, 2008a). 
However, ethical behavior and ethical business has effects not only on 
stakeholders, and shareholders but also on the entire economy. We believe 
that when we act ethically in business decision-making process this will 
ensure more effective and productive utilization of economic resources 
(Crowther & Seifi, 2011). 
Every company should have a Code of Ethics that covers the owners, the 
Board of Directors, the Management the employees and representatives. The 
Code of Ethics should be developed by the Management and approved by the 
Board of Directors. 
The code of ethics should cover (Brazilian Institute of Corporate 
Governance, 2016): 
 true and complete accounting; 
 correct invoice values; 
 bribery and improper payments; 
 loans to the controlling owner; 
 use of assets by controlling owner; 
 conflict of interest; 
 security of proprietary information; 
 receiving gifts; 
 giving gifts; 
 discrimination; 
 environment; 
 sexual harassment; 
 workplace safety; 








 community relations; 
 employee privacy; 
 substance abuse; 
 nepotism; 
 child labor. 
There is a conflict of interest whenever a party is not independent in 
regard to a particular issue and the party in question might influence or make 
decisions in this regard. Similar criteria are valid for management or any other 
company employee or representative (Brazilian Institute of Corporate 
Governance, 2016). 
The person in question should identify his/her conflict of interest. If 
he/she fails to do so, any other person should speak up. 
As soon as a conflict of interest has been identified the person in question 
should leave the meeting room and only return once the discussions have 
finished and the decisions have been taken. 
The temporary absence should be recorded in minutes (Brazilian Institute 
of Corporate Governance, 2016). 
One of the most certain definitions found in ISO 26000 is that declared 
the importance of ethical behavior. This standard has defined ethical behavior 
as: behavior that is in accordance with accepted principles of right or good 
conduct in the context of a particular situation and is consistent with 
international norms of behavior. 
We must remember however that international standards are a 
problematic concept as there are very few universally agreed upon standards 






1. Who are the stakeholders? 
2. How can we classify stakeholders? 
3. Name a multi-dimensional performance measurement framework. 
4. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights? 
5. Why does a company have to be ethical? 
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Questions to discuss 
 
1. Consider thr concept of CSR on the example Tiffany & Co (2017). How 
such practice may influence companies’ image (brand)?  
2. Study and discuss the obgectives of ISO 26000. How do you think 
Ukrainian compamies should follow this standart to immrove their 
performance in corporate governance? 
3.What do you know about stakeholder theory? Consider different 





2.1. Watch educational video “Enron: The Smartest Guys In The Room”. 
Discuss which actions of top management has caused the fatal consequence 
and led to corruption scandal? How companies may eliminate negative 
consecuences in future? 
  
2.2. Consider and discuss Case “Marcopolo” (OECD, 2006, pp. 50-57). 
Analyze according to the following scheme: 
1) a brief description of the company (where, by whom, when founded; 
in which sector of the economy it operates; what market share it owns). 
2) prerequisites, or what prompted the company to implement corporate 
governance standards. 
3) what is the essence of the chosen model of corporate governance. 
4) what results were achieved. 
5) what are the prospects for the studied company. 
 
Case 2.1. National provisions to facilitate effective minority 
shareholder participation in board selection 
Eight jurisdictions have special voting arrangements to facilitate effective 
participation by minority shareholders (Table 2.1). In Italy, at least one board 
member must be elected from the slate of candidates presented by 
shareholders owning a minimum threshold of the company’s share capital. In 
Israel, it is recommended for initial appointment and required for re-election, 
that all outside directors be appointed by the majority of the minority 
shareholders. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority 
published a rule in 2014 that provides additional voting power to minority 
shareholders in the election of independent directors for a premium listed 
company where a controlling shareholder is present (“dual voting 








both by the shareholders as a whole and the independent shareholders as a 
separate class. Moreover, initial appointments must be approved by the 
majority of the minority shareholders. Brazil, India, Portugal, Spain and 
Turkey have also established special arrangements to facilitate the influence 
of minority shareholders in the process of board nomination and election 
(OECD, 2019a). 
 
Table 2.1 Board representation of minority shareholders (OECD, 2019a) 
Jurisdiction Required for re-election Requirement / recommendation 
Brazil Allowed One or two members of the board may be elected 
separately by minority shareholders, pursuant to the 
following rules: Minority shareholders holding voting 
shares that represent 15% or more of the voting capital are 
entitled to appoint one member for the board; and  
Minority shareholders holding non-voting preferred 
shares or preferred shares with limited voting rights that 
represents 10% or more of the total capital stock are 
entitled to appoint one member to the board - if neither the 
holders of shares with voting rights nor the holders of 
preferred shares without voting rights or with restricted 
voting rights achieve the percentages mentioned above, 
they are allowed to aggregate their shares in order to 
jointly elect a member for the board of directors, as long 
as their shares represent at least 10% of share capital; and 
- in the case of state-owned enterprises, minority 
shareholders have the right to elect one representative for 
the Board with no minimum share capital requirement 
India  Allowed Companies Act, 2013 provides for nomination of one 
director by small shareholders. In this context, a small 
shareholder is someone holding shares of nominal value 
of not more than twenty thousand rupees. 
Israel  Recommend
ed for initial 
appointment; 
 Required for 
re-election 
All outside directors must be appointed by a majority of 
the minority. 
Italy Required At least one board member must be elected from the slate 
of candidates presented by shareholders owning a 
minimum threshold of the company’s share capital. 
His/her appointment is not a necessary condition for the 
valid composition of the board (i.e. the board composition 
is still valid if only one slate has been presented and the 
board is consequently made up of only directors elected 
from that slate). 
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Portugal Required The articles of association of public listed companies must 
provide that: i.) a maximum of one-third of board 
members are appointed within candidates proposed by a 
group of shareholders holding between 10 and 20% 
shareholding; or ii) that minority shareholders 
representing at least 10% of the share capital appoint at 
least one director. 
Spain Allowed Shares that are voluntarily grouped to constitute share 
capital amounting to or exceeding the sum resulting from 
dividing the capital by the number of members of the 
board of directors, shall be entitled to designate the 
number of members deduced from the proportion of share 
capital so grouped, rounding any fractions. In other words, 
depending on the number of directors, shareholders can 
pool their shares in order to appoint a number of directors 
to the board in proportion to the share capital they hold in 
accordance with the proportional representation system 
For instance, if minority shareholders possess 100 shares 
and the board has 12 members, they may pool the 100 
shares divided by 12 in order to designate a member of the 
board. 
Turkey Allowed The minority shareholders (holding 5% of the equity 
capital for listed companies) may be given the right to be 
represented at the board (maximum half of the members 
of the board can be elected in this way, provided that the 










Premium listed companies with controlling shareholders 
must ensure that their constitutions provide for the 
election of independent directors by a dual voting 
structure. This structure requires that independent 
directors must be separately approved both by the 
shareholders as a whole and the independent shareholders 





















CHAPTER 3  
 
 




The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015) state 
that board structures and procedures vary both within and among countries.  
Some countries have two-tier boards that separate the supervisory 
function and the management function into different bodies. Such systems 
typically have a “supervisory board” composed of non-executive board 
members and a “management board” composed entirely of executives.  
Other countries have “unitary” boards, which bring together executive 
and non-executive board members. In some countries there is also an 
additional statutory body for audit purposes.  
The G20/OECD Principles of Corpotate Governance (OECD, 2015) are 
“intended to apply to whatever board structure is charged with the functions 
of governing the enterprise and monitoring management. Together with 
guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly responsible for monitoring 
managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders, 
while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on 
the corporation. In order for boards to effectively fulfil their responsibilities 
they must be able to exercise objective and independent judgement. Another 
important board responsibility is to oversee the risk management system and 
systems designed to ensure that the corporation obeys applicable laws, 
including tax, competition, labour, environmental, equal opportunity, health 
and safety laws. In some countries, companies have found it useful to 
explicitly articulate the responsibilities that the board assumes and those for 
which management is accountable” (OECD, 2015).  
The board is not only “accountable to the company and its shareholders 
but also has a duty to act in their best interests. In addition, boards are 
expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder 
interests including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and 
local communities. Observance of environmental and social standards is 
relevant in this context”(OECD, 2015). 
The board of directors is “the highest governing authority within the 
management structure at a corporation or publicly traded business. The board 
owes a company's shareholders the highest financial duty under American 
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law, known as a fiduciary duty”. 
It's the board's duties to: 
1. Select, evaluate, and approve appropriate compensation for the company's 
chief executive officer (CEO). 
2. Evaluate the attractiveness of and pay dividends, recommend stock splits. 
3. Oversee share repurchase programs. 
4. Approve the company's financial statements. 
5. Recommend or strongly discourage acquisitions and mergers. 
A stock split is a decision by a company's board of directors to increase 




In a 2-for-1 stock split, an additional share is given for each share held by 
a shareholder. So, if a company had 1 million shares outstanding before the 
split, it will have 2 million shares outstanding after a 2-for-1 split. A stock's 
price is also affected by a stock split. After a split, the stock price will be 
reduced since the number of shares outstanding has increased. In the example 
of a 2-for-1 split, the share price will be halved. Thus, although the number 
of outstanding shares and the price change, the market capitalization remains 
constant. 
 
Stock buyback program is a process when a company choose to buy back 
shares of its stock. A company pays the market price for the shares, retains 
ownership, and increases the ownership stake of the remaining stockholders. 
In some European countries, the sentiment is much different in that many 
directors there feel that it is their primary responsibility to protect the 
employees of a company first and the shareholders second. In these social 
and political climates, corporate profitability takes a back seat to the needs of 
workers. 
The Structure and Makeup of the Board.  
“Shareholders shall have the possibility to evaluate the performance of 
the board of directors and the directors on a regular basis. Good corporate 
governance requires that the entire board of directors is elected annually at 
the annual general meeting. Any provisions of the company’s articles of 
association that depart from this recommendation shall be reported as 
departures” (Securities Market Association, 2020). 
The board is made up of individuals (the "directors") whoare elected by 
the shareholders for multiple-year terms.Many companies operate on a 
rotating system so that only afraction of the directors is up for election each 








the upper management of the company (so-called "executive directors"); or 
are independent of the company but are known for their business abilities.The 
number of people on a board of directors can vary substantially between 
companies and can range anywhere from 3 to 30. 
The composition of the company’s board of directors shall reflect the 
requirements set by the company’s operations and development stage. A 
person elected as a director must have the competence required by the 
position and the possibility to devote a sufficient amount of time to attending 
to the duties. The number of directors and the composition of the board of 
directors shall be such that they enable the board of directors to see to its 
duties efficiently. Both genders shall be represented in the board of directors 
(Securities Market Association, 2020). 
The audit committee is responsible for ensuring that the company's 
financial statements and reports are accurate and use fair and reasonable 
estimates. The board members select, hire, and work with an outside auditing 
firm that does the auditing. 
The compensation committee sets base compensation, stock option 
awards, and incentive bonuses for the company's executives, including the 
CEO. In recent years, many boards of directors have come under fire for 
allowing executive salaries to reach unjustifiably high levels. In exchange for 
providing their services, corporate directors are paid a yearly salary, 
additional compensation for each meeting they attend, stock options, and 
various other benefits. The total amount of directorship fees varies from 
company to company. The compensation directors receive, along with any 
otherbenefits, short biographical information, age, and level of existing 
ownership in the business is found in a special document known as the proxy 
statement. 
A proxy statement is a document containing the information the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies to provide to 
shareholders so they can make informed decisions about matters that will be 
brought up at an annual or special stockholder meeting.  Issues covered in a 
proxy statement can include proposals for new additions to the board of 
directors, information on directors' salaries, information on bonus and options 
plans for directors, and any declarations made by the company's management. 
The annual meeting of a corporation is a gathering of shareholders of the 
corporation. An annual meeting may also be calleda general meeting, an 
annual shareholder meeting, or an annual stockholder meeting. Every 
corporation is required to hold an annual meeting; usually, the meeting is 
heldjust after the end of the company's fiscal year, at a time and place 
designated in the bylaws. 
The annual meeting usually includes the following activities (Securities 
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Market Association, 2020): 
 election of directors whose terms are up for renewal or to fill vacancies 
on the board of directors; 
 declaration of a dividend or changes in the dividend policy; 
 review of the corporation's annual report; 
 discussion of new projects and activities. 
Before the annual meeting, each shareholder receives a proxy statement. 
This document (usually mailed) describes matters to be voted on at the 
meeting. Typically, the proxy is for voting on the board of directors’ members 
and for votes on other matters the board wants shareholder opinion on. 
Shareholders who cannot attend can usually vote their proxy by mail. 
Every corporation is required by the SEC to have an annual report and/or 
a more complex, detailed document called a 10-K, for shareholders. The 
annual report includes information on the company and its current financial 
position. 
Most corporate annual reports include: 
 a statement by the Chairman or CEO about the state of the business (kind 
of like the State of the Union address); 
 a narrative review of the past year, with new products, new research, 
 happenings, and other current information for shareholders; 
 a discussion of changes in financial policies, dividends changes, and other 
matters of concern to shareholders; 
 financial statements, including a balance sheet, income statement, and 
 sources and uses of funds statements; 
 for publicly traded companies, an auditor's report must also be included. 
The auditor certifies that the financial statements were compiled using 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
When a corporation starts having shareholders, the shareholders elect the 
board members – one share, one vote. Usually, a nominating committee 
prepares a slate of possible boardmembers, who are voted on at the annual 
meeting. Board members usually are elected for a term of several years, with 
staggered terms, so some board members are coming off the board each year 
and need to be replaced. This keeps the board from being filled with just new 
members or with members who "retire in place." 
Board work requires a considerable amount of work from the directors. 
In addition to attending the meetings, a significant part of board work consists 
of preparing for the meetings, committee work, familiarisation with the 
company’s business operations and operating environment, and monitoring 
and assessing the operations of the company. 
In order to ensure and improve the efficiency and continuity of its work, 








are evaluated regularly. The evaluation may be carried out in the form of an 
internal self-evaluation. Using an external evaluator at intervals and to the 
extent deemed necessary by the company may provide new and more 
objective perspectives. 
“The evaluation may focus on, for example, the composition of the board 
of directors, the organisation and effectiveness of the board of directors as a 
team, the meeting preparations, cooperation with the managing director, 
andthe competence, special expertise, and efficiency of each director and the 
board of directors as a whole. The evaluation may also include an assessment 
on how successfully the board of directors has operated in relation to the 
setobjectives. It may also be justified to conduct similar evaluations of 






1. What is the purpose of a Board of Directors? 
2. What is meant under fiduciary duty? 
3. When does company take decision to split a stock? 
4. Which activities does annual meeting usually include? 
5.Which elements do corporate annual reports consist of? 
 
 
Questions to discuss 
 
1.Has the board agreed on its role in formulating the company’s strategic 
plan – and, does the board understand the strategic factors that shape the 
company’s success? 
2. What should be discussed in a board meeting? 






Case 3.1. Case study on the flexible framework for boards in the United 
Kingdom 
 
A flexible and proportional approach to the composition, committees and 
qualifications of the board is well illustrated by the case study of the United 
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Kingdom where the Companies Act provides companies with a large degree 
of freedom to compose their boards in a manner that fits their business model. 
As a consequence, it does not contain any substantive provisions regarding 
the qualifications and composition of the board. Neither does the legislation 
address definitional issues, such as the distinction between executive and 
non-executive directors. Instead, the main guidance relating to the 
composition, workings and qualifications of the board is found in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, which is a legislative requirement for 
companies with Premium listing of equity shares. The Code is considered to 
allow for both flexibility and proportionality as it expects companies to either 
comply with its recommendations or explain why they have chosen a 
different arrangement. With respect to the appointment of independent non-
executive directors, the Code also has a special exemption with respect to 
company size, providing less extensive recommendations for smaller 
companies that are subject to the Code. 
Companies with a Standard listing on the London Stock Exchange benefit 
from wider flexibility. The requirement is limited to producing a Corporate 
Governance Statement in the Annual Report and disclose whether and to 
which extent they comply with a specific code. Companies listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) are also required to apply a recognised 
corporate governance code but are allowed the flexibility to choose between 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Quoted Companies Alliance 
(QCA) Corporate Governance Code (OECD, 2019a).) 
 
 
Case 3.2. Case study on the flexible and functional approach to say on 
pay in Sweden 
 
Sweden provides an example of how flexibility and proportionality is 
introduced with respect to say on pay in companies that are listed in a 
regulated market. The rules include a mix of statutory requirements, comply 
or explain code and ad-hoc rulings by the self-regulatory body, the Securities 
Council. The statutory provisions are mainly concerned with the decision 
making process, giving shareholders control of the cost. In the interest of 
flexibility the board may still deviate from the remuneration guidelines 
agreed by the shareholder’s meeting if there are particular reasons to do so. 
The Swedish comply or explain code expands beyond the cost and 
recommends an explanation of the link to performance criteria and the 
alignment with shareholder’s interests. But again, these provisions include 
flexibility in terms of comply or explain. The Securities Council has also 








participation in equity schemes and information requirements to the general 
meeting. When formulating these rulings, the Securities Council applies a 
flexible and functional approach that allows criteria such as company size, 




Case3.3. Case study on flexible and proportional disclosure in the 
United States 
 
In the United States, flexible and proportional disclosure is illustrated by 
the scaled disclosure provisions that facilitate access to the public capital 
market for emerging growth companies, with total annual gross revenues of 
less than USD 1.07 billion. The scaled requirements apply both to disclosure 
at the time of the initial public offering and for a defined period after the 
company’s listing. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
also adopted scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies, 
that generally are companies that are below certain threshold with respect to 
the amount of public equity float or total annual revenues. The scaled 
disclosure requirements permit smaller reporting companies to include, for 
example, less extensive narrative disclosure than required of other publicly 
listed companies, particularly in the description of executive compensation. 
The US federal securities laws also provide a certain degree of flexibility and 
proportionality as they relate to certain foreign private issuers and companies 
that offer and sell securities based on exemptions from registration. As 
already mentioned, it is important to recall that these requirements are 
complemented by both public and private enforcement actions and the SEC 






Case3.3. Case study on flexibility and proportionality mechanisms for 
related party transactions in Italy 
 
The flexibility and proportionality mechanisms in the Italian regulatory 
framework for related party transactions are embedded in the design of a 
three-layer system: the Civil Code provides the legal framework and the 
general objectives, the Securities Regulator (Consob) establishes the 
principles for achieving the objectives of the Code and the companies define 
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their own steps to be followed when dealing with related parties. The 
disclosure requirements, for example, in the Consob principles are 
proportionate with respect to the materiality of the transactions in the sense 
that only transactions that exceed certain thresholds must be disclosed. With 
respect to approval procedures, a primary role has been given to independent 
directors. At the same time, the Italian regulatory framework provides a 
proportionate approach by also defining stricter rules with respect to, for 
example, the company’s structure, such as different materiality thresholds for 









































A company shall establish an audit committee, if the extent of the 
company’s business requires that the preparation of the matters pertaining to 
financial reporting and control be done by a body smaller than the entire 
board of directors. 
The members of the audit committee must have sufficient expertise and 
experience with respect to the committee’s area of responsibility and the 
mandatory tasks relating to auditing. 
“The majority of the members of an audit committee must be independent 
of the company and at least one member shall be independent of the 
company’s significant shareholders” (Securities Market Association, 2020). 
In the UK, and most countries, audit is a statutory function which must be 
undertaken by someone appropriately qualified – either a qualified auditor or 
a qualified accountant with appropriate experience. Increasingly also other 
information – such as environmental impact assessments are subject to audit 
by appropriately qualified people. This kind of audit is growing in importance 
but is not yet subject to control such as for financial auditing. 
Although auditors are supposedly impartial, they are appointed by the 
Board of Directors of the company and receive remuneration from the 
company. This has raised questions about their actual independence from the 
company and this is one important issue as far as governance is concerned. It 
should be noted also that an impartial assessment is not always arrived at. For 
example, the accounts of Enron were always audited and confirmed, although 
the auditors – Arthur Andersen – went out of business at the same time as 
Enron did. But more recently the accounts of Lehman Bros were also audited 
and confirmed.  
Every company must have an audit committee. This is an operating 
committee of the Board of Directors charged with oversight of financial 
reporting and disclosure (Fottrell, 2014). Committee members are drawn 
from members of the company’s board of directors. It should contain 
independent directors and at least one member must be qualified as a financial 
expert. The role of audit committees continues to evolve as a result of the 
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (2002). 
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The audit committee will handle the auditor’s report and possible audit 
minutes as well as the supplementary report presented by the auditor to the 
audit committee. If necessary, the audit committee will discuss any key 
factors arising in the course of the aforementioned duties with the auditor. 
The legislation is based on the idea that an audit committee is responsible 
for the aforementioned mandatory auditing duties. If the company has no 
audit committee, the company’s entire board must see to these duties or 
assign them to another committee. If the mandatory auditing duties have been 
assigned to another committee, the composition of that committee must meet 
the requirement for independence and expertise set forth in this 
recommendation. 
An independent audit is an important tool for owners of all types of 
companies, since the auditors’ main role is to verify whether the financial 
statements adequately reflect the real situation of the company. 
The Independent Auditors should give an opinion on thefinancial 
statements to be submitted to the owners and/orthe market, in accordance 
with professional standardsand, for that purpose, assess the company’s 
internalcontrols and procedures. 
The Board of Directors, assisted by its audit committee (if in place), 
should establish the audit plan together with the Independent Auditors and 
reach an agreement on the fees. During the first year, the auditors are getting 
familiar with the company and will naturally devote many more work hours 
than in subsequent years. This should be reflected in their remuneration. 
The auditors should be contracted for a specific number of years in order 
to ensure the independence of their opinions. The contract may be renewed 
after evaluation of independence and performance. 
Some independent auditors are offering both audit and consulting work. 
The Board of Directors, or the Audit Committee (if in place), should make 
sure that there is a clear separation between auditing and consulting. 
Otherwise, it should either contract different consultants, or different 
Independent Auditors. 
The Independent Auditors are selected by the Board of Directors as 
representative of the owners. The Independent Auditors are therefore 
accountable directly or indirectly to the owners. The Independent Auditors’ 
relations with the CEO, the Management and other company employees 
should be at arm’s length and strictly professional. 
The responsibilities of the Fiscal Council are established by Company 
Law. The Independent Auditors are obliged, on request, to give explanations 
and information to the Fiscal Council. In order to avoid conflicts of interest, 
the Independent Auditors should not be members of the Fiscal Council. 








Directors/Audit Committee confirming their independence as per 
recommendations of the Independence Standards Board (Brazilian Institute 
of Corporate Governance, 2016). 
In addition to the aforementioned duties, the duties of the company’s audit 
committee may also comprise, for example, the following (Securities Market 
Association, 2020): 
• monitoring of the financial position of the company; 
• supervision of the financial reporting process and risk management 
process; 
• evaluation of the use and presentation of alternative performance 
measures; 
• approval of the operating instructions for internal audit; 
• handling of the plans and report of the internal audit function; 
• evaluation of the processes aimed at ensuring compliance with laws and 
regulations; 
• establishment of principles concerning the monitoring and assessment 
of related party transactions; 
• other communications with the auditor in addition to the duties required 
by regulations; 
• monitoring of the company’s funding and tax position; 
• monitoring of the significant financial, funding, and tax risks; 
• monitoring of the processes and risks relating to IT security; 
• handling of the company’s corporate governance statement and non-
financial report; and 
• resolution and monitoring of any special issues allocated by the board 
of directors and falling within the competence of the audit committee (such 
as issues relating to the company’s procedures and/or specific risks).  
The duties of the audit committee must be reported in the same manner as 
the duties of the other committees. 
The range of duties of the audit committee is wide. The versatile and 
mutually complementary expertise, competence, and business administration 
experience of the audit committee members contribute to the audit 
committee’s ability to support and challenge the company’s operative 
management in matters falling within the audit committee’s competence. The 
audit committee shall, as a whole – and taking into account the mutually 
complementary expertise, competence, and industry knowledge of its 
members – have sufficient expertise and experience in matters forming part 
of the audit committee’s duties and of the company’s operating environment. 
The audit committee must have sufficient expertise and experience to be 
able to challenge and evaluate the company’s internal accounting function 
and the company’s internal and external audit function. Due to the mandatory 
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auditing duties, legislation also requires that at least one member of the audit 
committee must have expertise in accounting or auditing. Expertise means, 
for example, competence obtained through experience and often also through 
studies or research. For example, serving as a chief financial officer, in other 
demanding financial administrative positions, or as an auditor are typical 
ways to obtain the competence referred to. Other corporate management 
experience can also be assessed to provide sufficient expertise in accounting 
and auditing (Securities Market Association, 2020). 
“Agency theory argues that managers merely act as custodians of the 
organisation and its operational activities and places upon them the burden of 
managing in the best interest of the owners of that business. According to 
agency theory all other stakeholders of the business are largely irrelevant and 
if they benefit from the business then this is coincidental to the activities of 
management in running the business to serve shareholders. This focus upon 
shareholders alone as the intended beneficiaries of a business has been 
questioned considerably from many perspectives, which argue that it is either 
not the way in which a business is actually run or that it is a view which does 
not meet the needs of society in general” (Crowther & Seifi, 2011). 
Conversely, stakeholder theory argues that there is a whole variety of 
stakeholders involved in the organization and each deserves some return for 
their involvement. According to stakeholder theory, therefore benefit is 
maximized if the business is operated by its management on behalf of all 
stakeholders and returns are divided appropriately amongst those 
stakeholders, in some way which is acceptable to all. Unfortunately, a 
mechanism for dividing returns amongst all stakeholders which has universal 
acceptance does not exist, and stakeholder theory is significantly lacking in 
suggestions in this respect. Nevertheless, this theory has some acceptance and 
is based upon the premise that operating a business in this manner achieves 
as one of its outcomes the maximization of returns to shareholders, as part of 
the process of maximizing returns to all other stakeholders. 
“Moral hazard arises where it is difficult or costly for owners to observe 
or infer the amount of effort exerted by managers. In such a situation, there 
is an inevitable temptation for managers to avoid working to the terms of the 
agreed employment contract, since owners are unable to assess the ‘true 
picture’. Managers may also have the incentive as well as the means to 
conceal the ‘true picture’ by misrepresenting the actual outcomes reported to 
the owners. Accounting provides one such means for misrepresentation 
through its ability to represent outcomes from any course of action in more 











A rating agency is a company that devises credit rating – assessments of 
the risk involved – for various financial instruments and their issuers. In some 
cases, the servicers of the underlying debt are also given ratings. In most 
cases, the issuers of such securities are companies, state and local 
governments, not-for-profit organizations and NGOs or national 
governments issuing debt-like securities (e.g. bonds) that can be traded on a 
secondary market. A credit rating for an issuer takes into consideration the 
issuer’s credit worthiness (i.e., its ability to pay back the loan), and affects 
the rate of interest applied to the particular security being issued. In theory 
the role of the rating agency is to provide an impartial assessment – based 
upon their expertise and research – to potential lenders in order to compensate 
for the inevitable information asymmetry between borrower and lender. 
Regulation 
The company must regularly control and monitor its activities to ensure 
the efficiency and results of its business operations. The board of directors 
shall ensure that the company has defined the operating principles for internal 
control and that the company monitors the functioning of the internal control. 
The purpose of the operating principles for internal control is to ensure 
that the company’s objectives relating to matters such as the company’s 
strategy, operations, practices, and especially financial reporting, are 
achieved. The operating principles for internal control also help to ensure that 
the company complies with all applicable laws and regulations. 
“Each company shall define its methods and operating principles for 
internal control on the basis of its own circumstances taking into account, 
inter alia, the size of the company, its line of business, the geographical scope 






1. What is information asymmetry? 
2. What is the main purpose of audit and how does the Audit Committee help 
this purpose? 
3. How do rating agencies help to solve information asymmetry? 
4. Why the role of regulation is important in corporate governance? 
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Questions to discuss 
 
1. Consider the examples of information asymmetry on different markets. 
How can this problem be solved? 
2. What does agency theory assume? 
3. Discuss the duties of Audit Committee. 
4. Discuss the the statement: “…Each company shall define its methods 
and operating principles for internal control on the basis of its own 
circumstances taking into account, inter alia, the size of the company, its line 
of business, the geographical scope of its operations, and its group structure” 





Case 4.2. Case study on the disclosure of major share ownership in 
Japan 
 
Japan provides a number of examples of flexibility and proportionality 
with respect to share ownership. The most important criterion for exception 
relates to changes in ownership by certain financial institutions for which the 
rules are relaxed in terms of the frequency of reporting and the deadlines for 
filings. The rationale is that strict adherence to the default rules would result 
in excess paperwork and impede smooth transactions of listed stocks. There 
are two important qualifications for using this exemption; the institution is 
not allowed to use its ownership to influence the company’s business in any 
important way and the ownership cannot exceed 10% of the company shares. 
Other exemptions from the general reporting requirements include the 
disclosure of treasury shares held by listed companies, since they do not carry 
any voting rights. 
 
 
Case 4.3. Case study on flexible and proportional provisions for 
takeovers in Portugal 
 
As the case study of Portugal illustrates, even within a national statutory 
framework, several provisions for flexibility and proportionality are typically 
applied. Some of them are of principal interest. First is the fact that the 
Portuguese Securities Commission has discretionary power to make an 
independent assessment of whether a change in control actually has occurred 








one-third of the voting rights. Circumstances that may influence the judgment 
on actual control include the specific shareholder structure (including the 
presence of shareholder agreements) and the target company’s free float. 
Other examples include instances where someone gains control as a 
consequence of a voluntary bid, a merger or as the result of a financial 












































According to Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2019) a “listed company should pay 
director remuneration sufficient to attract and retain high quality directors and 
design its executive remuneration to attract, retain and motivate high quality 
senior executives and to align their interests with the creation of value for 
security holders and with the entity’s values and risk appetite”. 
 “The board of a listed entity should have a remuneration committee. It 
has at least three members, a majority of whom are independent directors; 
and is chaired by an independent directos. The board of a listed entity 
shoulddisclosethe charter of the committee; the members of the committee; 
and as at the end of each reporting period, the number of times the committee 
met throughout the period and the individual attendances of the members at 
those meetings. If it does not have a remuneration committee, disclose that 
fact and the processes it employs for setting the level and composition of 
remuneration for directors and senior executives and ensuring that such 
remuneration is appropriate and not excessive” (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2019). 
Remuneration is a key driver of culture and a key focus for investors. 
Remuneration of senior management increasingly requires shareholder 
approval at a general meeting on the policy and various components of 
compensation of executives. The European Commission’s recommendation 
on remuneration of directors in listed companies (Commission 
Recommendation 2004/913/EC) introduced the concept of say on pay into 
the European Union corporate governance agenda. 
The Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) improves 
transparency on remuneration policies and individual remuneration of 
directors, as well as granting shareholders the right to vote on remuneration 
policy and the remuneration report. As part of a broader agenda to encourage 
shareholder engagement in their investee companies, the EU Commission has 
published proposals concerning say on pay relating to a revised Shareholder 
Rights Directive (Directive (EU) 2017/828). 
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According to the Commission, companies should benefit from 
remuneration policies that stimulate longer-term value creation, and 
executive pay should be linked to performance. Poor remuneration policies 
and/or incentive structures lead to unjustified transfers of value from 
companies, their shareholders, and other stakeholders to executives. The 
Commission’s goal is to enhance transparency on remuneration policies and 
individual remuneration of directors by granting shareholders the mandatory 
right to vote on remuneration policy and the remuneration report. 
The remuneration committee can focus on the development of the 
remuneration schemes of the managing director and the other management 
team, as well as on the remuneration principles observed by the company, 
more efficiently than the entire board of directors. The establishment of the 
remuneration committee promotes the transparency and systematic 
functioning of the company’s remuneration schemes and the development of 
the company’s intellectual capital and the organisation’s competence, as well 
as successor planning (Securities Market Association, 2020). 
The duties of the remuneration committee are established in the charter to 
be adopted for the committee. In addition to the preparation of the 
remuneration policy and report, the remuneration committee’s duties can 
include: 
• the presentation of the remuneration policy and report in the general 
meeting and responding to questions related there to; 
• the preparation of the appointment of the managing director and the rest 
of the management team as well as successor planning; 
• the preparation and assessment of the remuneration of the managing 
director and the rest of the management team; and 
 • planning of matters pertaining to the remuneration of other personnel 
and the development of the organisation. 
The duties of the remuneration committee shall be published in the same 
manner as the duties of other committees. 
The majority of the members of the committee shall be independent of the 
company. Neither the company’s managing director nor other board members 
in the management team may be members of the committee. 
When carrying out its duties, the remuneration committee shall act 
independently with relation to the operative management of the company. If 
the remuneration committee uses an external advisor to assist in carrying out 
its duties, the committee shall ensure that the advisor is not also an advisor to 
the operative management in a manner that can result in a conflict of interest 












1. What is a remuneration? 
2. Define the essense if the remuneration committee. 
3. Name the duties of remuneration committee. 
 
 
Questions to discuss 
 
1. Consider and discuss remuneration policy in famous listed companies. 
2. Do the remuneration committee understand all the reward structures in 
operation, how they operate and how they interact with each other?  How do 
these structures broadly operate, how were they determined and what isthe 
range of likely outcomes? 
3. Has remuneration committee appropriately considered what is and what is 



































CHAPTER 6  
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION ON CHANGES IN 




The Concept of Global Governance 
“All systems of governance are concerned primarily with managing the 
governing of associations and therefore with political authority, institutions, 
and, ultimately, control. Governance in this particular sense denotes formal 
political institutions that aim to coordinate and control interdependent social 
relations and that have the ability to enforce decisions. Increasingly however, 
in a globalized world, the concept of governance is being used to describe the 
regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of overarching political 
authority, such as in the international system” (Crowther,& Seifi, 2011). 
“Thus, global governance can be considered as the management of global 
processes in the absence of any form of global government. There are some 
international bodies which seek to address these issues and prominent among 
these are the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Each of these 
has met with mixed success in instituting some form of governance in 
international relations but is part of a recognition of the problem and an 
attempt to address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of 
individual states to solve” (Rosenau, 1999). 
To use the term global governance is not of course to imply that such a 
system actually exists, let alone to consider the effectiveness of its operations. 
It is merely to recognize that in this increasingly globalized world there is a 
need for some form of governance to deal with multinational and global 
issues. The term global governance therefore is a descriptive term, 
recognizing the issue and referring to concrete cooperative problem-solving 
arrangements. These may be formal, taking the shape of laws or formally 
constituted institutions to manage collective affairs by a variety of actors – 
including states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), other civil society actors, private sector organizations, 
pressure groups and individuals. The system also includes of course informal 
(as in the case of practices or guidelines) or temporary units (as in the case of 
coalitions). 
Thus, global governance can be considered to be the complex of formal 
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and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between 
and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-
governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are 
articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are 
mediated. 
How Globalization Affects Governance 
The question might be how globalization affects governance. But the 
answer to this question is not only related to the last quarter of the 20th 
century but also related to previous centuries. John Maynard Keynes 
calculated that the standard of living had increased 100 percent over four 
thousand years. Adam Smith had a seminal idea about the wealth of 
communities and in 1776 he described conditions which would lead to 
increasing income and prosperity. Similarly, there is much evidence from 
economic history to demonstrate the benefit of moral behavior; for example, 
Robert Owen in New Lanark, and Jedediah Strutt in Derbyshire – both in the 
UK – showed the economic benefits of caring for stakeholders. More recently 
Friedman has paid attention to the moral impact of the economic growth and 
development of society (Friedman, 1962). 
According to international norms, (practice) and expectations, companies 
have to take into account social, ethical and environmental issues more than 
during the last two decades. One of the reasons is more competition and not 
always more profit; another reason is consumer expectation is not only related 
to the cost of products but also related to quality, proper production process 
and environmental sensitivity. 
Moreover, shareholders are more interested in long term benefit and profit 
from the company. The key word of this concept is long termism which 
represents also a sustainable company. Shareholders want to get long term 
benefit with a sustainable company instead of only short-term profit. This is 
not only related to the company profit but also related to the social and 
environmental performance of the company. Thus, managers have to make 
strategic plans for the company concerning all stakeholder expectations 
which are sustainable and provide long term benefit for the companies with 
their investments. However, Sustainability can be seen as including the 
requirement that whatever justice is about – fair distribution of goods, fair 
procedures, respect for rights and social justice – and is capable of being 
sustained into the future indefinitely. 
“Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and various other failures of global 
corporations bring out some governance issues and have increased attention 
to the role of business ethics. Managers and CEOs of these companies must 
be considered responsible for all of these failures and these are cases of 








were to behave responsibly, most probably corporate scandals would stop” 
(Crowther & Seifi, 2011). 
Corporate governance protects firms against some long-term loss. When 
corporations have social responsibilities, they calculate their risk and the cost 
of failure. Firstly, a company has to have responsibility to shareholders and 
also all stakeholders which means that it has responsibility to all society. 
Corporate failures have an important impact on all society also. In particular, 
big scandals such as Enron have sharply affected the market and the 
economy. Various stakeholders (e.g. employee, customer, consumer, 
suppliers etc.) as well as shareholders and regulators of the firm have a 
responsibility to ensure good performance. Therefore, corporate governance 
is not only related to firms but also related to all society. 
Concentrated ownership structures are a common feature in Asian 
economies while dispersed structures are less typical, though there are 
noteworthy differences between jurisdictions. While the People’s Republic 
of China (hereafter China) and Viet Nam, for example, are characterised by 
substantial state ownership, India and Korea maintain significant family 
ownership structures. Understanding ownership structures in Asia is critical 
to ensuring the development of effective corporate governance standards 
(OECD, 2017). 
China. Listed companies in China are characterised by concentrated 
ownership. Only a small portion of shares of listed companies are held by 
individual or foreign investors, with average ownership equaling 2.38% and 
2.66%, respectively (OECD, 2017). Government and institutional investors 
hold large portions of shares, with 31.27% and 19.86%, respectively.3 The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange have 2 887 
listed companies (1 781 and 1 106 respectively) with a total market 
capitalisation of USD 6.966 trillion (WFE, 2017). Regulators/Custodians of 
the codes and principles in China are Ministry of Finance, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, Stated-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission. There are Non-profit institutions that promote 
better CG practices in China: Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, China Association for Public Companies. Key national corporate 
governance code and principles consist of The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China. 
Italy. Italian companies are in most cases incorporated and operating as 
corporations, i.e. limited liability company (società a responsabilità limitata) 
or joint stock company (società per azioni) (Legal 500). 
On the one hand, private companies are usually incorporated as limited 
liability companies – small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or closely-
held – or joint stock companies. On the other hand, public companies, i.e. 
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companies with shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, are 
typically incorporated as joint stock companies or cooperative companies 
limited by shares (as limited liability companies cannot be listed). 
It is worth noting that, while limited liability companies issue “quotas” – 
which are not securities from a legal standpoint, therefore investors are called 
“quotaholders” – joint stock companies issue shares. Shareholder activism 
and engagement have kept growing and gaining strength in the past years. 
Following the national implementation of Shareholder Rights Directive II 
(BNY Mellon, 2020), we expect such trend to increase even more in the 
Italian financial markets, also in light of the publishing of the new CG Code 
occurred in January 2020 (Italian Corporate Governance Committee, 2020). 
On a different note, strengthening corporate governance will be of pivotal 
importance for Italian companies (listed and non-listed), with a specific focus 
on internal control systems and procedures, as well as regulatory/compliance 
schemes, such as those related to the liability of legal entities for crimes 
committed in their interest or to their advantage (under Legislative Decree 
231/2001), data protection (under the General Data Protection Regulation and 
its national implementing and supplementing measures), whistleblowing, IT 
and cyber risks, AML (FIDH, HRIC, & ECCJ, 2019). 
Finally, it is expected companies and regulators to focus on the 
interactions between innovation and corporate governance (e.g. crypto-
assets, FinTech, AI and technology within the corporation, etc.) (Legal 500). 
France. French companies may take any of the following limited-liability 
corporate forms: 
 the société anonyme (‘SA’) is the most common corporate form for 
the largest companies (whether listed or not). An SA shall have at least seven 
shareholders (if it is listed) or two shareholders (if it is not listed), and a share 
capital of at least €37,000 represented by negotiable shares. Most French 
listed companies are SA. The legal regime applicable to the SA is governed 
by detailed rules with respect to corporate governance and shareholders’ 
rights; 
 the société par actions simplifiée (‘SAS’) is a very common corporate 
form for small and large non-listed companies (an SAS may not be listed). 
An SAS shall have at least one shareholder, its share capital is represented by 
negotiable shares (but there is no minimum share capital requirement). The 
main advantage of the SAS, as compared to that of an SA, is that its legal 
regime is very flexible in terms of corporate governance and shareholders’ 
rights. Most newly incorporated French companies, or French companies 
changing their corporate form, take the form of an SAS; 
 the société en commandite par actions (‘SCA’) is a much less common 








that of the SA. An SCA shall have at least four partners (whether it is listed 
or not), and a share capital of at least €37,000 represented by negotiable 
shares. The main characteristic, and difference from the SA, of an SCA is that 
certain of its partners are unlimited-liability partners (e.g., founders and heirs) 
while the other partners are limited-liability shareholders, with the unlimited-
liability partners often managing and controlling the SCA. The SCA has 
proved to be an efficient defence against unsolicited takeovers; 
 the société à responsabilité limitée (‘SARL’) is a traditional corporate 
form for closely held companies (e.g., family businesses). An SARL shall 
have at least one and no more than 100 limited-liability partners. There is no 
minimum share capital requirement. The share capital of an SARL is 
represented by non-negotiable shares (‘parts sociales’), meaning that any 
transfer of SARL shares is subject to legal formalities and, under most 
circumstances, restrictions such as a prior approval by the other partners; or 
 the European company or societas europaea (‘SE’) is governed by 
European regulations and, for SE having their registered office in France, the 
legal regime applicable to the SA. Certain technicalities for the constitution, 
organization and functioning of an SE and the fact that one of its main 
advantages is the possibility to transfer its registered office within the 
European Union makes it appropriate for large companies having European 
or worldwide activities. Ten of the SBF 120 listed companies (i.e., the 120 
largest companies listed on Euronext Paris) are SE. 
New trends in Freanch corporate governance are: 
1. The legal developments and new campaigns relating to shareholder 
activism. 
2. The steady increase of the role and participation of significant 
shareholders in the review and determination of the compensation of the 
board members and executive officers of listed companies. 
3. The recent reforms of the legal regime applicable to preferred shares 
issued by non-listed companies, which are intended to significantly increase 
the use of such instruments. 
Japan. The most common corporate entity form in Japan is a stock 
company (kabushiki kaisha or KK), and its organisational structure typically 
consists of (i) shareholders, (ii) a board of directors, (iii) representative 
directors and (iv) statutory auditors, with some notable exceptions (see 
question 2). 
Stock companies may generally be divided into two groups according to 
the restrictions on the transfer of shares by their articles of incorporation 
(Legal 500): 
1. Closed KKs. Closed KKs require the company’s approval for any 
acquisition or transfer of the company’s shares. In numbers, most existing 
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KKs are closed KKs. Closed KKs may simplify the organisational structure, 
and some organs, like board of directors, representative directors, or statutory 
auditors may not be mandatory. 
2. Open KKs. Open KKs are companies without articles of incorporation 
requiring the approval of the company for acquisition or transfer of all or part 
of their shares. Generally, only securities issued by open KKs can be listed 
on a securities exchange in Japan. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is the 
most well-known securities exchange in Japan and is one of the largest equity 
markets in the world, listing over 3,700 companies (as of January 31, 2020), 
including major Japanese companies. 
The applicable requirements and practice thereunder regarding corporate 
governance may significantly differ depending on whether a company is 
closed KK or open KK, and whether the company is listed or not. In order to 
simplify the discussion, however, we assume that the corporate entities 
mainly discussed herein are listed companies on the TSE, unless otherwise 
noted. 
The three most significant issues influencing corporate governance trends 
over the next two years are (Legal 500): 
First, the 2019 CA Amendment will come into effect by June 11, 2021. 
Not only the amended provisions themselves, but we also anticipate seeing 
significant updates on the corporate governance environment in connection 
with the 2019 CA Amendment, such as the requirement that there be at least 
one independent officer for a listed company (see question 7), and discussions 
regarding potential future revisions of the CGC, and the like. 
Second, the role of independent directors will become more important. 
Based on recent discussions on corporate governance in Japan, it will be 
indispensable for them to be actively involved in discussions regarding 
appointment and dismissal of top management such as CEOs, and 
remuneration for members of the governing body. 
Third, it is still very important for listed companies to improve the 
contents of their disclosures. While the form and requirements regarding 
disclosure have been expanded or modified year to year, each listed company 
should keep in mind what information shareholders and investors really want. 
At the same time, the role of shareholders is becoming more important, 
encouraging them to review company disclosure material more carefully and 
to engage in fruitful dialogue with the company for the sustainable growth 














1. How does globalization affect corporate governance? 
2. Why is global governance an issue and what form might it take? 
3. Is irresponsible management the reason for the big corporate scandals? 
 
 
Questions to discuss 
 
1. Consider and discuss the future trends in corporate governance. 
2. How has corporate covernance changed in China? 
3. How has corporate covernance changed in France? 
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Numerous reports have been produced in recent years in many countries 
focusing on corporate governance. In 1999, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a set of principles, 
Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999), to assist member and 
nonmember governments in their efforts to “evaluate and improve the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance” and to 
“provide guidance and suggestions” for various stakeholders in corporate 
governance.  
Corporate governance deals with the way corporations are managed and 
governed. As a new term, corporate governance suffers from a lack of 
definition and can mean many different things to different people.  
According to the OECD (1999), “Corporate governance . . . involves a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring” (OECD, 1999, 
p. 1)  
The OECD principles deal with, among other issues, the rights and fair 
treatment of various groups of shareholders, the role of various stakeholders, 
the importance of disclosure and transparency of information, and the 
responsibility of the board. They clarify the notion that the board of directors 
has the ultimate responsibility for governing (not operating on a day-to-day 
basis) a company. The OECD principles formed the basis of the corporate 
governance component of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund’s 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). 
In April 2004, the member governments of the OECD ratified a revised 
Code of Corporate Governance that would give shareholders stronger rights 
in most of the member countries. The revised principles emphasize, among 
other things, that auditors should be accountable to shareholders, not 
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management, and that boards of directors should effectively oversee the 
financial reporting function, ensuring that appropriate systems of control are 
in place. The principles are designed to strengthen corporate governance 
practices in companies around the world. The International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) has its own task force on Rebuilding Credibility in 
Financial Reporting.  
 
Note 
IFAC comprises more than 160 professional accounting bodies from 
throughout the world, representing more than 2.5 million accountants in 
public practice, education, the public sector, industry, and commerce. 
 
In March 2003, to support this task force, IFAC introduced a new Internet 
resource center entitled “Viewpoints: Governance, Accountability and the 
Public Trust.” In a report published in early 2008, based on a survey 
conducted in 2007, titled Financial Reporting Supply Chain – Current 
Perspectives and Directions, IFAC identifies positive areas, areas of concern, 
and areas for further improvements. With regard to the positive, the report 
states that there is increased awareness that good corporate governance 
counts; there are new codes and standard improvements in board structure, 
risk management, and internal control; and more disclosure and transparency 
in business and financial reporting. The report identifies five areas of 
concern: governance in name but not in spirit; overregulation; the 
development of a checklist mentality; personal risk and liability for company 
directors and senior management; and cost-benefit concerns. IFAC makes 
improvements in the areas of behavioral and cultural aspects of governance; 
review of existing rules, since many have been introduced as a response to 
crises; quality of directors; the relationship of remuneration to performance; 
expanding the view from compliance governance to business governance. 
IFAC guidance on corporate governance addresses risks and organizational 
accountability. The Professional Accountants in Business (PAIB) Committee 
of IFAC has released a new International Good Practice Guidance document 
entitled “Evaluating and Improving Governance in Organizations” (PAIB 
Committee, 2009). The new guidance to professional accountants in business 
includes a framework, a series of fundamental principles, supporting 
guidance, and references on how they can contribute to evaluating and 
improving governance in organizations. In February 2008, the FRC in the 
United Kingdom published The Audit Quality Framework (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2008). The FRC states that it will assist companies (in 
evaluating audit proposals), audit committees (in undertaking annual 








evaluating the policies and actions taken by audit firms to ensure that high-
quality audits are performed, whether in the United Kingdom or overseas), 
and regulators (when undertaking and reporting on their monitoring of the 
audit profession). The Framework identifies the following key drivers of 
audit quality: 
1. The culture within an audit firm. 
2. The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff. 
3. The effectiveness of the audit process. 
4. The reliability and usefulness of audit reporting. 
5. Factors outside the control of auditors affecting audit quality.  
In the United States, proposals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) for 
better corporate governance include the following: 
 A new oversight board for the accountancy profession: the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
 Certification by chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial 
officers (CFOs) regarding financial statements and internal controls. 
 A tightened definition of “independent” audit committee members. 
 A requirement for external auditors to report directly to audit 
committee. 
 Prohibitions on certain nonaudit services by external auditors. 
 Tougher penalties for financial statement fraud.  
 Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (2002), the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) introduced several new listing requirements: 
 Corporate boards must have a majority of independent directors. 
 Listed companies must have audit, compensation, and monitoring 
committees composed entirely of independent directors. 
 Nonmanagement directors must meet at regularly scheduled executive 
sessions without management.  
 For a director to be deemed independent, the board must affirmatively 
determine that the director has no material relationship with the listed 
company. 
 Listed companies must have an internal audit function. 
 Companies must adopt and disclose governance guidelines, codes of 
business conduct, and charters for their audit, compensation, and nominating 
committees.  
In December 2007, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) published a Staff Audit Practice Alert (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, 2007b) on the audit of fair value measurements 
in financial statements. The alert provides auditors with additional 
information related to auditing fair value measurements and disclosures.  
The results of a survey of senior executives at U.S.-based MNCs, 
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published in July 2004, show that a majority of the companies (over 60 
percent) had made compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) part of 
their regular corporate governance approach and had integrated it with other 
regulatory activities.  
The common issues concerning corporate governance include the quality 
of published information, internal controls, independent directors, auditor 
independence, audit committees, ethical conduct, and treatment of financial 
statement fraud.  
The measures that have been taken around the world by governments, 
worldwide regulators, IFAC, accountancy organizations, and others to 
strengthen and improve corporate governance rules, regulations, and audit 
standards have had an impact on the operations of MNCs to the extent that 
some MNCs now include a separate section in their annual reports explaining 
corporate governance issues. 
 
Example 
The following excerpt from the 2009 annual report of the Volkswagen 
Group in Germany is an example. 
Sustainable economic success can only be generated in our company if 
we comply with national and international rules and standards, because that 
is the only way to strengthen the trust of our customers and investors. 
Transparent and responsible corporate governance takes the highest priority 
in our daily work. That’s why the Board of Management and the Supervisory 
Board of Volkswagen AG comply with the recommendations of the current 
German Corporate Governance Code (Government Commission, 2009) as 
issued on June 18, 2009, with only a few exceptions.  
 
Auditing issues, concerning both external and internal auditing, are 
directly linked to corporate governance. External auditing provides assurance 
to financial statement users that the information contained in those statements 
is of high quality. Monitoring risks and providing assurance regarding 
controls are two main internal auditing functions. Monitoring risks involves 
identifying risks, assessing their potential effect on the organization, 
determining the strategy to minimize them, and monitoring the possibility for 
new risks. As a result of recent credit market conditions, the risks to 
confidence in corporate reporting and governance are higher than they have 
been for some years. Companies may find that their precise circumstances 
are not expressly provided for in the standards. In fact this is one of the 
strengths of principles-based standards. In a multinational context, the 
linkages between auditing and corporate governance can be explained in 











Figure 7.1 International Auditing and Corporate Governance 
 
There are two main theories of corporate governance, namely, agency 
theory and stakeholder theory. According to agency theory, corporate 
governance emphasizes shareholder value, and board composition is 
determined by shareholder election (this view is predominant in the Anglo-
American system). In contrast, the German system embraces a wider set of 
stakeholders with some stakeholder groups (such as employees) having a 
legal right to elect members of the supervisory board. However, the past 
decade has seen the emergence of several hybrid (or at least aligned) 
stakeholder–agency approaches, which recognize that if shareholders are to 






1. What are the main differences between the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance issued in 1999 and the revised version issued in 
2004? 
2. What are the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the New 
York Stock Exchange listing requirements that are aimed at improving 
Corporate Governance and are directly related to audit committees? 
3. What determines the primary role of external auditing in a particular 
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4. What is audit quality? What determines audit quality in a given country? 























































External auditing is the first line of enforcement of legal and professional 
requirements concerning financial reporting. Given the prevalence of MNCs 
and the audit of nondomestic companies, issues related to international 
auditing are becoming increasingly important. However, there are major 
variations in many aspects of external auditing across different countries. 
These aspects include the purpose of external auditing, the audit environment, 
the regulation of auditing, and audit reports. 
Purpose of Auditing 
The external auditor’s primary concern is whether the financial statements 
are free of material misstatement. In recent years, an increasing number of 
companies revealing “financial accounting irregularities” in their past 
financial statements and causing heavy financial losses to investors around 
the world has created considerable problems for the accounting profession, 
particularly in view of the fact that many of these companies had received 
clean audit reports from large international accounting firms. The investors 
raised doubts about the integrity of financial information disclosed by large 
corporations. The question often asked by investors and other interested 
parties is “Where was the auditor?” However, this is not new; the same 
question has been asked on many occasions in the past. For example, 
following the global financial market crisis that emerged from Asia in 1997 
and 1998, the World Bank asked international accounting firms to refuse to 
give clean audit reports for financial statements that had not been prepared in 
accordance with internationally acceptable accounting standards. Later, 
commenting on the causes of the Asian financial crisis, an official of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pointed to the failures of 
(1) company accounts to show billions of dollars of debt, allowing companies 
to continue borrowing with no hope of repayment and (2) auditing to detect 
the vulnerabilities (Turner, 2001). 
The role of the auditor can vary in different countries. For example, in 
Germany the role of the statutory auditor is much wider compared to that of 
his or her counterparts in the United Kingdom or the United States. The UK 
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Companies Act of 1989 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The Parliament, 1989), which requires that audits of large and 
medium-sized companies must be performed by a registered auditor, 
specifies that the role of the auditor is to report to shareholders whether the 
financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position and 
results of operations of the company and whether the financial reports have 
been properly prepared in accordance with the provisions of the act (Section 
235). In Germany, Section 316 of the German Commercial Code (Germany. 
Federal Office of Justice, 1897) requires that in addition to financial 
statements, an auditor should examine management reports of large and 
medium-sized corporations. The role of the statutory auditor in Germany is 
legally defined by the Auditors’ Regulation and the German Commercial 
Code. German auditors take a much broader view of the concept of “client” 
than their counterparts in the United Kingdom or the United States. It is less 
problematic for German auditors to view the state and thus society as in part 
constituting the client (Baker, 2001).  
A country’s corporate governance structure seems to be a major factor 
that determines the purpose of external auditing. In Anglo-Saxon traditions, 
auditors’ primary reporting responsibilities are to the shareholders of 
companies. However, this is not the case in some other countries, which have 
different corporate structures. In some European countries, a two-tiered board 
of directors is required for a public company, in that in addition to the 
management board, a company is also required to have a supervisory board. 
In Germany, for example, limited liability companies (public companies and 
private companies with over 500 employees) are required to appoint a 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) to oversee the management board 
(Vorstand). The management board is composed solely of insiders and is 
responsible for the company’s daily business activity, whereas the 
supervisory board has general oversight functions and is responsible for 




The supervisory board consists of directors who are representatives of 
employees, creditors, and shareholder groups. The duties of the supervisory 
board as set out in the German Commercial Code (Germany. Federal Office 
of Justice, 1897) are as follows: The supervisory board supervises the 
management of the corporation in all branches of its administration. For that 
purpose members of the supervisory board have the right to ask the 
management for information, to have access to the books of account, and to 








the balance sheet and the application of profits suggested by the management 
(Vorstand). The supervisory board is required to call a general assembly if it 
is deemed necessary and is in the interests of the corporation (Article 225a, 
1870 Amendment to the German Commercial Code (Germany. Federal 
Office of Justice, 1897)). 
 
The German Commercial Code (Germany. Federal Office of Justice, 
1897) establishes a duty for the supervisory board to conduct audits of the 
financial statements presented by the management to the shareholders’ 
general meeting. It was envisaged that the supervisory board would perform 
substantive corporate governance. As accounting valuation issues became 
increasingly complex, supervisory boards started to use external auditors to 
fulfill their audit and control duties. This was the beginning of the 
development of the profession of external auditors in Germany. Historically, 
the German auditor’s primary reporting responsibility is to the supervisory 
board and not to shareholders, as in the Anglo-Saxon traditions. The basic 
function of the statutory auditor in Germany is to assist the supervisory board, 
and the audit report is normally addressed to the supervisory board, which 
engages the auditor. 
In China, many former state-owned enterprises are being redefined to 
create new economic enterprises that will be looking to list their securities on 
domestic and foreign stock exchanges. However, these enterprises do not 
conform to the Anglo-Saxon concept of an accounting entity:  
In China, the principal business of a geographical region or Province 
might have been historically designated as the reporting entity, and made 
responsible for the education and health care of its citizens as well as 
employment and production. The State is now “carving out” business 
enterprises from these former social and economic units so they can be 
established as independent businesses. These newly “carved-out” enterprises 
are just now encountering the Western concept of entity (Graham, 1996). 
These enterprises will still have many related-party transactions with 
formerly related business units that are now outside the new entity. There will 
also be intercompany transactions involving these units. The auditor’s role or 
responsibilities in defining the boundaries of these entities and reviewing 
their transactions becomes unclear.  
 
Example 
In China, some public companies have a supervisory committee, 
somewhat similar to the German supervisory board. The 2009 annual report 
of China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd., for example, includes a separate 
report of the supervisory committee, in addition to the auditors’ report; this 
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report states, In 2009, the members of the Supervisory Committee, basing 
themselves on the powers bestowed upon them by the Company Law and the 
Articles of Association of the Company and their sense of responsibility 
toward all the shareholders, actively carried out their tasks, faithfully 
performed their supervisory duties, and protected the legitimate rights and 
interests of the Company and of all the shareholders. 
 
Audit Environments 
Cultural values in different countries can have an impact on the nature 
and quality of the audit work undertaken. For example, the perceptions of 
auditor’s ethical conduct may be influenced by cultural norms. Similarly, the 
perceptions of auditor independence may vary as a result of underlying 
cultural and environmental differences across countries. Therefore, culture 
may be helpful in understanding the differences in auditor behavior patterns 
in different countries (Soeters & Schreuder, 1988). For example, the concept 
of an independent auditor is neither historically nor culturally appropriate in 
Japan, and legal liability suits against Japanese auditors are almost 
nonexistent (McKinnon, 1983). The exercise of legal rights in a court of law 
is not in accordance with the underlying Japanese beliefs in the maintenance 
of harmony in interpersonal and intergroup relationships and the avoidance 
of open confrontation (Mueller, 1985). 
Chinese cultural values - including respect for seniors, the desire to avoid 
confrontation and look for agreeable compromises, and the concern for 
“saving face” - are likely to have implications in the audit judgment area. 
Further, history also plays a part in shaping the practice of auditing in China. 
As Graham explains: 
 
Example 
One culture shock for auditors steeped in the “risk-based audit” concepts 
of the 1980s, is the statutory limitation on allowances for doubtful accounts 
or the rule limiting the application of lower [ sic ] cost or market 
considerations for Chinese inventories. . . . This practice is steeped in the 
State enterprise system, where all products were perceived as useful for 
something, someday, thereby obviating the need for obsolescence reserves or 
written-downs. Foreign enterprises may now create an allowance for doubtful 
accounts of up to 3 percent of ending accounts receivable. Bad debt allowance 
accounts for Chinese enterprises are limited to between 1/3 to 1/2 percent of 
ending accounts receivable. . . . Since enterprises historically were, and most 
still are, State owned, State credit was always by definition “good,” and bad 
debt provisions were/are generally unnecessary. There seems to be a “go-








Chinese principles to accommodate the expectations of business partners 
from more advanced nations (Graham, 1996). 
 
The various environmental factors affecting auditing issues can be 
identified in terms of a broad concept often referred to as the accounting 
infrastructure, which includes producers of information; final users of 
information; information intermediaries; laws and regulations that govern the 
production, transmission, and usage of information; and legal entities that 
monitor and implement the laws and regulations (Lee, 1987). 
In less developed countries, in particular, creditors and investors play a 
minimal role in the accounting infrastructure and so a less developed auditing 
profession, compared to that in a developed country, would be expected. 
Further, the primary source of finance in a country may influence the degree 
to which the audit profession in that country has evolved. Countries in which 
the primary source of capital is absentee owners (stockholders) and creditors 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia may have a 
much greater need for audit services and more sophisticated audit procedures 
compared to those countries in which state-controlled banks or commercial 
banks are the primary source of capital. In a debt-financing country such as 
Japan, for example, there may be a much reduced need for audited 
information or reliance on public financial information. 
Different legal systems are also likely to influence auditing in different 
countries. For example, a codified Roman law system that exists in countries 
such as Germany and France may require more reliance on the stated legal 
objectives of the auditing profession. Countries with a common law system, 
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, or New Zealand, may allow audit 
characteristics to develop more freely or rely more on the auditing profession 
to set a general tone for the profession (Wood, 1996).  
The differences in the environment in which auditing operates can have 
implications for the transfer of auditing technology among countries. The 
international diversity in accounting and securities market regulations and 
practices, economic and political systems, patterns of business ownership, 
size and complexity of business firms, and stages of economic development 
would affect the nature of the demand for audit services and the complexity 
of the audit task. Therefore, audit technologies which are cost-beneficial in 
one national setting can be ineffective, or even dysfunctional, in a different 
setting (Chow & Hwang, 1994). 
Further, audit quality is also likely to vary across different audit 
environments. Audit quality can be defined as the probability that an error or 
irregularity is detected and reported (DeAngelo, 1981). The detection 
probability is affected by the actual work done by auditors to reach their 
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opinion. This in turn is influenced by the level of competence of the auditors 
(eligibility and qualifications), the requirements regarding the conduct of the 
audit (quality review and monitoring), and the reporting requirements. The 
reporting probability is affected by the auditor’s independence. High 
independence implies a high probability of publicly reporting a detected 
material error or irregularity.  
Audit quality is also affected by the nature of the legal liability regime 
that exists in a country (we also discuss auditor liability later in this chapter). 
A strong liability regime will provide incentives for auditors to be 
independent and produce high-quality audits. In some Asian countries, for 
example, this is an unlikely scenario, because (due to cultural and other 
reasons) the liability regimes may not be strong and violations of professional 
conduct may go unpunished. This creates audit markets of uneven quality. In 
some countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, fraud and 
irregularities are required to be reported to the board of directors, not in the 
audit report (Favere-Marchesi, 2000).  
Regulation of Auditors and Audit Firms 
The approaches taken to regulate auditing in different countries range 
from those that leave the task largely in the hands of the profession to those 
that rely heavily on the government. In Anglo-Saxon countries, mechanisms 
are put in place to regulate auditors within the framework of professional self-
regulation. In the United States, PCAOB, composed of five independent 
members (not more than two of whom may be professional accountants), was 
established in 2002 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). This act reaffirms the necessity 
for the auditor to be independent of management, in fact and appearance, and 
expands the auditor’s reporting responsibility. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), “Management Assessment of Internal Controls,” requires 
public companies to include in their annual report an assessment by 
management of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting. The external auditor must attest to and 
report on that assessment. Accordingly, the PCAOB issued an audit standard, 
“An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in 
Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements”, which was approved by 
the SEC in June 2004 (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
2004a). The new standard requires two audit opinions: one on internal control 
over financial reporting and one on the financial statements. 
Auditors of SEC-registered companies are required to be members of the 
PCAOB. This also includes non-U.S. audit firms that audit the accounts of a 
company or subsidiary (domestic or foreign) listed on a U.S. stock exchange. 








quality control standards, and ethical rules in relation to the conduct of audits 
of public companies and (2) to inspect audit firms. It also has the power to 
require cooperation with quality control reviews and disciplinary 
proceedings, and it may impose a broad range of disciplinary sanctions 
against auditing firms and individual members. Large firms that undertake 
audits of more than 100 public companies will be inspected annually. The 
requirement for non-U.S. audit firms to become members of PCAOB has 
caused some concern among the large European audit firms. Although at first 
the PCAOB said it should regulate both U.S. and non-U.S. accounting firms, 
in July 2004 announced that, for some non-U.S. audit firms that audit 
companies registered with the SEC (e.g., audit firms in Canada, Japan, 
andmany European countries, including the United Kingdom), it would be 
willing to rely on the auditor’s home-country regulators (Fisher, 2004). 
In the United Kingdom, the word accountant is not defined in statute and 
there is no qualification requirement in order for someone to practice as an 
accountant. However, most accountants choose to qualify under the auspices 
of one of the professional bodies. The situation for auditor is different. The 
Companies Act of 1985 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The Parliament, 1985) prescribes a statutory scheme for the 
regulation of auditors, under which the Department of Trade and Industries 
(DTI) recognizes certain accountancy bodies for the training and supervision 
of auditors. The Companies Act of 1985 (The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1985) states that every 
company shall appoint an auditor or auditors (except for most small 
companies or dormant companies). The Companies Act of 1989 (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1989), 
which implemented the European Union’s Eighth Directive, introduced 
stronger statutory arrangements for the regulation of auditors. It restricts 
qualifications for appointment as a statutory auditor to those who hold a 
recognized professional qualification and are subject to the requirements of a 
recognized supervisory body. It makes specific provision for the 
independence of company auditors. An officer or employee of a company 
being audited, for example, may not act as auditor for that company.  
Under the regulatory structure for the accounting profession introduced 
in 1998, an independent body, the Accountancy Foundation, with a non-
accountant board of trustees, was established in 2000. With the establishment 
of the Foundation, a strong lay and independent element was introduced into 
the regulatory framework. This element involved oversight arrangements 
concerning the regulatory activities undertaken by the principal professional 
accountancy bodies. The Foundation was funded by the Consultative 
Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB).  
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The Foundation (Accountancy Foundation, www.frc.org.uk) and its 
related bodies (The structure of the Foundation comprises five limited 
companies: the Accountancy Foundation Ltd.; The Review Board Ltd. (to 
monitor the operation of the regulatory system to ensure that it serves the 
public interest); The Auditing Practices Board Ltd. (to establish and develop 
auditing standards): The Ethics Standards Board Ltd. (to secure the 
development of ethical standards for all accountants); and the Investigation 
and Discipline Board Ltd. (to investigate disciplinary cases of public 
interest)) were responsible for the nonstatutory independent regulation of the 
six chartered accountancy bodies of the CCAB. This framework was 
developed in light of a growing recognition in the profession of the need for 
the regulatory arrangements to reflect the wider public interest. The 
regulatory functions of the Foundation included monitoring the work of 
accountants and auditors, handling complaints and disciplinary violations, 
and conducting investigations. The regulatory structure under the foundation 
provided an increased level of public oversight regarding statutory auditors, 
while essentially retaining the self-regulatory nature of the profession 
(Departmentof Trade and Industry, 1998). Accordingly, the responsibility for 
determining who might be recognized as a statutory auditor has been 
delegated primarily to four CCAB members: the Association of Chartered 
Corporate Accountants (ACCA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ireland (ICAI), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 
(ICAS). Each of the four recognized professional bodies has its own 
examinations to assess thetechnical competence of the entry-level registered 
auditor (the term used in the United Kingdom for statutory auditor). In order 
to become a registered auditor in the United Kingdom, the professional 
accountant must be listed in a register maintained for that purpose by a 
recognized professional body.  
The Auditing Practices Board (APB) was responsible for setting and 
developing auditing standards in the United Kingdom. The APB, as 
constituted under the Accountancy Foundation arrangements, continued the 
work of its predecessor body, which was established in 1991 under the 
auspices of the CCAB. Failure to abide by the professional standards issued 
by the APB might be grounds for disciplinary action. According to a report 
on audit regulation in the United Kingdom made public by the Department of 
Trade and Industry in July 2004, the ICAEW, ICAS, and ICAI undertook 
1,030 monitoring visits during 2003. Of the firms visited, 88 percent required 
no action at all or, by the conclusion of the visit, had suitable plans in place 
to improve their audit work, and 14 firms had their registration as auditors 








are available at link). 
The Companies (Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprises) Act of 
2004 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The 
Parliament, 2004) provided the Financial Reporting Review Panel with 
statutory power to require companies, directors, and auditors to provide 
documents, information and explanations if it appears that accounts do not 
comply with relevant reporting requirements.  
Under the new regime the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the 
United Kingdom’s unified, independent regulator for corporate reporting and 
governance. Its functions, which are relevant to auditing, include the 
following: 
 Setting, monitoring, and enforcing auditing standards, statutory 
oversight, and regulation of auditors. 
 Operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for 
public interest cases involving professional accountants. 
 Overseeing the regulatory activities of the professional accountancy 
bodies. 
The FRC is also responsible for the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance and its associated guidance on internal control (the Turnbull 
Guidance) and audit committees (the Smith Guidance). Similar bodies have 
been established in Canada, Australia, Japan, France, Germany, and several 
other countries in the European Union.  
The requirements for becoming an auditor may vary in different countries. 
For example, unlike in the United States, there is no uniform system of 
examination in the United Kingdom where four professional bodies conduct 
their own examinations. On the other hand, in Germany, the examinations for 
the prospective auditors are set by the Ministry of Economics, and self-
regulation of the auditing profession takes place within the strict boundaries 
of the law (Baker et al., 2001). Unlike in the United Kingdom, instead of the 
professional bodies, quasi-governmental agencies play a major role in the 
regulatory functions in Germany. The Auditors’ Regulation specifies the 
admission requirements to become a statutory auditor and defines, among 
other things, the rights and duties of the auditor, the organization of the 
Chamber of Auditors, or Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (WPK), and the 
disciplinary measures for breeches of professional duties. The WPK is 
supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Statutory auditors, including audit 
corporations, must bemembers of the WPK, a public law body created in 
1961. The WPK also participates in disciplining auditors who violate 
standards.  
In China, the government is heavily involved in the regulation of the 
auditing profession. China’s accounting and auditing profession is sanctioned 
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and regulated by the state. All certified public accounting (CPA) firms, both 
state owned and privately owned, are under the supervision of the local Audit 
Bureau, which is itself supervised by the state. The CPA firms must be 
approved by the state in order to be able to audit foreign owned or joint 
venture companies or Chinese companies listed on the stock exchange, as 
required by law. The state may also intervene in the allocation of audit 
assignments among CPA firms.  
Audit Reports  
There are significant differences in the audit reports across different 
countries and sometimes across different companies within the same country. 
In this section we describe some of these differences. The appendix to this 
chapter provides examples of audit reports from MNCs located in Japan, 
Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and China.  
Audit reports on company annual reports for 2009 show a variety of 
applicable audit standards and formats.  
 China Southern Airline’s audit report states that an audit has been 
conducted in accordance with Hong Kong Standards on Auditing issued by 
the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  
 China Eastern Airline’s audit report is in both English and Chinese. It 
states that the audit has been conducted in accordance with International 
Standards on Auditing.  
 The audit report of Bayer states that the audit has been conducted in 
accordance with German Commercial Code requirements and German 
generally accepted standards for the audit of financial statements 
promulgated by the Institute of Public Auditors in Germany.  
 The audit report of Sumitomo Metal Industries states that audit has 
been conducted in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in 
Japan.  
 Toshiba’s audit report has been prepared in accordance with auditing 
standards generally accepted in the United States. However, the report states 
that “The Company’s consolidated financial statements do not disclose 
segment information required by Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No.131 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1997), disclosures 
about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information. Therefore, the 
audit opinion is that financial statements present fairly, in all material 
respects, except for the omission of segment information.”  
 The audit report of Unilever PLC has been prepared in accordance 
with Chapter 3 of Part 16 of the Companies Act of 2006 (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 2006). It 
also states that “Our responsibility is to audit the consolidated financial 








Auditing (UK and Ireland). There are three sets of opinion, namely, Opinion 
on financial statements, separate opinion in relation to IFRS, and Opinion on 
other matter prescribed by the Companies Act 2006.”  
 The audit report of Unilever N.V. states that the audit has been 
conducted in accordance with Dutch law. 
 The audit report of Kubota states that the audit has been conducted in 
accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board and that financial statements as of March 31, 2010, and 2009, are in 
conformity with U.S. GAAP. The report further states that the auditors 
expressed a qualified opinion in the audit report for 2009 because there was 
no segment information, but in the current financial statements this has been 
corrected.  
 The audit report on Cadbury PLC’s financial statements of 2008 states 
that the audit was conducted in accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing (UK and Ireland) issued by the Auditing Practices Board (UK). The 
audit opinion states that  
(a) the Group financial statements give a true and fair view, in accordance 
with IFRS as adopted by the EU, of the state of the Group’s affairs as of 
December 31, 2008, and profit for the year then ended; 
(b) the parent company financial statements give a true and fair view, in 
accordance with IFRS as adopted by the EU as applied in accordance with 
the provisions of the Companies Act of 1985, of the state of the parent 
company’s affairs as of December 31, 2008;  
(c) the financial statements and the part of the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report to be audited have been properly prepared in accordance with the 
Companies Act of 1985 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The Parliament, 1985) and as regards the Group financial statements, 
Article 4 of the IAS Regulation (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003);  
(d) the information given in the Directors’ Report is consistent with the 
financial statements. The audit report also includes a separate opinion in 
relation to IFRS, which states that the Group, in addition to complying with 
its legal obligation to comply with IFRS as adopted by the EU, has also 
complied with the IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB).  
Some audit reports, for example, those of China Southern Airline, China 
Eastern Airline, Unilever PLC, and Unilever N.V., specifically mention that 
the auditors need to comply with ethical requirements.  
As mentioned earlier, a special feature in the corporate structure in some 
European countries, including Germany, is the two-tiered structure with a 
management board and a supervisory board.  
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The report of the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG, in the annual 
report 2009, states: ‘During the past fiscal year, the Supervisory Board 
addressed the situation and the development of the Volkswagen Group 
regularly and in detail. In compliance with the legal requirements and the 
German Corporate Governance Code, we provide advice and support to the 
Board of Management in issues relating to the management of the Company. 
The Supervisory Board was consulted directly with regard to all decisions of 
fundamental importance to the Group. In addition, current strategic 
considerations were discussed with the Board of Management at regular 
intervals.’ 
 
The Board of Management provided the Supervisory Board with regular, 
prompt, and comprehensive verbal and written reports on the development of 
business, the planning and the position of the Company, including the risk 
situation and risk management. These included all key aspects relating to the 
creation of an integrated automative group with Porsche. The Board of 
Management also informed us continuously about other current issues and 
the topic of compliance. We always received documents relevant to our 
decisions in good time prior to the Supervisory Board meetings. Furthermore, 
the Board of Management provided the Supervisory Board with detailed 
monthly reports on the current business position and the forecast for the year 
as a whole. The Board of Managementexplained any variations from the 
defined plans and targets in a comprehensive verbal or written report. The 
Board of Management and the Supervisory Board discussed and analyzed the 






1. What is the PCAOB? What is its role in audit regulation? 
2. What does the audit environment include? 
3. What was the impact of the European Union’s Eighth Directive on the 
regulation of auditing in the United Kingdom? 






















The audit report is the primary tool auditors use to communicate with 
financial statement users about the results of the audit function. The 
globalization of capital markets and the growth of international capital flows 
have heightened the significance of cross-national understanding of corporate 
financial reports and the associated audit reports (Gangolly et al., 2002). For 
MNCs the ideal situation would be for both the parent company and its 
foreign subsidiaries to adopt one set of accounting standards, and for the 
auditors in both cases to use one set of auditing standards in providing their 
opinion on the financial statements. However, as explained in the previous 
sections, the audit environments and the mechanisms for audit regulation can 
vary significantly among different countries, and this could affect the form, 
content, and quality of the audit report.  
International harmonization of auditing standards is important in view of 
the drive toward international convergence of financial reporting standards. 
It ensures the international capital markets that the audit process has been 
consistent across companies, and in particular that one set of high quality 
standards has been applied in auditing both the parent and its subsidiary 
companies. This enhances the credibility of the information in corporate 
financial reports. This would lead to a more efficient and effective allocation 
of resources in international capital markets. In addition, harmonization of 
auditing standards would enable audit firms to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the audit process globally. However, efforts to harmonize 
auditing standards internationally have met with limited success.  
The responsibility for developing international auditing standards rests 
mainly with IFAC through its International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB). The IAASB was formerly known as the 
International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC). As a condition of IFAC 
membership, a professional accountancy body is obliged to support the work 
of IFAC by informing its members of every pronouncement developed by 
IFAC; to work toward implementation, to the extent possible under local 
circumstances, of those pronouncements; and specifically to incorporate 
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IFAC’s International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) into national auditing 
pronouncements (Preface to International Standards on Auditing and Related 
Services).  
The IAASB develops ISAs and International Auditing Practice 
Statements (IAPSs). These standards and statements outline basic principles 
and essential procedures for auditors, and serve as the benchmark for high-
quality auditing standards and statements worldwide. The IAASB also 
develops quality control standards for firms and engagement teams in the 
practice areas of audit, assurance, and related services. Table 9.1 provides a 
list of ISAs and International Standards on Quality Control (ISQC) issued by 
IFAC (International Standards on Auditing are available at www.ifac.org). 
The complete listing of the ISAs and ISQC 1 is set in Table 9.1 along with 
the Basis for Conclusions for each project. These staff-prepared documents 
provide background information, main comments received on the exposure 
drafts, and the IAASB’s conclusions regarding these comments in developing 
the final standard. 
 
Table 9.1 –International Standards on Auditing and International Standards 




200 Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an 
Audit in Accordance with International Standards on Auditing 
210 Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements 
220 Quality Control for an Audit of Financial Statements 
230 Audit Documentation 
240 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of 
Financial Statements 
250 Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial 
Statements 
260 Communication with Those Charged with Governance 
265 Communicating Deficiencies in Internal Control to Those Charged 
with Governance and Management 
300 Planning an Audit of Financial Statements 
315 Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement through 
Understanding the Entity and Its Environment 
320 Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit 
330 The Auditor’s Responses to Assessed Risks 
402 Audit Considerations Relating to an Entity Using a Service 
Organization 
450 Evaluation of Misstatements Identified during the Audit 
500 Audit Evidence 












505 External Confirmations 
510 Initial Audit Engagements-Opening Balances 
520 Analytical Procedures 
530 Audit Sampling 
540 Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Accounting 
Estimates, and Related Disclosures 
550 Related Parties 
560 Subsequent Events 
570 Going Concern 
580 Written Representations 
600 Special Considerations-Audits of Group Financial Statements 
(Including the Work of Component Auditors) 
610 Using the Work of Internal Auditors 
620 Using the Work of an Auditor’s Expert 
700 Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements 
705 Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report 
706 Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter Paragraphs in the 
Independent Auditor’s Report 
710 Comparative Information-Corresponding Figures and Comparative 
Financial Statements 
720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information in 
Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements 
800 Special Considerations-Audits of Financial Statements Prepared in 
Accordance with Special Purpose Frameworks 
805 Special Considerations-Audits of Single Financial Statements and 
Specific Elements, Accounts or Items of a Financial Statement 
810 Engagements to Report on Summary Financial Statements 
 
IFAC’s international regulatory and compliance regime consists of the 
Forum of Firms (FoF) and the Compliance Committee, with participation 
from outside the accounting profession. Firms that carry out transnational 
audit work are eligible for membership in the FoF. Membership obligations 
include compliance with ISAs and the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, and submission to periodic quality control review. The 
Compliance Committee monitors and encourages compliance with 
international standards and other measures designed to enhance the reliability 
of financial information and professional standards around the world.  
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
supports IFAC’s efforts in this area. IOSCO’s Technical and Emerging 
Markets Committees participate in the discussions that take place between 
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the IFAC and the international regulatory community regarding processes for 
the development of international auditing standards. In October 1992, IOSCO 
recommended that its members endorse ISAs and accept audits of financial 
statements from other countries audited in accordance with ISAs.  
The issuance of ISA 13 in October 1983 by the International Auditing 
Practices Committee (IAPC) was an important landmark in international 
efforts to harmonize the audit report. The purpose of ISA 13 was to “provide 
guidance to auditors on the form and content of the auditor’s report issued in 
connection with the independent audit of the financial statements of any 
entity” (paragraph 2). ISA 13 has been revised several times since 1983 
(International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2007). ISA 700, The 
Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements (The International Federation of 
Accountants, 2015b), establishes standards and provides guidance on the 
form and content of the auditor’s report. It requires the auditor to express an 
opinion about whether the financial statements “give a true and fair view” or 
“present fairly,” which in turn requires the auditor to conduct the necessary 
auditing procedures to support his or her expressed opinion. The requirement 
also helps ensure that the information satisfies the need of the international 
users of financial statements.  
ISA 700 (The International Federation of Accountants, 2015b) describes 
four types of audit opinion that can be expressed by the auditor: unqualified, 
qualified, adverse, and disclaimer of opinion. It also discusses circumstances 
that may result in other than an unqualified opinion, which includelimitation 
of scope, disagreement with management, and uncertainty. The appendixes 
to the standard include suggested expressions for the different types of 
opinion. For example, Table 9.2 provides an illustration of an unqualified 
opinion that incorporates the basic requirements.  
 
Table 9.2 – ISA 700 Illustrative Audit Report (The International 





We have audited the accompanying (the reference can be by page 
numbers) balance sheet of the ABC Company as of December 31, 20x1, 
and the related statements on income, and cash flows for the year then 
ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s 
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 









We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing (or refer to relevant national standards or practices). Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An 
audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant 
estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statements presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable 
basis for our opinion. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of (or 
“present fairly” in all material respects) the financial position of the 
company as of December 31, 20x1, and of the results of its operations and 
its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with International 
Accounting Standards (IAS Plus) (or [title of financial reporting 
framework with reference to the country of origin] In some circumstances 
it also may be necessary to refer to a particular jurisdiction within the 
country of origin to identify clearly the financial reporting framework 
used.) (and comply with. . . . Refer to relevant statutes or law ) 
 
 
ISA 700 points out that although the auditor’s opinion enhances the 
credibility of the financial statements, the user cannot assume that the opinion 
is an assurance as to the future viability of the entity or the efficiency or 
effectiveness with which management has conducted the affairs of the entity.  
ISA 200, Objectives and General Principles Governing an Audit of 
Financial Statements, states that the objective of an audit of financial 
statements is to enable the auditor to express an opinion whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects in accordance with an 
identified financial reporting framework. However, this could be a problem 
in some cases; for example, the European Union has endorsed a modified 
version of IAS 39 (International Accounting Standards Board, 1998), and 
selecting an appropriate text for such identification may not be easy.  
Auditors are expected to comply with IFAC’s Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants (International Federation of Accountants, 2005a) 
and to consider the activities of internal auditing and their effect, if any, on 
external audit procedures (ISA 610, Considering the Work of Internal 
Auditing (The International Federation of Accountants, 2015a)). In a paper 
published in December 2005, entitled The Role and Domain of the 
Professional Accountants in Business, IFAC’s Professional Accountants in 
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Business (PAIB) Committee states that while there is certainly high 
awareness of the work of accountants in audit practice and tax preparation, 
there is a less understood, but equally important role that professional 
accountants in business play in designing and maintaining mechanisms to 
assure effective, ethical, and responsible corporate governance and control in 
organizations. To provide resources for professional accountants, IFAC 
launched the International Center for Professional Accountants in Business 
in July 2007.  
In June 2003, IFAC issued an IAPS providing guidance on expressing an 
audit opinion when the financial statements are asserted by management to 
have beenprepared (1) solely in accordance with IFRS, (2) in accordance with 
IFRS and a national financial reporting framework, or (3) in accordance with 
a national financial reporting framework with disclosure of the extent of 
compliance with IFRS (The International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board, 2003). 
In accordance with IAS 1, the IAPC specifies that financial statements 
should not be described as complying with IFRSs unless they comply with 
all the requirements of each applicable standard and each applicable 
interpretation of the International Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee (IFRIC). An unqualified opinion may be expressed only when the 
auditor is able to conclude that the financial statements give a true and fair 
view (or are presented fairly, in all material respects) in accordance with the 
identified financial reporting framework. In all other circumstances, the 
auditor is required to disclaim an opinion or to issue a qualified or adverse 
opinion depending on the circumstances. An opinion paragraph that indicates 
that “the financial statements give a true and fair view and are in substantial 
compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards” does not meet 
the requirements of ISA 700 (The International Federation of Accountants, 
2015b). Further, financial statements claimed to have complied with more 
than one financial reporting framework must comply with each of the 
indicated frameworks individually.  
There have been efforts at harmonizing auditing standards at the regional 
level, particularly within the European Union. For example, the Fourth 
Directive of the European Commission requires that the auditor’s report 
include whether the financial statements present a “true and fair view.” The 
Eighth Directive aimed at harmonizing the educational and training 
prerequisites necessary to become a statutory auditor. Many EU member 
countries, including the United Kingdom, modified their company laws and 
regulations to comply with the provisions of the Eighth Directive. As a result, 
the UK professional bodies amended their entry requirements to include a 








a prospective candidate for membership of one of the professional bodies 
would also be required to undergo a three-year training period under the 
supervision of a practicing member of that professional body. A few years 
ago, the representative body for the accountancy profession in Europe, the 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), conducted a survey 
and found that fundamental requirements to be recognized as a professional 
accountant and auditor largely have converged across Europe (Federation des 
Experts Comptables Europeens, 2007).  
The UK Auditing Practices Board, one of the FRC’s operating bodies, 
taking a big-bang approach, has recently issued a revised suite of auditing 
standards that very closely reflect the ISAs.  
The IAASB has issued a series of key questions and answers in a 
publication titled “First-time Adoption of IFRSs, Guidance for Auditors on 
Reporting Issues” as well as a glossary incorporating terms used in ISAs 
issued as of October 31, 2004 (International Federation of Accountants, 
2004). Further, in April 2005 the IFAC Education Committee issued an 
exposure draft on educational requirements for audit professionals proposing 
an International Education Standard (IES) titled “Competence Requirements 
for Audit Professionals” (International Federation of Accountants, 2005b). 
There seems to be international cooperation in regulating auditors and 
audit firms. For example, the PCAOB has entered into a Statement of 
Protocol with Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) to 
enhance cooperation in the supervisory oversight of auditors and public 
accounting firms that practice in the United States and Australia. The PCAOB 
is expected to enter into similar arrangements in other non-U.S. jurisdictions. 
In December 2007, the PCAOB issued for comment proposed guidance 
regarding the implementation of PCAOB Rule 4012, Inspection of Foreign 
Registered Public Accounting Firms (Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, 2004). Accordingly, if the essential criteria as mentioned in the policy 
statement are met, the board may place full reliance on the inspection 
program of qualified non-U.S. auditor oversight entities. Rule 4012 sets out 
five broad principles:  
1. Adequacy and integrity of the oversight system.  
2. Independent operation of the oversight system.  
3. Independence of the system’s source of funding.  
4. Transparency of the system.  
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1. What are the main benefits of international harmonization of 
auditingstandards? 
2. What determines whether or not to issue an unqualified audit 
opinion on thecompliance of a set of financial statements with 
IFRS? 
3. What role the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) play  regarding processes for the development of 
international auditing standards? 
4. What main five broad principles sets out Rule 4012? 
5. Name the basic International Standards on Auditing and 













































A More Communitarian View of Professional Ethics  
 
Globalization in business and the global nature of the accounting 
profession increase the importance of the new global profession of accountant 
and auditor, as well as the importance of consensus of international morality 
and values in the global profession of accountant. 
Further, accounting does not operate in a static environment and is 
undergoing change in accordance with community and business values. What 
was local – including business and professional fundamentals and community 
values – is now global. These values are currently directed to corporate 
responsibility and social and environmental issues and are communicated in 
nonmonetary terms. These changes in community values form part of what 
accounting is. Further, the realm of the accounting profession’s jurisdiction 
does not seem to remain within the boundaries of monetary symbols and 
financial reporting. These issues are important in judging professional 
credibility and integrity into the next generation. Moral standing of the 
accounting profession is based on trust, which is established by the ethical 
conduct of its members. This is as important as an asset such as plant and 
equipment. At an international level, the profession has been directed to 
ethics education by international organizations such as IFAC. For example, 
IFAC membership obligations include compliance with ISAs and the IFAC 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. The importance of consistency 
of ethical codes for the various professional bodies operating within 
individual geographical locations has also been emphasized. At the 
international level, the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) was formed 
in early 2005 to oversee the work of IFAC committees, including n ethics 
standard-setting committee. Following the consideration and approval by the 
PIOB, the revised Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2005a). was issued by the Auditing Practices 
Board. The revised code clarifies requirements for all professional 
accountants and significantly strengthens the independence requirements of 
auditors. Accountability over how banks are run is emphasized in the Walker 
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Review into Corporate Governance of UK banks. 
However, ethical codes may also offer opportunities for “creative 
accounting.” Further, a focus on individual benefits has resulted in recent 
corporate failures. As a consequence, the accounting profession – as stewards 
of corporate behavior – was admonished in terms of public trust. When 
ethical values are falling, people often turn to government for help, as 
reflected during the recent global financial crisis.  
The response to crises of the accounting profession in the United States 
has been to form committees and commissions whose recommendations end 
up changing little of substance. Those recommendations generally focused 
on rules of behavior. However, the shift from social norms to rules of 
behavior may not be the right path, as the focus on norms and culture are 
important to society.  
A More Communitarian View of Professional Ethics  
Professionals face their careers constrained by local laws and a set of 
values that appear to be universally held. Ethical standards are important in 
professional accounting work, and professional ethics reside in the form of a 
contract between a professional group and the community within which that 
professional group operates. Therefore, ethical issues can be local and 
contextual. Consequently, the notion of a universal or global set of ethical 
norms that is embedded in IFRS can be challenged, as the notion of an 
“international community” reflects the aspirations of Anglo-American 
culture. For example, some of the accepted methods of relationship building 
generally accepted in Chinese society may be considered bribery and 
corruption in an Anglo-American culture. Is a more communitarian view of 





1. What is the moral position of the accounting profession based on? 
2. The role of international organizations in the formation of ethics of 
accountants. Give examples. 
3. Which international organizations care about the ethics of auditors? 
4. The value of ethical norms and rules of conduct for the profession 
of auditor and accountant. Common and different between norms 
and rules. 




















As a result of the renewed interest in restoring investor confidence 
internationally, the issues of auditor’s liability, auditor independence, and the 
role of audit committees have figured prominently in discussion and debate. 
The fact that there is no international agreement on how to deal with any of 
these issues is of particular interest to MNCs, because they have to operate 
under different regulatory regimes in different countries.  
Auditor’s Liability  
In general, auditors can be subject to three kinds of liability, namelycivil 
liability, criminal liability, and professional sanctions. Civil liability arises 
when auditors break contractual or civil obligations or both, and criminal 
liability arises when they engage in criminal acts, such as intentionally 
providing misleading information. Professional sanctions (warnings and 
exclusions by professional bodies) are imposed when auditors violate the 
rules of the professional bodies to which they belong (Favere-Marchesi, 
2000). In terms of civil liability, the auditor may be exposed to litigation 
initiated by (1) the client company (the other party to the engagement 
contract) or (2) a third party (a party not involved in the original contract, 
such as a shareholder). In certain national jurisdictions, auditors are not liable 
to third parties. This was the case in Germany prior to 1998, but the situation 
changed as a consequence of a court decision in that year. Statutory auditors 
in Germany currently are liable to third parties in cases of negligent behavior. 
In the United Kingdom, under the Companies Act, the auditor reports to the 
members of the company but enters intoa contract with the company as a 
corporate entity. Accordingly, the auditor’s primary duty of care is to the 
company and its shareholders as a group, not necessarily to individual 
shareholders. To be liable in negligence, the auditor must owe a “duty of 
care” to a third-party claimant. It is relatively difficult for individual 
shareholders to successfully assert claims against statutory auditors under 
British law (Baker et al., 2001).  
In China, the concept of legal liability extending beyond the firm to its 
owners does not appear to exist. This is due to the flexibility in the ownership 
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structure of CPA firms, and the lack of a developed legal environment. A 
unique feature in the ownership structure of the Chinese CPA firms is that 
other entities, such as universities, may also have ownership interests in them. 
For example, Shanghai University has an ownership interest in Da Hua CPAs, 
one of the larger CPA firms in China (Graham, 1996). 
Limiting Auditor’s Liability  
Prompted by the collapse of Arthur Andersen, the UK government 
conducted a public consultation on whether it should initiate legislation to 
limit auditors’ liability. In its response, one of the Big Four firms pointed out 
that the risks involved in auditing are uninsurable, unquantifiable, 
unmanageable, and could at any time destroy the firm or any of its 
competitors (Parker, 2004). This should be of concern to MNCs, given that 
further reduction in the number of global accounting firms could seriously 
affect MNCs’ ability to obtain the necessary professional services at 
reasonable prices. The remainder of this section describes some of the 
alternatives available for limiting auditor’s liability.  
Change the Ownership Structure  
Audit firms, particularly in the UK tradition, are often organized as 
partnerships in which the principle of “joint and several liability” applies. 
Under this principle, each audit partner of the firm against whom a claim is 
made for negligence may be held liable for the whole amount of the claim. 
However, the joint and several liability feature is seen as a weakness of the 
partnership form of ownership. An effective way to limit auditor’s liability 
would be to change the ownership structure of audit firms. Under the U.S. 
model of limited liability partnerships, “innocent” partners are able to protect 
their personal wealth from legal action. The Big Four firms are using limited 
liability partnerships, where permitted by law, to reduce their exposure to 
litigation. For example, Deloitte & Touche LLP became a limited liability 
partnership in August 2003.  
Under UK law, limited partnerships are effective only if the limited 
partners are simply passive investors and take no role in the firm’s 
professional work. Consequently, for many audit firms in the United 
Kingdom, the principle of joint and several liability applies to audit partners, 
as the firms are organized as partnerships. However, it is possible in the 
United Kingdom for audits to be carried out by limited liability companies. 
Among the ASEAN countries, in Thailand and Vietnam, auditing firms may 
be organized as limited liability companies (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). It was 
reported recently that of the United Kingdom’s top 60 accountancy firms, the 
majority had turned to limited liability (Fisher, 2004a). In 1995, KPMG 
announced the formation of a new company, KPMG Audit PLC, to audit its 








Germany also, statutory audits can be performed by audit corporations with 
limited liability. However, in other countries, such as New Zealand, an audit 
firm cannot be incorporated.  
Proportionate Liability  
Another approach that has been suggested to limit auditor’s liability is to 
apply the concept of proportionate liability, by which the claim against each 
auditor would be restricted to the proportion of the loss for which he or she 
was responsible. However, this is not a widely adopted approach. For 
example, in September 1998, the New Zealand Law Commission declined a 
proposal by the then Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand 
(ICANZ) [now, Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA 
ANZ)] for changing auditors’ liability from “joint and several liability” to 
“proportionate liability.” In doing so the Law Commission stated that fairness 
among defendants was not relevant to fairness to the injured party. German 
regulators seem to have taken a different view on this issue. Although 
German law specifies the disciplinary procedures against auditors, they are 
not always strictly implemented due to an overall tendency to focus on 
damage to the reputation of the profession rather than on the extent of the 
individual culpability of the auditor. Australia and Canada have recently 
introduced systems that recognize proportionate liability for auditors. The 
Companies Act of 2006 in the United Kingdom removed the longstanding 
bar on auditors limiting their liability to the companies they audit, which was 
contained in section 310 of the Companies Act of 1985 (The United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1985). Accordingly, 
limits for auditor liability could be agreed upon between the company and the 
auditor. From an international perspective, although the current UK regime 
is less favourable to auditors compared to those in Australia and Germany, a 
reasonable degree of protection is possible. 
Statutory Cap  
The use of a statutory cap is yet another approach that has been suggested 
to limit auditor’s liability. The purpose of statutory cap is to reduce the 
amount of money that an audit firm would have to pay if found liable for 
negligence. In Germany, this has been the practice for many decades. In 1931, 
an explicit limit on auditors’ maximum exposure to legal liability damages 
was introduced to relieve the auditor of an overwhelming worry of unlimited 
liability, and to limit the premiums for liability insurance (Baker et al., 2001). 
In the United Kingdom, the auditors are legally prevented from limiting their 
liability to their client company arising from negligence, default, breach of 
duty, and breach of trust (Napier, 1998). As an example of the extent to which 
auditors may be expected to pay, damages of £65 million were awarded 
against the accounting firm Binder Hamlyn in 1995. The case involved a 
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careless acknowledgement of responsibility for a set of audited accounts 
made to a takeover bidder by the firm’s senior partner as reported in the 
Financial Times of December 7, 1995 (Doupnik, T. S., & Perera, H., 2012).  
Disclaimer  
UK auditors often include disclaimers of liability in their audit opinions 
to protect themselves from unintended liability. In March 2003, in response 
to a proposal put forward by the ICAEW to promote the capping of 
unintended auditor liability by changing the wording in audit opinions to 
illustrate to whom an opinion is given, the U.S. SEC clearly stated that this 
would not be acceptable in theUnited  States and that disclaimers of liability 
placed in audit opinions by UK auditors would have no validity if placed on 
U.S. financial reports. 
Auditor Independence  
One of the main principles governing auditors’ professional 
responsibilities is independence, in particular independence from 
management. However, reports of independence rule violations by major 
international accounting firms have appeared with increasing frequency. As 
an example, in January 2000, the SEC made public the report by an 
independent consultant who reviewed possible independence rule violations 
by one of the Big Four firms arising from ownership of client-issued 
securities. The report revealed significant violations of the firm’s, the 
profession’s, and the SEC’s auditor independence rules (the full report is 
available at www.sec.gov/pdf/pwclaw.pdf). Following the corporate 
collapses at the beginning of this century in many countries, a series of such 
reports appeared and auditor independence became the subject of much 
debate at the international level.  
IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2005a) identifies two different categories of 
independence: independence in mind and independence in appearance. 
Independence of mind requires auditors to be in a state of mind that allows 
them to express opinions about the auditee without feeling that they are under 
pressure due to independence issues and to feel that they are allowed to act 
with integrity, conducting their audits objectively and with professional 
skepticism. Independence of mind is also referred to as “independence in 
fact.” Independence in appearance relates to a third party’s perception 
regarding the auditor’s independence. If the third party doesn’t think that the 
auditor appears to be independent, even though the auditor is independent in 
his or her mind, the third party doesn’t trust the auditor due to certain 
circumstances or relationships that are incompatible with independence and 
the promise of the assurance that the auditor is supposed to provide is lost.  








Stock Exchange, 2014) require, among other things, that the board will have 
four committees: an Audit Committee, a Human Resources and 
Compensation Committee, a Nominating and Governance Committee, and an 
Information Technology Committee. The guidelines also require that all of 
the members of these committees, except for information Technology 
Committee, should be independent directors.  
The PCAOB requires public accountancy firms to communicate to an 
audit client’s audit committee about any relationship between the firm and 
the client that may reasonably be thought to bear on the firm’s independence. 
The communication would be required both before the firm accepts a new 
engagement pursuant to the standards of the PCAOB and annually for 
continuing engagements. The remainder of this section reviews various 
attempts to strengthen auditors’ independence.  
Auditor Appointment  
Having stockholders involved in the auditor appointment process is 
expected to strengthen the independence of auditors from management and 
to improve audit quality. Generally, the law, for example the UK Companies 
Act of 1989 (Section 384), requires that the registered (or statutory) auditor 
be appointed by the shareholders in an annual general meeting (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1989). 
However, in practice, it is the company’s managers who actually select the 
auditor, after negotiating fees and other arrangements. The auditor often 
considers the managing directors of the company as theclient, and hence the 
auditor’s contractual arrangement is with the management of the company, 
not with the individual shareholders.  
Restricted or Prohibited Activities  
Another issue related to auditor independence is restricted or prohibited 
activities, including relationships with client companies. Mandated activities 
such as communication between auditors could also strengthen auditor 
independence. On the issue of the auditor’s relationship with client 
companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) has specific provisions 
prohibiting certain nonaudit services provided by external auditors. However, 
the large audit firms point out that certain consulting work in fact helps 
improve audit quality. For example, they argue that consulting on information 
systems and e-commerce puts them on the cutting edge of business, and as a 
result, they can (1) start to measure items, such as a company’s customer 
service quality, that are not on balance sheets even though investors consider 
them to be crucial assets; (2) develop continuous financial statements that 
provide real-time information instead of historical snapshots; and (3) explore 
ways to audit other measures of value that investors use, such as Web site 
traffic and market share locked up by being first with a new technology.  
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Regulatory Oversight  
In many countries, the regulation and oversight of auditors have expanded 
to incorporate external monitoring and oversight of auditor competence and 
independence. The PCAOB in the United States and the Professional 
Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA) in the United Kingdom are two 
examples. In October 2002, IOSCO issued a document titled Statement of 
Principles for Auditor Oversight (International Organization of Securities 
Regulators, 2020), which requires that “within a jurisdiction auditors should 
be subject to oversight by a body that acts and is seen to act in the public 
interest.” In its Statement of Principles of Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting, IOSCO recommends the following: 
 Auditors should be independent, in line with international best 
practice. 
 Auditors should make a statement to the board concerning their 
independence at the time the audit report is issued.  
 The audit committee should monitor the auditor’s appointment, 
remuneration and scope of services, and any retention of the auditor to 
provide nonaudit services. 
 The board should disclose the scope of the audit, the nature of any 
nonaudit services provided by the auditors, and the remuneration for these. 
 The board should disclose how auditor independence has been 
maintained where the auditor has been approved to provide any nonaudit 
services. 
 An independent oversight body should monitor issues of audit quality 
and auditor independence. 
Mandatory Rotation  
Mandatory rotation of audit firms often has been advocated as a means of 
strengthening auditor independence, ensuring that potential conflicts of 
interest are avoided. A recent government inquiry into auditor independence 
in theUnited Kingdom resulted in a recommendation for mandatory auditor 
rotation as a way to restore investor confidence in the market in response to 
investor and public concerns in the wake of corporate scandals like the one 
involving Enron. However, the United Kingdom’s largest audit firms have 
overwhelmingly rejected the notion that auditors should face mandatory 
rotation (Details are available at link). They argue that such a change would 
only serve to bring down the quality of the audit and that there is no evidence 
that rotation will prevent corporate collapse. By contrast, in Singapore, the 
law requires the rotation of audit partners for publicly listed companies. 
In revising its code of ethics for professional accountants, IFAC has 
specified that, for audits of listed entities, the lead engagement partner should 








that a partner rotating after a predefined period should not participate in the 
audit engagement until a further period of time, normally two years, has 
elapsed (IFAC, 2004). This requirement may be of particular concern in 
countries where there may be few partners with a sufficient understanding of 
the particular industry involved or a particular set of accounting rules (such 
as U.S. GAAP or SEC regulations).  
Splitting Operations  
To address the independence issue, the large accounting firms have taken 
more drastic action, splitting into separate entities, each dealing with a 
specific operational area. This allows auditing and consulting arms to deal 
with the same customer. In 2000, Ernst & Young announced the sale of its 
management-consulting business to CAP Gemini Group SA for around $11 
billion. One reason was to reduce SEC concerns about lack of independence. 
Also in 2000, PricewaterhouseCoopers decided to separate its audit and 
business advisory services from its other businesses (e.g., e-commerce 
consulting) in a decision that was “encouraged” by the SEC. In February 
2000, KPMG announced the incorporation of KPMG Consulting, to be 
owned by KPMG LLP and its partners (80.1 percent), and Cisco Systems Inc. 
(19.9 percent), which in August 1999 agreed to invest $1 billion in the new 
company.  
Stringent Admission Criteria 
In the United Kingdom, the Companies Act of 1989 (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1989), 
which implemented the EU Eighth Directive (The Council of the European 
Union, 2008), introduced stronger statutory arrangements for the regulation 
of auditors. It restricts qualifications for appointment as a statutory auditor to 
those who hold a recognized professional qualification and are subject to the 
requirements of a recognized supervisory body. It makes specific provision 
for the independence of company auditors; for example, an officer or 
employee of the company being audited may not act as auditor.  
A Principles-Based Approach to Auditor  
Independence In a recent auditor independence standard, the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (2003) (CICA) makes a shift to a more 
rigorous “principles-based” approach. The standard reflects features of the 
relevant requirements included in IFAC, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), and the SEC for public companies. Its applicability goes beyond any 
specific situation and mandates a proactive approach based on clearly 
articulated principles. The core principle of the CICA standardis that every 
effort must be made to eliminate all real or perceived threats to the auditor’s 
independence. It requires auditors to ensure that their independence is not 
impaired in any way. In a set of specific rules for auditors of listed entities, 
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the standard  
 Prohibits certain nonaudit services (bookkeeping, valuations, 
actuarial, internal audit outsourcing, information technology system design 
or implementation, human resource functions, corporate finance activities, 
legal services, and certain expert services).  
 Requires rotation of audit partners (lead and concurring partners after 
five years with a five-year time-out period, partners who provide more than 
10 hours of audit services to the client and lead partners on significant 
subsidiaries after seven years with a two-year time-out period).  
 Prohibits members of engagement team from working for the client in 
a senior accounting capacity until one year has passed from the time when 
they were on the engagement team.  
 Prohibits compensation of audit partners for cross-selling nonaudit 
services to their audit clients.  
 Requires audit committee prior approval for any service provided by 
the auditor.  
 Stipulates that the rules for listed entities apply only to those listed 
entities with market capitalization or total assets in excess of $10 million.  
A Conceptual Approach to Auditor Independence  
In Europe, the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (Federation 
des Experts Comptables Europeens, 2000) describes its approach to auditor 
independence as a conceptual approach. By focusing on the underlying aim 
rather than detailed prohibitions, it combines flexibility with rigor in a way 
that is unavailable with a rule-based approach. It is argued that this approach  
 Allows for the almost infinite variations in circumstances that arise in 
practice.  
 Can cope with the rapid changes of the modern business environment.  
 Prevents the use of legalistic devices to avoid compliance.  
 Requires auditors to consider actively and to be ready to demonstrate 
the efficiency of arrangements for safeguarding independence.  
An example of this approach would be the two-tiered corporate 
governance structure that exists in many continental European countries, such 
as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, and its perceived impact on auditor 
independence. Under that structure, because the supervisory board monitors 
the activities of the management board, and the auditors report to the 
supervisory board, the auditors may be more independent compared to their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom or the United States.  
The main difference between the last two approaches is that, whereas the 
former uses a list of specific prohibitions, the latter avoids making such a list. 
Audit Committees  








the financial reporting process including auditing. The subject of audit 
committeeshas drawn increased attention in recent years (each of the Big 
Four firms has issued audit committee guidance, see, for example 
(AmericanInstitute of Certified Public Accountants, 2000; Blue Ribbon 
Committee, 1999; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000). In a 1999 report, the U.S. 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), which made recommendations on improving 
the effectiveness of audit committees, describes the role of the audit 
committee as first among equals in supporting responsible financial 
disclosure and active and participatory oversight (Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999). It defines the oversight role as “ensuring that quality accounting 
policies, internal controls, and independent and objective outside auditors are 
in place to deter fraud, anticipate financial risks, and promote accurate, high 
quality and timely disclosure of financial and other material information to 
the board, to the public markets, and to shareholders.”(BlueRibbon 
Committee, 1999, p.20).  
In general, the audit committee responsibilities are to 
 Monitor the financial reporting process.  
 Oversee the internal control systems. 
 Oversee the internal audit and independent public accounting 
function. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) contains specific provisions dealing with 
issues related to audit committees, expanding their role and responsibilities. 
It requires the audit committee to be responsible for the outside auditor 
relationship, including the responsibility for the appointment, compensation, 
and oversight of a company’s outside auditor. It also requires that members 
of the audit committee be independent from company management. Further, 
the requirements cover audit committee’s authority to engage advisors, 
funding for the audit committee to pay the independent auditor, and any 
outside advisers it engages, and procedures for handling complaints about 
accounting, internal control, and auditing matters (whistleblower 
communication).  
In January 2003, responding to Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), the SEC proposed new rules for audit committees to prohibit the 
listing of companies that fail to comply with the requirements of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) and SEC (Securitiesand Exchange Commission, 2003). 
The SEC’s requirements relate to the independence of audit committee 
members, the audit committee’s responsibility to select and oversee the 
issuer’s independent accountant, procedures for handling complaints 
regarding the issuer’s accounting practices, the authority of the audit 
committee to engage advisers, and funding for the independent auditor and 
any outside advisers engaged by the audit committee.  
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One of the key responsibilities of an audit committee is oversight of the 
external auditor. It is now widely accepted that the external auditor works for 
and is accountable to the audit committee and board of directors (in some 
cases, the supervisory board). The regulatory bodies in many countries now 
require listed companies to establish audit committees. For example, under 
the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2019, February), listed companies in Australia are required to set up 
an independent audit committee made up completely of non-executive 
directors. All of the audit committee members are required to be financially 
literate, and at leastone must have financial expertise. Among the ASEAN 
countries, audit committees for publicly listed companies are required in 
Malaysia and Singapore (Favere-Marchesi, 2000, p.142).  
Understanding how the accountability relationship through audit 
committees is supposed to work effectively is very important for all parties 
interested in corporate reporting in an international context. One of the 
potential problems, at least in some countries, would be the unavailability of 
individuals with the desired skills to be independent directors. Another 
concern is that as a result of the expanded responsibilities given to audit 
committees, suitable individuals may now be reluctant to take on the position 
of audit committee member. KPMG reported that 65 percent of a sample of 
UK audit committee members in 2003 believed the enhanced role and 
responsibilities would discourage individuals from taking on such positions 
(This research was carried out among 118 members of FTSE 350 audit 
committees at the recent Audit Committee Institute Round Table. (The UK 






1. What are some of the strategies adopted internationally to limit the 
auditor’sliability? 
2. What are the main factors that complicate the issue of auditor 
independence? 
3. What is the oversight role of an audit committee? 
4. What is a Conceptual Approach to Auditor Independence? 




















Internal auditing is a segment of accounting that uses the basic techniques 
and methods of auditing, and functions as an appraisal activity established 
within an entity. The Institute of Internal Auditors (2004) (IIA) founded in 
the United States in 1941(for more details, see (Ramamoorti, 2003)) defines 
internal auditing as ‘an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations’. 
The internal auditor is a person within the organization and is expected to 
have a vital interest in a wide range of company operations. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) specifically recognizes the importance of internal auditing 
in restoring credibility to the systems of business reporting, internal control, 
and ethical behavior. The SEC requires listed companies to have an internal 
audit function. The IIA is a main source of feedback to the SEC regarding 
implementation of the internal control provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act.  
The role of internal auditing is determined by management, and its scope 
and objectives vary depending on the size and structure of the firm and the 
requirements of its management. In general, the objectives of internal 
auditing differ from those of external auditing. As stated in ISA 610 
(International Federation of Accountants, 2015a), internal auditing activities 
include the following:  
 Review of the accounting and internal control systems. The 
establishment of adequate accounting and internal control systems is a 
responsibility of management that continuously demands proper attention. 
Internal auditing is an ordinarily assigned specific responsibility by 
management for reviewing these systems, monitoring their operations, and 
recommending improvements thereto.  
 Examination of financial and operating information. This may include 
review of the means used to identify, measure, classify and report such 
information and specific inquiry into individual items including detailed 
testing of transactions, balances and procedures. 
 Review of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of operations. 
These operations include nonfinancial controls of an entity.  
 Review of compliance with laws, regulations, and other external 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 




requirements, as well as with management policies and directives and other 
internal requirements.  
Risk management is directly related to corporate governance and is an 
area in which internal auditing can make a significant contribution. 
Monitoring risks and providing assurance regarding controls are among the 
main internal audit functions (Figure 12.1). 
IFAC defines an internal control system as follows: ‘An internal control 
system consists of all the policies and procedures (internal controls) adopted 
by the management of an entity to assist in achieving management’s objective 
of ensuring, as far as practicable, the orderly and efficient conduct of its 
business, including adherence to management policies, the safeguarding of 
assets, the prevention and detection of fraud and error, the accuracy and 
completeness of the accounting records, and the timely preparation of 
reliable financial information. The internal control system extends beyond 
these matters which relate directly to the fairness of the accounting 
system’(IFAC, 2004). 
 
Figure 12.1. Competing Demands on Internal Audit Function 
(Bailey et al., 2003) 
 
Management requests of internal audit function 
 Independent evaluation of controls 
 Assistance in preparing report on controls 
 Evaluation of efficiency of processes 
 Assistance in designing controls 
 Risk analysis 
 Risk assurance 
 Facilitation of risk and control self-assessment 
Internal Audit Function 
Audit committee requests of internal audit function 
 Assurance regarding controls, including an independent 
assessment of the tone at the top 
 Independent evaluation of accounting practices and processes, 
including financial reporting 
 Risk analysis primarily focusing on internal accounting control 
and financial reporting 








Recently, the IIA published a paper on internal auditing’s role in 
enterprise risk management (ERM) (This is available at www.theiia.org). As 
shown in Figure 12.1, there are competing demands on internal audits from 
corporate management and audit committees. On the one hand, corporate 
management requests, among other things, assistance in designing controls, 
self-assessment of risk and control, and preparing reports on controls. On the 
other hand, audit committee requests assurance regarding controls and 
independent evaluation of accounting practices and processes.  
The PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting, which is integrated with An Audit of Financial 
Statements (approved by the SEC), requires registered audit firms to use the 
new standard for all audits of internal control no later than for fiscal years 
ending on or after November 15, 2007 (Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 2007). Adopted in May 2007, this standard implements 
Sections 103 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). The new standard 
reflects a principles-based approach, and allows auditors to apply 
professional judgment in determining the extent to which they will use the 
work of others. It is less prescriptive and easier to read. It directs auditors to 
focus on what matters most, and eliminates unnecessary procedures from the 
audit.  
In August 2007, in a paper focused on internal control from a risk-based 
perspective, IFAC states that one of the best defenses against business 
failures and an important driver of business performance is strong internal 
control. In June 2008, a pplying the extensive expertise and experience of its 
members and IFAC member bodies to draw out a set of globally applicable 
statements of principles. These principles should (1) guide the thought 
processes of professional accountants in business when they tackle the 
relevant topic, and (2) underpin the exercise of the professional judgment that 
is important in their roles. They provide professional accountants in business 
(and those served by them) with a common frame of reference when deciding 
how to address issues encountered within a range of individual organizational 
situations.  
The Demand for Internal Auditing in MNCs  
In a global competitive environment, internal auditing has become an 
integral part of managing MNCs. The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has issued its Guidance 
on Monitoring Internal Control Systems. The guidance is designed to help 
organizations better monitor the effectiveness of their internal control 
systems and to take timely corrective actions if needed. In China, the Ministry 
of Finance has provided guidance on internal control. In April 2010, five 
government departments jointly issued “Guidance on Internal Control.” This 
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guidance, together with the previously issued ”Framework on Internal 
Control,” is regarded as the basis for requirements on Chinese companies’ 
internal control systems.  
There is a growing demand for risk management skills as MNCs face an 
increasing array of risks due to the fact that their control landscape is more 
extensive and complicated compared to purely domestic enterprises. The 
demand for internal auditing has been growing internationally during the past 
three decades, particularly due to regulatory and legislative requirements in 
many countries, for example, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
U.S. Legislation against Foreign Corrupt Practices  
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which became law in 
December 1977 (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977), requires companies to 
establish and maintain appropriate internal control systems so that corporate 
funds are not improperly used for illegal purposes. Following the FCPA 
internal control requirement, the SEC Act of 1934 (United States Congress, 
1934) was amended and, as a result, all the registrants of the SEC are required 
to install internal control systems to prevent or detect the use of firm assets 
for illegal activities. 
The FCPA makes it illegal for U.S. companies to pay bribes to foreign 
government officials or political parties in order to secure or maintain 
business transactions or secure another type of improper advantage. Violation 
of the FCPA could result in large fines being levied against the corporation, 
and the executives, employees, and other individuals involved could also be 
fined or jailed or both. U.S. companies may be subject to liability for FCPA 
violations by their foreign subsidiaries or joint venture partners. 
The FCPA grew out of the revelations of widespread bribery of senior 
officials of foreign governments by American companies. In particular, the 
Lockheed and Watergate scandals in the mid-1970s triggered the enactment 
of the FCPA. The Lockheed scandal involved kickbacks and political 
donations paid by Lockheed, the American aircraft manufacturer, to Japanese 
politicians in return for aid in selling planes to All-Nippon Airlines. The 
scandal forced Tanaka Kakuei to resign as prime minister and as member of 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Lockheed had paid a total of $22 million 
to Japanese and other government officials.  
In an investigation launched by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
following the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, it was discovered that 
American companies were engaged in large-scale bribery overseas. 
According to the report from that investigation, by 1976 more than 450 
American companies had paid bribes to foreign government officials, made 
contributions to political parties, or made other questionable payments. A 








falsifying their accounting records. Thus, the original intention behind the 
enactment of the FCPA was to improve corporate accountability and 
transparency. 
The FCPA has two main components – accounting provisions and 
antibribery provisions. The SEC plays the main role in enforcing the 
accounting provisions, which require a company to maintain books, records, 
and accounts fairly reflecting the transactions and dispositions of the assets. 
In addition, a company must devise and maintain an appropriate internal 
accounting controls system, execute transactions in accordance with the 
management’s authorization, prepare financial statements in conformity with 
accounting principles, and record transactions to maintain accountability for 
assets. These requirements apply to SEC-regulated public companies – both 
U.S. and foreign companies – including their overseas branches. 
The FCPA’s accounting provisions require that a company holding a 
majority of a subsidiary’s voting securities must cause that entity to comply 
with the FCPA accounting requirements. With regard to cases in which the 
parent holds less than a majority interest, the act requires a parent entity to 
“proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the 
circumstances” to cause compliance. 
The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting in the U.S. (Treadway Commission Report, 1987), and the Report 
of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway 
Commission, 1992, also placed particular emphasis on internal controls. The 
1987 Treadway Report made several recommendations designed to reduce 
financial statement fraud by improving control and governance. The report 
made it clear that the responsibility for reliable financial reporting “resides 
first and foremost at the corporate level, in particular at the top management 
level.” Top management “sets the tone and establishes the financial reporting 
environment.” The idea is that good record keeping and internal control 
would make it more difficult to conceal illegal activities. 
The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 
expanded the scope of the FCPA for application to foreign companies (other 
than those regulated by the SEC) and foreign nationals, if their corrupt 
activity occurs within the United States. A U.S. company can be prosecuted 
not only when it directly authorizes an illegal payment by its foreign affiliate 
but also when it provides funds to that affiliate while knowing or having 
reason to know that the affiliate will use those funds to make a corrupt 
payment. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), Section 404(a), and the SEC’s related 
implementing rules require the management of a public company to assess 
the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting, 
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and include in the company’s annual report management’s conclusion about 
whether the company’s internal control is effective, as of the end of the 
company’s most recent fiscal year. Following these requirements, the 
PCAOB issued an audit standard, and in June 2004 the SEC approved the 
PCAOB Release No.2004-003: “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements.” 
Accordingly, the integrated audit results in two audit opinions: one on 
internal control over financial reporting and one on the financial statements 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004a). 
Legislation in Other Jurisdictions 
In December 1997, 33 countries signed the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and are required to make offshore bribery a crime under 
domestic law (OECD, 1997). 
In the United Kingdom, the Cadbury Committee, which was set up by the 
FRC, the London Stock Exchange, and the accounting profession to address 
the financial aspects of corporate governance, presented Internal Control 
Frameworks in its report published in December 1992 (Report, 1992). The 
sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of confidence both in 
financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards, 
which the users of corporate reports sought and expected. These concerns 
were heightened by some unexpected failures of major companies such as 
Polly Peck (Gwilliam, & Russell, 1991). The report developed 
recommendations for the control and reporting functions of the board, and on 
the role of auditors. The main output of the committee was a Code of Best 
Practice for companies. It emphasized openness, integrity, and 
accountability, and was implemented by the London Stock Exchange. Similar 
proposals were made by the Criteria of Control Committee of Canada (CoCo 
Report) and by the OECD Convention. A detailed comparison is given by 
Professional Accountants in Business Committee in August 2006 in the 
Information Paper "Internal Controls – A Review of Current Developments" 
(Professional Accountants in Business Committee, 2006). 
In July 2007, in response to the FRC’s review of impact of the Combined 
Code, which became effective to reporting years beginning on or after 
November 1, 2006, following a review by FRC, the ICAS raised the question 
whether the comply or explain approach was working. It stated that the bodies 
who oversee its application must ensure that it does not become an exercise 
in mindless compliance for the increasing number of companies who adhere 
to the principles of the code. Too often the comply or explain principle in 
relation to applying the code was being interpreted as comply meaning good 








state that it is a good thing for a company to explain its policies and practices 
in support of compliance or noncompliance. It is also important that 
independence of directors should not be interpreted as more important than 
experience. 
A study that examined whether the style and form of corporate 
governance has an effect in deterring financial fraud in China found that firms 
that had a high proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board were less 
likely to engage in fraud (Chen et al., 2006). Both internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms are weak or nonexistent in China. 
Externally the market for corporate control and managerial labor market are 
seriously underdeveloped, and internally it was not until 2002 that 
independent directors and audit committees appeared in listed companies. 
Chinese auditors have enjoyed an almost litigation-free environment because 
of a lack of sophisticated users and providers of accounting information. 
For an MNC, an important task of monitoring risks is to develop a plan to 
systematically assess risk across multinational activities within the 
organization. In addition, the MNC needs to assess existing risk of audited 
area and reporting of that assessment to management or the audit committee, 
or both; lead the risk management activities when a void has occurred within 
the organization; facilitate the use of risk self-assessment techniques; 
evaluate risks associated with the use of new technology; and assist 
management in implementing a risk model across the organization covering 
operations in different countries. Table 12.1 shows several evaluative 
frameworks that have been proposed for internal control. 
 









Developed by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission 
and sponsored by the AICPA, the FEI, the IIA and 
others, COSO is the dominant framework in the United 
States. The guidelines were first published in 1991, 
with anticipated revisions and updates forthcoming. 
This is believed to be the framework chosen by the vast 
majority of the U.S.-based public companies 
CoCo–The Control 
Model 
Developed by the Criteria of Control Committee 
(CoCo) of the CICA. The CoCo focuses on behavioral 
values rather than control structure and procedures as 
the fundamental basis for internal control in a company 
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Developed by the ICAEW, in conjunction with the 
London Stock Exchange, the guide was published in 
1999. Turnbull requires companies to identify, 
evaluate, and manage their significant risks and to 
assess the effectiveness of the related internal control 
systems 
Australian Criteria of 
Control (ACC) 
Issued in 1998 by the Institute of Internal Auditors—
Australia, the ACC emphasizes the competency of 
management and employees to develop and operate the 
internal control framework. Self-committed control, 
which includes such attributes as attitudes, behaviors, 
and competency, is promoted as the most cost-
effective approach to internal control 
The King Report The King Report, released by the King Committee on 
Corporate Governance in 1994, promotes high 
standards of corporate governance in South Africa. 
The King Report goes beyond the usual financial and 
regulatory aspects of corporate governance by 
addressing social, ethical, and environmental concerns 
 
However, in regard to internal controls a question remains: What if the 
top management was involved in the illegal transaction? After all, the top 
management is responsible for internal control and has discretionary power 
to override or restructure the internal control system. Managers can commit 
fraud by overriding internal controls, and audits conducted in accordance 
with auditing standards do not always distinguish between errors and fraud 
(Capalan, 1999, p.101). Evidence suggests that, although better internal 
controls would prevent or discourage fraudulent conduct on the part of 
employees, it would be more difficult to prevent fraud at the top level: 
 In 1992, General Electric (GE) allegedly misappropriated $26.5 
million from the U.S. government by falsifying accounting records in 
conjunction with a sale of weapons to Israel. GE was accused of violating not 
only the FCPA but also the Money Laundering Control Act, among other 
laws, and was ordered to pay $69 million in fines. 
 In 1995, Lockheed was prosecuted for violating the FCPA based on 
its alleged payment of a bribe of $1 million to a member of the Egyptian 
parliament in order to sell its military jets to Egypt’s armed forces. The 
company paid a $24.8 million fine. In this case, a fine of $20,000 was also 
imposed on the responsible manager, and the vice president of Middle East 
and North Africa marketing was fined $125,000 and sentenced to 18 months 
in prison. 
 In 1998, a large U.S. oil company, Saybolt, was prosecuted for 








government official to obtain a lease for a site near the Panama canal, and 
paid a fine of $4.9 million. 
 In 1996, Montedison, a major Italian company listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, allegedly concealed hundreds of millions of dollars in losses 
by falsifying its books, and paid bribes to Italian politicians and others. The 
SEC filed a civil suit alleging violations of FCPA accounting standards. In 
response, the company reformed its internal controls and settled the case with 
the SEC for $300,000.  
According to the results of the Management Barometer Survey 2004 79 
percent of senior executives of U.S. MNCs stated that their company needed 
improvements in order to comply with Section 404 of Sarbanes- Oxley Act, 
which requires companies to file a management assertion and auditor 
attestation on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting. 
They also mentioned the areas needing remedies (Table 12.2). 
For effective governance, the ultimate responsibility for internal control 
should be vested in the board, which represents shareholders. The board is 
responsible for achieving corporate objectives by providing guidance for 
corporate strategy and monitoring management. The board is effective only 
if it is reasonably independent from management. Board independence 
usually requires a sufficient number of outsiders; an adequate time devoted 
by the members; and access to accurate, relevant, and timely information. 
 
Table 12.2 – The areas needing remedies, according to the Management 
Barometer Survey 2004 
The areas  % 
Financial processes 55% 
Computer controls 48 
Internal audit effectiveness 37 
Security controls 35 
Audit committee oversight 26 
Fraud programs 24 
 
Because the board is usually not engaged in its work on a full-time basis, 
it needs to rely on experts for necessary information, such as the internal 
auditor and the external auditor. Being employees of the company, internal 
auditors are faced with a built-in conflict in regard to their allegiance. This 
makes the role of the external auditor crucial. External auditors are normally 
required to make an assessment of the internal control. If the external auditors 
are to attest to the “fair representation” or “true and fair view” of the financial 
position of the firm, they need to be able to form their opinion independent 
of the board and management. However, the issue of auditor independence is 
complicated by the facts that auditors are paid by the auditee company – more 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 




specifically, its management – and often the auditors provide consultancy 





1. What are the main differences between internal auditing and external 
auditing within an MNC? 
2. What norms does the internal auditing activities include, as stated in ISA 
610? 
3. What Competing Demands on Internal Audit Function canyou name? 
4. Which areas needed improvement to meet the requirements of the 
Section 404 of Sarbanes- Oxley Act? 









































So far in this chapter we have discussed the current status with regard to 
various auditing issues that are important to MNCs. In this section, we 
provide some thoughts on the likely future developments. We identify them 
in terms of consumer demand for auditing, increased competition in the audit 
market, Big Four firms’ continued high interest in the audit market, increased 
exposure of Big Four firms, a tendency toward a checklist approach, and the 
possibility that audit may not be the external auditor’s exclusive domain. 
Building robust corporate governance systems and processes, managing 
risk on a global scale, and complying with an increasingly vast web of 
regulatory requirements is difficult, costly, and time-consuming for MNCs. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) has had a noticeable effect on corporate 
behavior, particularly in regard to disclosure of information. For example, a 
recent survey of 2,588 global companies found that 95 percent of U.S. 
companies (versus 65 percent in 2002) now report having a qualified financial 
expert on the audit committee (More details about rating of companies from 
different countries can be obtained at www.Gmiratings.com). However, in 
November 2004, a study of audit firm performance, based on interviews with 
1,007 audit committee chairs and 944 CFOs, indicated that there was a 
significant angst among them. Top management was concerned about the 
costs, in terms of money and time, of implementing the extensive 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). Audit committee chairs were 
feeling the pressure of increased accountability of the required financial 
reporting process. Further, a survey conducted by Financial Executives 
International (FEI) found that the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404 requirements was much more than companies expected. The 
Year 1 cost averaged $4.36 million, up 39 percent from the $3.14 million they 
expected to pay based on FEI’s July 2004 cost survey. 
Consumer Demand 
Historically, the assurance opinion of the statutory auditor has been led 
by legislation rather than by consumer demand. In the future, however, there 
will be increasing demand to meet the needs of consumers at a global level 
(Percy, 1999). For example, with the disclosure of corporate information on 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 




the Internet, auditors will be expected to find new ways of giving assurance 
on that information, which would not be limited to financial information, and 
on a real-time basis. A report published by the IASC in November 1999 
concluded that there was a need for a generic code of conduct for Internet-
based business reporting (Lymer et al., 1999). The report suggested that such 
a code should include conditions clearly setting out the information that is 
consistent with the printed annual report, which contains the audited financial 
statements. It also pointed out that the users of Internet-based reports are 
likely to be confused as to which part of the Web site relates to the audit 
report, signed off by an auditor. From the auditor’s point of view, there is a 
risk involved when the financial report issued by the entity (on which the 
auditor provides an audit report) is materially misstated due to unauthorized 
tampering. This could put auditors at risk of legal action. 
Attempts are being made to find solutions to some of these problems on 
a national basis. For example, according to recent legislation in Australia, 
stockholders are allowed to put questions in writing to auditors in advance of 
the annual general meeting. However, it appears that governments have now 
realized the importance of collective action at the international level in this 
area.  
Reporting on the Internet 
The AICPA and the CICA have developed a set of principles and criteria 
to provide assurance services in the area of electronic business. Accordingly, 
public accounting firms and practitioners, who have a Web Trust business 
license from an authorized professional accounting body, can provide 
assurance services to evaluate and test whether a particular Web site meets 
these principles and criteria. The AICPA/CICA initiative has received 
international recognition as a major development (For example, the third 
version of CICA/AICPA Web Trust principles is available at 
www.accounting education.com/news/news497.html). 
Increased Competition in the Audit Market 
In the current global environment, auditor independence in the traditional 
sense is becoming increasingly problematic as both the audit firms and their 
clients grow in size and complexity. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
has proposed more stringent independence standards, including some 
restrictions on the delivery of audit and nonaudit services to the same client, 
the Big Four international auditing firms need to ensure that they are 
independent both in fact and in perception. This is critical because the 
perception of a lack of independence will reduce the quality premium the Big 
Four firms are able to charge their clients and will open the audit market to 
more competition. 








an assurance of their effectiveness. In addition, there is an increasing demand 
for assurance on the effectiveness and quality of management arrangements 
and corporate governance. These new demands will require new skills. This 
will also encourage those not trained in accountancy, but trained in 
investigative matters in other areas, such as the environment and technology, 
to develop into a competitive force. In other words, nonaccounting groups 
may enter the audit market, which traditionally has been the domain of the 
accounting profession, protected by statutory franchise. 
Continued High Interest in the Audit Market 
Because they have a virtual monopoly of the large-firm audit market, the 
Big Four have been able to use this market to build their brands. They audit 
the world’s largest 100 companies, with market capitalization ranging from 
US$31 billion to $273 billion (see www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen1_9.htm). The 
audit market will remain central to the Big Four firms’ operations because it 
helps them to maintain their brands. This will continue to be the case in the 
future, as it will be more difficult for the large firms to develop a reputation 
for perceived quality and build brands in the nonaudit market given that they 
are competing against recognized competitors with their own brands, such as 
McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group. Thus, even though the audit market 
is not extremely profitable, it will be in the interest of the Big Four to protect 
this market from the encroachment of competitors. 
Increased Exposure of the International Auditing Firms 
Becoming more global also means becoming more visible. The Big Four 
international auditing firms audit MNCs listed in numerous jurisdictions, and 
as these companies grow and become more globalized, the Big Four are 
increasingly coming under the watchful eye of global financiers and 
regulatory institutions. 
The Big Four accounting firms, which together audit more than 90 percent 
of the world’s largest businesses, can expect a more intense focus on their 
activities than at any time since the aftermath of the scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom, and Parmalat. There will be renewed interest in what users can 
expect from an audit. The audit firms need to recognize that the nature of 
business has changed. It is quicker,  more connected, more global, and very 
different to the nature of business in the last century. Questions such as these 
will be the subjects of discussion and debate: 
Have auditors kept pace with changes in the nature of business? 
Do auditors, like rating agencies, suffer from a potential conflict of 
interest because they are paid by those they judge? 
Particularly, with such big fees available, it is likely that politicians and 
regulators will be considering whether auditors face a temptation to sign off 
on practices that meet the rules but may present a misleading picture. 
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Tendency toward a Checklist Approach 
The advent of litigation and the need for efficiency and effectiveness has 
driven the audit in some cases to be led more by process than by judgment. 
Given the various codes of corporate governance, regulations, and auditing 
standards and guidelines, there is a tendency for auditors to use a checklist 
approach in order to protect themselves from litigation (Percy, 1999).  
Auditing No Longer Only the Domain of the External Auditor 
Given the increased attention on corporate governance and the resulting 
changes to corporate structures in recent years, no longer is auditing only the 
domain of the external auditor. The audit function is increasingly becoming 
a process that involves a partnership between the audit committee, internal 
auditors, and external auditors. 
Different Corporate Governance Models 
Currently, the UK model of splitting the roles of chairperson and chief 
executive is  taking hold globally. As recently as 2002, more than half of 
incoming chief executives at North American and European companies also 
chaired their company’s board. In 2009, that number fell to less than 17 
percent in North America and 7 percent in Europe. UK good governance 
guidelines have long advocated splitting the job to strengthen the board’s 
oversight role. This can be described as the globalization of governance. 
There is also growing use of the Japanese “apprenticeship” model, in which 
the outgoing chief executive is promoted to chairperson to oversee his or her 
replacement. In Japan, this happens in 75 percent of companies. This 
happened in more than 40 percent of North American companies in the 2005–





1. Recent corporate disasters have prompted regulatory measures that 
emphasize the importance of assurance services as essential ingredient 
in establishing and maintaining investor confidence in markets through 
corporate governance. 
2. Over the years, the international aspects of auditing have received 
relatively less attention among policymakers and researchers, compared 
to the international accounting standards. 
3. MNCs are realizing the need to pay attention to corporate governance 
issues in their efforts to succeed in increasingly competitive global 
markets. 
4. The role of the external auditor can vary in different countries. For 








than that of their counterparts in the United Kingdom or the United 
States. 
5. Corporate structure is an important factor that determines the purpose 
of external audit. For example, some European countries have a two-
tiered corporate structure, with a supervisory board and a management 
board. The supervisory board has general oversight function over the 
performance of the management board and the basic function of the 
statutory auditor is to assist the supervisory board. This is different from 
the situation that exists in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
6. Audit quality is likely to vary in different audit environments, and the 
audit environments in different countries are determined by cultural, 
legal, financing, and infrastructural factors. 
7. The approaches taken to regulate the audit function in different 
countries range from heavy reliance on the profession, for example, in 
the United Kingdom, to heavy reliance on the government, for example, 
in China. 
8. The nature of the audit report varies depending largely on the legal 
requirements in a particular country and the listing status of the 
company concerned. 
9. The responsibility for harmonizing auditing standards internationally 
rests mainly with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 
10. Auditors are subject to civil liability, criminal liability, and professional 
sanctions. 
11. Different approaches have been taken in different countries to deal with 
the issues concerning the auditor’s liability to third parties, and the 
principle of joint and several liability. 
12. Recently many countries have turned increased attention to audit 
committees as an important instrument of corporate governance. 
13. Currently, regulators in the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
some other countries have placed emphasis on public oversight bodies 
to monitor issues of auditor independence. 
14. Large auditing firms have adopted a policy of splitting the auditing and 
non-auditing work into separate entities as a way of demonstrating 
independence. 
15. Internal auditing is an integral part of multinational business 
management, as it helps restore/maintain credibility of the business 
reporting system. The demand for internal auditing has grown during 
the past three decades, particularly due to regulatory and legislative 
requirements in many countries. 
 
 
  [НАЗВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТА] 






1. What are the current trends in consumer demand for international 
auditing? 
2. What increase competition in the Audit Market?  
3. What contributes to the continuation high interest in the Audit Market? 
4. Why is the influence of international audit firms increasing? 






1. Refer to the Report of Independent Auditors of Unilever NV and 
Unilever PLC, signed on 1 March 2005 (see the appendix to this chapter). 
Required: Identify the features in the above audit report that are unique 
to an MNC. 
2. ISA 700 describes three types of audit opinions that can be expressed by 
the auditor when an unqualified opinion is not appropriate: qualified, 
adverse, and disclaimer of opinion. Required: What are the 
circumstances under which each of the above three opinions should be 
expressed? ISA700 is accessible from the IFAC Web site ( www.ifac.org 
). 
3. Internationally, legislators and professional bodies have focused on 
corporategovernance issues in making recommendations for restoring 
investor confidence, and auditing is an essential part of corporate 
governance.Required:Explain the link between auditing and corporate 
governance. 
4.  Some commentators argue that the two-tiered corporate structure, with 
a management board and a supervisory board, prevalent in many 
Continental European countries, is better suited for addressing corporate 
governance issues,including the issue of auditor independence, 
compared to that with one boardof directors prevalent in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Required: Evaluate the merits of the above argument. 
5. There is a unique ownership structure of many former stateowned 
enterprises in China, which have been redefined to create new economic 
entities. Required: Describe the uniqueness of the ownership structure of 
the entities mentioned above, and explain its implications for auditing. 
6.  There is the concept of accounting infrastructure, which encompasses 
the various environmental factors affecting the issues concerning 








factors that affect the issues concerning auditing in your own country. 
7.  The establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) in 2002 was a major step toward strengthening the auditing 
function in the United States. Required: What can the PCAOB do to 
strengthen the auditing function in the United States? Provide examples 
of two key steps it has taken so far to achieve this. 
8.  In Anglo-Saxon countries, mechanisms are put in place to regulate 
auditors within the framework of professional self-regulation, whereas 
in many Continental European countries, quasi-governmental agencies 
play a major role in this area. Required: (a) Briefly describe the main 
differences between the audit regulation mechanisms in the United States 
and Germany, (b) Compare the audit regulation mechanisms in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
9. The responsibility for harmonizing auditing standards across countries 
rests with IFAC. Required: Comment on some of the problems faced by 
IFAC in achieving the above goal. 
10.  There is no agreement internationally on how to address the issue of 
auditor liability. Required: Describe the approach taken in your own 
country in addressing the issue of auditor liability, and explain the 
rationale behind that approach. 
11.  The UK Corporate Governance Code takes the “comply or explain” 
approach. Required: (a) Describe the main features of the comply or 
explain approach to corporate governance, (b) Why do think this 
approach seems to be popular internationally?  
 
 
Case 13.1. Director’s dilemma: chairman’s conflict of interest 
 
The scenario 
David is a long-standing expert in the airline business. He has been non-
executive chairman of a large listed low-cost airline, RA plc, for 16 years. A 
recent Sunday newspaper has revealed that David’s own multi-million dollar 
investment company, which he co-founded some years ago, is a bidder for an 
airport that is up for sale. RA plc is the airport’s biggest customer and has, 
until recently, also been interested in buying the airport. 
Question: Should the chairman, through his investment company, bid for 
the airport that is up for sale? 
Analysis – issues to consider/debate: 
1. Is David a suitable chairman of RA plc? 
2. Does David have a conflict of interest? 
3. If David has a conflict of interest, how should it be handled at the 
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RA plc board? 
4. If David has a conflict of interest, how should it be handled at his 
investment company board? 
5. What are the issues concerning this matter from the managing director 
of RA plc’s point of view? 
6. What are the issues concerning this matter from the board of RA plc’s 
point of view? 
Formulating a course of action 
This dilemma is in that the conflict of interest relates to the chairman. The 
chairman does not currently have a conflict of interest. There is no evidence 
that the chairman influenced RA plc in dropping its interest in buying the 
airport. However, the proposed transaction through his company could 
potentially result in a conflict of interest, arising from RA plc being the 
biggest customer of the airport the chairman’s company is contemplating 
buying. This conflict of interest is not directly between the chairman and the 
company, RA plc. Rather, it potentially arises indirectly because of the 
chairman’s potential ownership (through his investment company) of a 
supplier to RA plc. 
Identification of key parties to the dilemma. 
There are four key parties to this dilemma: 
Chairman David: It appears that the chairman of the board may be 
contemplating a transaction which, if it proceeds, could introduce a 
significant conflict of interest for him. 
It is not clear that buying another company that has a relationship with 
RA plc involves an insurmountable conflict of interest for the chairman. 
Inevitably, from time to time, directors may have a conflict of interest with 
their company. However, in this case, pricing of the airport services to RA 
plc is at the heart of the conflict of interest and is fundamental. Thus, it 
appears that the conflict of interest for David if his company purchases the 
airport could be so systematic as to suggest his continuing position on the RA 
plc board would be inappropriate. 
If David’s company decides to go ahead with the tender, should David 
remain on the board of RA plc at that stage? 
The wording of the dilemma (‘A recent Sunday newspaper has revealed’) 
implies that information on the proposed transaction may not have been 
known to the board prior to the newspaper article. Such information 
asymmetry between the chairman and his board may undermine trust on the 
board.  
Board terms of reference documents usually set out how such occasional 
conflicts of interest are to be handled. They are usually handled by conflicted 








receiving minutes of meetings recording how the issue was dealt with by the 
board and absenting themselves from parts of the meeting where the issue of 
conflict is being discussed. 
Senior independent director (see below): This non-executive director 
should act as mediator between the views of the chairman and the views of 
other directors on the board. 
Other directors: Other directors will have to make their views known on 
the proposed transaction, possibly through the senior independent director. If 
the transaction takes place, other directors should require full transparency to 
the shareholders of the event. 
External auditors: If the transaction goes ahead, it may have to be 
disclosed in the annual report as a related party transaction and be subject to 
questioning at the next annual general meeting. Obtaining the advice of the 
finance director, supported possibly by advice from/briefing by the external 
auditors to the board as part of their audit, on the disclosures required by law 
and by accounting standards would ensure directors have clarity on the 
consequences of the transaction proceeding.   
Legal regulations to be considered and any pertinent associated case 
law 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures requires the disclosure of related party 
transactions. In defining related parties, a distinction is made between persons 
and entities who are related parties. A person (e.g., David, the chairman) who 
is a director is a related party of the company. An entity is a related party of 
the company where the entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a director 
of the company. It would appear, therefore, that David’s company is a related 
party to RA plc. The entity is David’s own, which he co-founded, and 
therefore is probably controlled by him. The consequences of RA plc and 
David’s entity being related parties is that the transactions between the two 
will have to be disclosed in the annual financial statements. This could cause 
proprietary information (i.e., valuable private commercial information) to be 
revealed publicly 
Guidance from codes of best practice such as The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
Supporting principle A.1 of The UK Corporate Governance Code states 
that ‘All directors must act in what they consider to be the best interests of 
the company, consistent with their statutory duties’, which are set out in the 
Companies Act 2006 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The Parliament, 2006). 
Code provision A.4.1 of The UK Corporate Governance Code requires 
(on a comply-or-explain basis) the appointment of one of the independent 
non-executive directors as senior independent director. The role of the senior 
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independent director is inter alia to act as a sounding board for the chairman, 
as an intermediary for the other directors and as an extra channel of 
communication for shareholders (in addition to the managing director and 
chairman) for unresolved concerns. 
David has been serving as chairman for 16 years. Code provision A.3.1 
of The UK Corporate Governance Code requires (on a comply-or-explain 
basis) the chairman on appointment to meet the seven independence criteria 
under Code provision B.1.1. One of these is service on the board of more than 
nine years. Given the chairman’s tenure, should the board be considering 
succession planning for this role? 
Application of ethical principles 
It is not clear from this dilemma that there is an insurmountable conflict 
of interest in this case. If David’s company purchases the airport, this will 
result in a conflict of interest, which of itself is not unethical. It is a question 
of how the conflict of interest is handled. David will be privy to detailed 
financial information concerning RA plc. A supplier (such as David’s 
company) to RA plc with such detailed financial information could use the 
information to its advantage. For example, there is a risk that the detailed 
financial information could be used during pricing negotiations with RA plc. 
This suggests that the conflict of interest in this dilemma is systematic. All 
board meetings of RA plc would consider detailed financial information of 
RA plc. It would be inconceivable for the chairman to have to leave every 
meeting of RA plc. It would be unworkable for the chairman not to receive 
financial information on RA plc. 
 
 
Case 13.2. Director’s dilemma: trade-offs between conflicting objectives  
 
The scenario 
You are a non-executive director of a railway company charged with 
running trains and managing the railway track infrastructure. Passenger 
safety is a regular topic on the board agenda. Passengers have persistently 
complained about the high price of train fares, and this has also attracted 
adverse newspaper coverage. 
The company’s chief transport officer has tabled a significant and very 
material capital expenditure project for the forthcoming board agenda. The 
proposal is to install a very expensive cutting-edge, state-of-the-art signalling 
system. The railway company will have the best and safest system in the 
world if the project goes ahead. The effect of the plan will be to significantly 
increase journey cost. 








views on a more expensive transport system and a safer signalling system, 
have overwhelmingly chosen the less expensive option. Passengers have 
indicated that if prices go up they will move to a cheaper supplier, which has 
experienced a number of accidents resulting in serious injuries of its 
passengers. 
Question: Would you approve more expensive but much safer equipment 
which would result in loss of business because of higher prices?  
Analysis – issues to consider/debate: 
1. What are the commercial issues at play in this dilemma? 
2. What are the trade-offs at play in this dilemma? 
3. What are the risks and rewards of approving/not approving the capital 
expenditure proposal? 
4. As a non-executive director, what are your responsibilities and how 
would you prioritise these? 
5. Would you approve the capital expenditure proposal, and why/why 
not? 
Formulating a course of action 
This dilemma entails cost-benefit trade-offs which involve issues of 
company performance, governance, reputation and ethics. In a nutshell, the 
trade-offs involve profitability versus customer/passenger safety. Resolving 
the trade-offs is a matter of judgement for the board of directors. As the 
network railway infrastructure and train companies are separated in the UK, 
this dilemma would not arise in that jurisdiction. Identification of key parties 
to the dilemma 
There are two key parties to this dilemma: 
Board of directors: The board is presented with a decision trading off 
significantly increased costs and likely reduced profitability in favour of 
passenger safety which passengers have indicated in a survey they will not 
pay for. The board needs to exercise scepticism and challenge the results of 
the survey. The results of such a survey are likely to be influenced by how 
the survey questions have been framed. Were the questions asked in a 
different manner would the results have been the same? Were the railway 
company itself to experience a significant railway accident in the future, and 
it were to come to light the board had not approved an expenditure on 
passenger safety, judgement of the board’s decision is likely to be adversely 
affected by subsequent events not existing at the time of the decision. If the 
board chooses to invest in the safer signalling system, it might make this a 
unique selling point of the company and promote the company’s services as 
safer than the competition. 
Customers/passengers: In addition, passengers might answer the 
questions differently were there to be a significant railway accident in the 
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future. What people say in a questionnaire survey cannot be relied upon, as 
passenger views may change, and would certainly change in the event of an 
accident.  
Legal regulations to be considered and any pertinent associated case 
law 
It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the detailed laws and 
regulations on health and safety. Under Section 37 of the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974, in the event a company is found to have committed an 
offence under the Act, with the consent, connivance or neglect of a director, 
manager or secretary those parties are guilty of an offence. Obtaining 
convictions against individuals under this legislation can be difficult. The 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 introduced the 
offence of Corporate Manslaughter but only companies not directors can be 
found liable under the legislation. 
In the recent case of Lion Steel where an employee fell through a roof, 
the managing director, finance director and one other director were charged 
with health and safety offences and with gross negligence manslaughter. 
Following a hastily convened board meeting, the directors instructed the 
company to plead guilty to the charge of corporate manslaughter. The 
company was fined £480,000. 
Guidance from codes of best practice such as The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 
2018) advocates a long-term perspective for board decisions, referencing the 
phrase ‘long-term success’ a number of times.  
The FRC’s Guidelines on Board Effectiveness (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2011) warns against boards paying insufficient attention to risk in 
making decisions. 
Application of ethical principles 
This dilemma deals with the trade-off between monetary rewards versus 
human safety. Which is more important: profit or human life? It also involves 
consideration of short-term versus long-term interests. Monetary rewards are 
current and measurable. The risk of an accident is in the future and 
contingent. It could be argued that in the long term, safer railways may attract 
more passengers. 
 
Case 13.3. Director’s dilemma: gifts 
 
The scenario 
You are a non-executive director in an engineering company that prides 








staff member in the organisation that around Christmas time employees 
receive gifts from clients. This is a norm in the industry. The gifts range from 
boxes of chocolates/bottles of wine, to cases of wine and other drinks, to gift 
certificates and cash. As the company operates in countries all over the world, 
such gifts are a feature of doing business in those parts of the world. Further, 
to refuse such gifts would cause extreme offence to clients, as a result of 
which the engineering company would lose business. 
Question: As a non-executive director, what is your view of employees 
receiving gifts at Christmas? 
Analysis – issues to consider/debate 
1. How should boards/board members handle hearsay? 
2. What high level principles would you apply in this dilemma? 
3. What policies, processes and procedures of the company would you 
consult in this matter? 
4. What policies, processes and procedures of the company would you 
expect to be in place in this matter? 
5. What are the arguments for and against the company’s staff receiving 
gifts at Christmas? 
6. How should the gifts received this coming Christmas be handled? 
Formulating a course of action 
The giving and receiving of gifts are common in business – more common 
in some countries than in others. While the monetary amounts involved may 
be quite small, it is important to treat gifts properly, given their influence on 
the culture and ethics in the business. There are legal and reputational risks 
to companies as a consequence of inappropriate treatment of gifts. Staff also 
need to be protected from allegations of inappropriate behaviour. 
Identification of key parties to the dilemma 
There are three key parties to this dilemma: 
Board of directors: A key role of the board is to set the tone at the top. 
Although the amounts involved may not be material, gifts and hospitality are 
particularly important for the board to handle properly in setting the tone at 
the top. Does the company have a policy on gifts, hospitality, favours, 
sponsorship and entertainment? The policy should cover gifts offered, given, 
provided or accepted by employees and their family members. The policy 
should cover cash and non-cash items. The board has to consider whether a 
blanket prohibition on gifts is appropriate or whether gifts up to a certain 
value are acceptable. The policy should ensure that no gift could be construed 
as a bribe or payoff, and that any gifts do not violate laws or regulations. Gifts 
might be pooled within the organisation such that no individual could be 
accused of being influenced by a gift. Alternatively, gifts could be auctioned 
at the Christmas Party for charity. 
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Management: If there is a policy on gifts, favours and entertainment, 
management must ensure that the policy is robustly implemented. 
Implementation may involve a carrot-and-stick approach. In particular, for 
employees found to have breached the policy, sanctions may be appropriate. 
Management may also have to introduce training for employees to ensure that 
they understand the policy in practice. 
Employees: In an industry where gifts are the norm, and where offence 
may be taken if employees do not accept a gift, the employer has a duty to 
protect employees through implementing an appropriate policy and 
guidelines for employees. This may entail keeping a register of gifts 
received/offered/accepted. 
Legal regulations to be considered and any pertinent associated case 
law 
The Bribery Act 2010 (OECD, 1997) applies to UK companies and 
includes their operations outside the UK. Lavish gifts and hospitality could 
be caught under this legislation. In 2012, ICAS and the Serious Fraud Office 
provided guidance on gifts and hospitality under the Act. While recognising 
that bona fide hospitality or promotional or other legitimate business 
expenditure is an established and important part of doing business, the 
guidance warns that bribes are sometimes disguised as legitimate business 
expenses. 
Guidance from codes of best practice such as The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
The introduction to The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2018) observes that the board’s actions are subject to 
laws, regulations and shareholders in general meetings. Thus, the board 
should ensure that the company’s policies on gifts and hospitality meets legal 
requirements. A requirement of The UK Corporate Governance Code is for 
the board to set the values of the company. These values should be reflected 
in a company policy on gifts and hospitality. A strong policy on gifts and 
hospitality is also likely to protect the company’s reputation. 
Application of ethical principles 
Part C of ICAS’s Code of Ethics addresses the issue of inducements for 
professional accountants. Inducements include gifts, hospitality, preferential 
treatment, and inappropriate appeals to friendship or loyalty. Offers of 
inducements may create threats to compliance with the Codes’ five 
fundamental principles. The existence and significance of any threats will 
depend on the nature, value and intent behind the offer. If a reasonable and 
informed third party, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances, would 
consider the inducement insignificant and not intended to encourage 








that the offer is made in the normal course of business and may generally 
conclude that there is no significant threat to compliance with the 
fundamental principles. When the threats cannot be eliminated or reduced to 
an acceptable level through the application of safeguards, a professional 
accountant in business shall not accept the inducement. A professional 
accountant in business is advised under the Code to evaluate any threats 
created by such offers and determine whether to take one or more of the 
following actions: 
 inform higher levels of management or those charged with 
governance; 
 inform third parties of the offer – for example, ICAS or the employer 
of the individual who made the offer – which may involve seeking legal 
advice before taking such a step; 
 advise immediate or close family members of relevant threats; and 
 inform higher levels of management or those charged with governance 
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COCA-COLA COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES 
 
Extract from Form 10-K Report for the fiscal year ended December 
31, 2008 
Report of Management on Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
 
Management of the Company is responsible for the preparation and 
integrity of the consolidated financial statements appearing in our annual 
report on Form 10-K. The financial statements were prepared in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles appropriate in the 
circumstances and, accordingly, include certain amounts based on our best 
judgments and estimates. Financial information in this annual report on Form 
10-K is consistent with that in the financial statements. 
Management of the Company is responsible for establishing and 
maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting as such term is 
defined in Rule 13a-15(f) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”). The Company’s internal control over financial reporting 
is designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of 
financial reporting and the preparation of the consolidated financial 
statements. Our internal control over financial reporting is supported by a 
program of internal audits and appropriate reviews by management, written 
policies and guidelines, careful selection and training of qualified personnel 
and a written Code of Business Conduct adopted by our Company’s Board of 
Directors, applicable to all officers and employees of our Company and 
subsidiaries. In addition, our Company’s Board of Directors adopted a written 
Code of Business Conduct for Non- Employee Directors which reflects the 
same principles and values as our Code of Business Conduct for officers and 
employees but focuses on matters of most relevance to non-employee 
Directors. 
Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial 
reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements and, even when 
determined to be effective, can only provide reasonable assurance with 
respect to financial statement preparation and presentation. Also, projections 
of any evaluation of effectiveness to future periods are subject to the risk that 
controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the 
degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
The Audit Committee of our Company’s Board of Directors, 
composed solely of Directors who are independent in accordance with the 





requirements of the New York Stock Exchange listing standards, the 
Exchange Act and the Company’s Corporate Governance Guidelines, meets 
with the independent auditors, management and internal auditors periodically 
to discuss internal control over financial reporting and auditing and financial 
reporting matters. The Audit Committee reviews with the independent 
auditors the scope and results of the audit effort. The Audit Committee also 
meets periodically with the independent auditors and the chief internal 
auditor without management present to ensure that the independent auditors 
and the chief internal auditor have free access to the Audit Committee. Our 
Audit Committee’s Report can be found in the Company’s 2009 Proxy 
Statement. 
Management assessed the effectiveness of the Company’s internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2008. In making this 
assessment, management used the criteria set forth by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework. Based on our assessment, management 
believes that the Company maintained effective internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 2008. 
The Company’s independent auditors, Ernst & Young LLP, a 
registered public accounting firm, are appointed by the Audit Committee of 
the Company’s Board of Directors, subject to ratification by our Company’s 
shareowners. Ernst & Young LLP has audited and reported on the 
consolidated financial statements of The Coca-Cola Company and 
subsidiaries and the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. The 
reports of the independent auditors are contained in this annual report. 
 
 Muhtar Kent 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
February 26, 2009 
Gary P. Fayard 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer 
February 26, 2009 
 Harry L. Anderson 
Vice President and Controller 















COCA-COLA COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES 
 
Extract from Form 10-K Report for the fiscal year ended December 
31, 2008 
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm On Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting 
 
Board of Directors and Shareowners 
The Coca-Cola Company 
We have audited The Coca-Cola Company’s internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 2008, based on criteria established in 
Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (the COSO criteria). 
The Coca-Cola Company’s management is responsible for maintaining 
effective internal control over financial reporting, and for its assessment of 
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting included in the 
accompanying Report of Management on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company’s 
internal control over financial reporting based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether effective internal control over financial reporting was 
maintained in all material respects. Our audit included obtaining an 
understanding of internal control over financial reporting, assessing the risk 
that a material weakness exists, testing and evaluating the design and 
operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk, and 
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our 
opinion. 
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. A company’s 
internal control over financial reporting includes those policies and 
procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 





assets of the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts 
and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance with 
authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide 
reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of 
unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that 
could have a material effect on the financial statements. 
Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial 
reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of effectiveness to future periods are subject to the risk that 
controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the 
degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
In our opinion, The Coca-Cola Company maintained, in all material 
respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 
31, 2008, based on the COSO criteria. 
We also have audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the consolidated 
balance sheets of The Coca-Cola Company and subsidiaries as of December 
31, 2008 and 2007, and the related consolidated statements of income, 
shareowners’ equity, and cash flows for each of the three years in the period 
ended December 31, 2008, and our report dated February 26, 2009 expressed 
an unqualified opinion thereon. 
 
Ernst & Young LLP 
Atlanta, Georgia 














EXAMPLES OF 2009 AUDIT REPORTS FROM MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 
 
The following audits were prepared in accordance with the 
requirements in the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and China. 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
China Southern Airline Co. Ltd 
KPMG 
 
Independent auditor’s report to the shareholders of China Southern 
Airlines Company Limited 
(Incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability) 
We have audited the consolidated financial statements of China 
Southern Airlines Company Limited (the “Company”) and its subsidiaries 
(the “Group”) set out on pages 46 to 138, which comprise the consolidated 
and company balance sheets as at 31 December 2009, and the consolidated 
income statement, the consolidated statement of comprehensive income, the 
consolidated statement of changes in equity and the consolidated cash flow 
statement for the year then ended, and a summary of significant accounting 
policies and other explanatory notes. 
Directors’ Responsibility for the Financial Statements 
The directors of the Company are responsible for the preparation and 
the true and fair presentation of these financial statements in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the disclosure requirements of the 
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. This responsibility includes designing, 
implementing and maintaining internal control relevant to the preparation and 
the true and fair presentation of financial statements that are free from 
material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, selecting and applying 
appropriate accounting policies, and making accounting estimates that are 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
Auditor’s Responsibility 
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 
statements based on our audit. This report is made solely to you, as a body, 
and for no other purpose. We do not assume responsibility towards or accept 





liability to any other person for the contents of this report. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with Hong Kong Standards on 
Auditing issued by the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Those standards require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance as to whether the 
financial statements are free from material misstatement. 
An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence 
about the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. The procedures 
selected depend on the auditor’s judgement, including the assessment of the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to 
fraud or error. In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal 
control relevant to the entity’s preparation and true and fair presentation of 
the financial statements in order to design audit procedures that are 
appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an 
opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s internal control. An audit also 
includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the 
reasonableness of accounting estimates made by the directors, as well as 
evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements. 
We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and 
appropriate to provide a basis for our audit opinion. 
Opinion 
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements give a true and 
fair view of the financial position of the Company and of the Group as at 31 
December 2009 and of the Group’s financial performance and cash flows for 
the year then ended in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards and have been properly prepared in accordance with the disclosure 
requirements of the Hong Kong  Companies Ordinance. 
 
KPMG 
Certified Public Accountants 
8th Floor, Prince’s Building 
10 Chater Road 
Central, Hong Kong 
The People’s Republic of China 














INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
China Eastern Airline Corp. Ltd 
 
To the Shareholders of China Eastern Airlines Corporation 
Limited(incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability) 
We have audited the financial statements of China Eastern Airlines 
Corporation Limited (the “Company”) and its subsidiaries (together, the 
“Group”) set out on pages 66 to 164, which comprise the consolidated and 
Company balance sheets as at 31 December 2009, and the consolidated 
statement of comprehensive income, the consolidated statement of changes 
in equity and the consolidated cash flow statement for the year then ended, 
and a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes. 
Directors’ Responsibility for the Financial Statements 
The Directors of the Company are responsible for the preparation and 
the true and fair presentation of these financial statements in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards and the disclosure requirements 
of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. This responsibility include: 
designing, implementing and maintaining internal control relevant to the 
preparation and the true and fair presentation of financial statements that are 
free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, selecting and 
applying appropriate accounting policies; and making accounting estimates 
that are reasonable in the circumstances. 
Auditor’s Responsibility 
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 
statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with 
International Standards on Auditing Those Standards require that we comply 
with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance whether the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement. An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit 
evidence about the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. The 
procedures selected depend on the auditor’s judgment, including the 
assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, 
whether due to fraud or error. In making those risk assessments, the auditor 
considers internal control relevant to the entity’s preparation and true and fair 
presentation of the financial statements in order to design audit procedures 
that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of 
expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s internal control. An 
audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used 
and the reasonableness of accounting estimates made by the Directors, as well 
as evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements. 
We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and 





appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion. 
Opinion 
In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the 
state of affairs of the Company and the Group as at 31 December 2009, and 
of the Group’s financial performance and cash flows for the year then ended 
in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and have 
been properly prepared in accordance with the disclosure requirements of the 
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. 
Other Matters 
This report, including the opinion, has been prepared for and only for 
you, as a body, and for no other purpose. We do not assume responsibility 
towards or accept liability to any other person for the contents of this report. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Certified Public Accountants 
Hong Kong, 19 April 2010 
 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, Leverkusen 
 
Auditor’s Report 
We have audited the consolidated financial statements prepared by 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, Leverkusen, comprising the income statement and 
statement of comprehensive income, statement of financial position, 
statement of cash flows, statement of changes in equity and the notes to the 
consolidated financial statements, together with the group management 
report for the business year from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009, 
which is combined with the management report of the company. The 
preparation of the consolidated financial statements and the combined 
management report in accordance with the IFRS, as adopted by the E.U., and 
the additional requirements of German commercial law pursuant to § 
(Article) 315a Abs. (paragraph) 1 HGB (“Handeisgesetzbuch”: 
German Commercial Code (Germany. Federal Office of Justice, 1897) 
are the responsibility of the parent Company’s Board of Management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on the consolidated financial 
statements and on the combined management report based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit of the consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with § 317 HGB and German generally accepted standards for 
the audit of financial statements promulgated by the Institut der 








additionally observed the International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit such that misstatements 
materially affecting the presentation of the net assets, financial position and 
results of operations in the consolidated financial statements in accordance 
with the applicable financial reporting framework and in the combined 
management report are detected with reasonable assurance. Knowledge of 
the business activities and the economic and legal environment of the Group 
and expectations as to possible misstatements are taken into account in the 
determination of audit procedures. The effectiveness of the accounting-
related internal control system and the evidence supporting the disclosures in 
the consolidated financial statements and the combined management report 
are examined primarily on a test basis within the framework of the audit. The 
audit includes assessing the annual financial statements of those entities 
included in consolidation, the determination of the entities to be included in 
consolidation, the accounting and consolidation principles used and 
significant estimates made by the Company’s Board of Management, as well 
as evaluating the overall presentation of the consolidated financial statements 
and the combined management report. We believe that our audit provides a 
reasonable basis for our opinion. 
Our audit has not led to any reservations. 
In our opinion based on the findings of our audit the consolidated 
financial statements comply with the IFRS as adopted by the E.U., the 
additional requirements of German commercial law pursuant to § 315a Abs. 
1 HGB and give a true and fair view of the net assets, financial position and 
results of operations of the Group in accordance with these requirements. The 
combined management report is consistent with the consolidated financial 
statements and as a whole provides a suitable view of the Group’s position 
and suitably presents the opportunities and risks of future development. 


















INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd 
 
Independent Auditors’ Report 
To the Board of Directors of Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd.: 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of 
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. (“Sumitomo Metals”) and consolidated 
subsidiaries as of March 31, 2009 and 2008, and the related consolidated 
statements of income, changes in equity, and cash flows for the years then 
ended, all expressed in Japanese yen. These consolidated financial statements 
are the responsibility of Sumitomo Metals’ management. Our responsibility 
is to express an opinion on these consolidated financial statements based on 
our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards 
generally accepted in Japan. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, 
on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting 
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. In our opinion, the 
consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the consolidated financial position of Sumitomo Metals and 
consolidated subsidiaries as of  March 31, 2009 and 2008, and the 
consolidated results of their operations and their cash flows for the years then 
ended in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in Japan. 
Our audits also comprehended the translation of Japanese yen 
amounts into U.S. dollar amounts and, in our opinion, such translation has 
been made in conformity with the basis stated in Note 1. Such U.S. dollar 
amounts are presented solely for the convenience of readers outside Japan. 
 
Deloitte Touche Tohaten 















INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Toshiba Corporation 
 
Report of Independent Auditors 
The Board of Directors and Shareholders of Toshiba Corporation 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of 
Toshiba Corporation and subsidiaries (the “Company”) as of March 31, 2009 
and 2008, and the related consolidated statements of income, shareholders’ 
equity, and cash flows for the years then ended, all expressed in Japanese yen. 
These consolidated financial statements are the responsibility of the 
Company’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these 
financial statements based on our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards 
generally accepted in the United States. Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes 
examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures 
in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting 
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
The Company’s consoidated financial statements do not disclose 
segment information required by Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 131, “Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and 
Related Information.” In our opinion, disclosure of segment information is 
required by U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. 
In our opinion, except for the omission of segment information 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the financial statements referred to 
above present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial 
position of Toshiba Corporation and subsidiaries at March 31, 2009 and 2008, 
and the consolidated results of their operations and their cash flows for the 
years then ended in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
We also have reviewed the translation of the consolidated financial 
statements mentioned above into United States dollars on the basis described 
in Note 3. In our opinion, such statements have been translated on such basis. 
 
June 24, 2009 
Ernst & Young Shinnikon LLC 
 
 





INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Unilever PLC 
 
Auditor’s report United Kingdom 
Independent auditors’ report to the members of Unilever 
PLC on the consolidated financial stetements 
We have audited the consolidated financial statements of the Unilever 
Group for the year ended 31 December 2009 which comprise the consolidated 
income statement, consolidated balance sheet, consolidated cash flow 
statement, consolidated statement of comprehensive income, consolidated 
statement of changes in equity, the related notes on pages 79 to 128, and 
principal group companies and non-current investments on pages 131 and 
132. These consolidated financial statements have been prepared under the 
accounting policies set out in note 1 on pages 83 to 86. The financial reporting 
framework that has been applied in their preparation is applicable law and 
international Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) as adopted by the 
European Union. 
Respective responsibilities of Directors and auditors 
As explained more fully in the Statement of Directors’ responsibilities 
set out on page 76, the directors are responsible for the preparation of the 
group financial statements and for being satisfied that they give a true and 
fair view. Our responsibility is to audit the consolidated financial statements 
in accordance with applicable law and International Standards on Auditing 
(UK and Ireland). Those standards require us to comply with the Auditing 
Practices Board’s Ethical Standards for Auditors.  
This report, including the opinions, has been prepared for and only for 
the shareholders of Unilever PLC as a body in accordance with Chapter 3 of 
Part 16 of the Companies Act 2006 and for no other purpose (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 2006). We 
do not, in giving these opinions, accept or assume responsibility for any other 
purpose or to any other person to whom this report is shown or into whose 
hands it may come save where expressly agreed by our prior consent in 
writing. 
Scope of the audit of financial statements 
An audit involves obtaining evidence about the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements sufficient to give reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are free from material misstatement, whether 
caused by fraud or error. This includes an assessment of: whether the 
accounting policies are appropriate to the Group’s circumstances and have 
been consistently applied and adequately disclosed; the reasonableness of 








presentation of the financial statements. 
Opinion on financial statements 
In our opinion the Group financial statements: 
• give a true and fair view of the state of the Group’s affairs as at 31 
December 2009 and of its profit and cash flows for the year then ended; 
• have been properly prepared in accordance with IFRSs as adopted 
by the European Union; and 
• have been prepared in accordance with the requirements of the 
Companies Act 2006 and Article 4 of the IAS Regulation. 
Separate opinion in relation to IFRS as issued by the IASB. As 
explained in note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Group in 
addition to complying with its legal obligation to apply IFRSs as adopted by 
the European Union, has also applied IFRSs as issued by the IASB. 
In our opinion the Group financial statements comply with IFRSs as 
issued by the IASB. 
 
Opinion on other matter prescribed by the CompaniesAct 2006 
In our opinion the information given in the Report of the Directors for 
the financial year for which the Group financial statements are prepared is 
consistent with the Group financial statements. 
Matters on which we are required to report by exception 
We have nothing to report in respect of the following: 
Under the Companies Act 2006 (The United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 2006) we are required to report to you 
if, in our opinion: 
 certain disclosures of directors’ remuneration specified by law are not 
made; or 
 we have not received all the information and explanations we require 
for our audit. 
Under the Listing Rules we are required to review: 
 the Directors’ statement, set out on page 76, in relation to going 
concern; and 
 the part of the Corporate Governance statement relating to the 
company’s compliance with the nine provisions of the 2008 
Combined Code specified for our review. 
Other matter 
We have reported separately on the parent company accounts of 
Unilever PLC for the year ended 31 December 2009 and on the information 
in the Directors’ Remuneration Report that is described as having been 
audited. 
 






(Senior Statutory Auditor) 
For and on behalf of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
Chartered Accountants and Statutory Auditors 
London, United Kingdom 
2 March 2010 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Unilever N.V. 
 
Auditor’s report Netherlands 
Independent auditor’s report to the shareholders of 
Unilever N.V. 
Report on the consolidated financial statements 
We have audited the consolidated financial statements which are part 
of the Annual Report 2009 of the Unilever Group for the year ended 31 
December 2009 which comprise the consolidated income statement, 
consolidated balance sheet, consolidated cash flow statement, consolidated 
statement of comprehensive income, consolidated statement of changes in 
equity and the related notes on pages 79 to 128 and 131 to 132. 
We have reported separately on the company accounts of Unilever 
N.V. for the year ended 31 December 2009. 
Director’s responsibility 
The Directors are responsible for the preparation and fair presentation 
of the consolidated financial statements in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union and as 
issued by the IASB and with Part 9 of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code 
(DCL), and for the preparation of the Report of the Directors in accordance 
with Part 9 of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code(DCL, 1992). This 
responsibility includes: designing, implementing and maintaining internal 
control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of the consolidated 
financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
fraud or error; selecting and applying appropriate accounting policies; and 
making accounting estimates that are reasonable in the circumstances. 
Auditor’s responsibility 
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the consolidated 
financial statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in 
accordance with Dutch law. This law requires that we comply with ethical 
requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
whether the consolidated financial statements are free from material 
misstatement. An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit 








statements. The procedures selected depend on the auditor’s judgement, 
including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the 
consolidated financial statements, whether due to fraud or error. In making 
those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the 
entity’s preparation and fair presentation of the consolidated financial 
statements in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the 
circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the 
effectiveness of the entity’s internal control. An audit also includes evaluating 
the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of 
accounting estimates made by the Directors, as well as evaluating the overall 
presentation of the consolidated financial statements. 
We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and 
appropriate to provide a basis for our audit opinion. 
 
Opinion 
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements give a true and 
fair view of the financial position of the Unilever Group as at 31 December 
2009, and of its result and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European 
Union and as issued by the IASB and with Part 9 of Book 2 of the Netherlands 
Civil Code(DCL, 1992). 
Report on other legal and regulatory requirements 
Pursuant to the legal requirement under 2:393 sub 5 part f of the 
Netherlands Civil Code(DCL, 1992), we report, to the extent of our 
competence, that the Report of the Directors is consistent with the 
consolidated financial statements as required by 2:391 sub 4 of the 
Netherlands Civil Code(DCL, 1992). 
 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2 March 2010 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V. 
R A J Swaak RA 
 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Kubota Corporation 
 
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of Kubota Corporation: 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of 
Kubota Corporation and subsidiaries (the “Company”) as of March 31, 2010 
and 2009, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive 





income (loss), changes in equity, and cash flows for each of the three years 
in the period ended March 31, 2010. These financial statements are the 
responsibility of the Company’s management. Our responsibility is to express 
an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. 
An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and 
significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall 
financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a 
reasonable basis for our opinion. 
In our report dated June 19, 2009, we expressed a qualified opinion, 
because certain information required by Accounting Standards Codification 
(“ASC”) 280, “Segment Reporting” was not presented in the consolidated 
financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2009 and 2008. As 
discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company 
has now presented the segment information required by ASC 280 for the 
years ended March 31, 2009 and 2008. Accordingly, our present opinion on 
the consolidated financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2009 and 
2008, as expressed herein, is different from that expressed in our prior report 
on the previously issued consolidated financial statements for the years ended 
March 31, 2009 and 2008. 
In our opinion, such consolidated financial statements present fairly, 
in all material respects, the financial position of Kubota Corporation and 
subsidiaries as of March 31, 2010 and 2009, and the results of their operations 
and their cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended March 31, 
2010, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the 
United States of America. 
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the 
Company adopted a new accounting standard for noncontrolling interests 
during the year ended March 31, 2010. 
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the Company’s 
internal control over financial reporting as of March 31, 2010, based on the 
criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission and 
our report dated June 18, 2010 expressed an unqualified opinion on the 









Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu LLC 
June 18, 2010 
 
 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
Cadbury PLC 
 
We have audited the Group and Parent Company financial statements 
(the “financial statements”) of Cadbury plc for the year ended 31 December 
2008 which comprise the Group Income Statement, the Group Statement of 
Recognised Income and Expense, the Group and Parent Company Balance 
Sheets, the Group and Parent Company Cash Flow Statement, Group 
Segmental reporting (a) to (d) and the related notes 1 to 40. 
These financial statements have been prepared under the accounting 
policies set out therein. We have also audited the information in the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report that is described as having been audited. 
This report is made solely to the Company’s members, as a body, in 
accordance with section 235 of the Companies Act 1985 (The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Parliament, 1985). 
Our audit work has been undertaken so that we might state to the 
Company’s members those matters we are required to state to them in an 
auditors’ report and for no other purpose. To the fullest extent permitted by 
law, we do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the 
Company and the Company’s members as a body, for our audit work, for this 
report, or for the opinions we have formed. 
Respective responsibilities of directors and auditors  
The Directors’ responsibilities for preparing the Annual Report, the 
Directors’ Remuneration Report and the financial statements in accordance 
with applicable law and international Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
as adopted by the European Union are set out in the Statement of Directors’ 
Responsibilities. 
Our responsibility is to audit the financial statements and the part of 
the Directors’ Remuneration Report to be audited in accordance with relevant 
legal and regulatory requirements and International Standards on Auditing 
(UK and Ireland). 
We report to you our opinion as to whether the financial statements 
give a true and fair view and whether the financial statements and the part of 
the Directors’ Remuneration Report to be audited have been properly 
prepared in accordance with the Companies Act 1985 and, as regards the 
Group financial statements. Article 4 of the IAS Regulation. We also report 





to you whether in our opinion the information given in the Directors’ Report 
is consistent with the financial statements. The information given in the 
Directors’ Report includes that specific information presented elsewhere in 
the document that is cross referred from the Business Review section of the 
Directors’ Report. 
In addition we report to you if; in our opinion, the Company has not 
kept proper accounting records, if we have not received all the information 
and explanations we require for our audit, or if information specified by law 
regarding Directors’ remuneration and other transactions is not disclosed. 
We review whether the Corporate Governance Statement reflects the 
Company’s compliance with the nine provisions of the 2006 Combined Code 
specified for our review by the Listing Rules of the Financial Services 
Authority, and we report if it does not. We are not required to consider 
whether the board’s statements on internal control cover all risks and 
controls, or form an opinion on the effectiveness of the Group’s corporate 
governance procedures or its risk and control procedures. 
We read the other information contained in the Annual Report as 
described in the contents section and consider whether it is consistent with 
the audited financial statements. We consider the implications for our report 
if we become aware of any apparent misstatements or material 
inconsistencies with the financial statements. Our responsibilities do not 
extend to any further information outside the Annual Report. 
Basis of audit opinion 
We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing (UK and Ireland) issued by the Auditing Practices Board. An audit 
includes examination, on a test basis of evidence relevant to the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements and the part of the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report to be audited. It also includes an assessment of the 
significant estimates and judgements made by the Directors in the preparation 
of the financial statements, and of whether the accounting policies are 
appropriate to the Group’s and Company’s circumstances, consistently 
applied and adequately disclosed. 
We planned and performed our audit so as to obtain all the information 
and explanations which we considered necessary in order to provide us with 
sufficient evidence to give reasonable assurance that the financial statements 
and the part of the Directors’ Remuneration Report to be audited are free from 
material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or other irregularity or error. 
In forming our opinion we also evaluated the overall adequacy of the 
presentation of information in the financial statements and the part of the 









In our opinion: 
• the Group financial statements give a true and fair view, in 
accordance with IFRSs as adopted by the European Union, of the state of the 
Group’s affairs as at 31 December 2008 and of its profit for the year then 
ended; 
• the parent company financial statements give a true and fair view, in 
accordance with IFRSs as adopted by the European Union as applied in 
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act 1985, of the state of the 
parent company’s affairs as at 31 December 2008; 
• the financial statements and the part of the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report to be audited have been properly prepared in accordance with the 
Companies Act 1985 and, as regards the Group financial statements. Article 
4 of the IAS Regulation; and 
• the information given in the Directors’ Report is consistent with the 
financial statements. 
 
Separate opinion in relation to IFRSs 
As explained in Note 1(b) to the financial statements, the Group in 
addition to complying with its legal obligation to comply with IFRSs as 
adopted by the European Union, has also complied with the IFRSs as issued 
by the IASB. 
In our opinion the Group financial statements give a true and fair view, 
in accordance with IFRSs, of the state of the Group’s affairs as at 31 
December 2008 and of its profit for the year then ended. 
 
Deloitte LLP 
Chartered Accountants and Registered Auditors 
London, United Kingdom 



















Agency theory argues that managers merely act as custodians of the 
organisation and its operational activities and places upon them the burden of 
managing in the best interest of the owners of that business. (p. 40) 
Annual meeting of a corporation is a gathering of shareholders of the 
corporation. (p. 31) 
Audit committee is responsible for ensuring that the company's financial 
statements and reports are accurate and use fair and reasonable estimates. 
(p. 31) 
Board of directors is the highest governing authority within the management 
structure at a corporation or publicly traded business. (p. 29) 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. (p. 7) 
Creditors are a key stakeholder and the terms, volume and type of credit 
extended to firms will depend importantly on their rights and on their 
enforceability. (p. 231) 
Ethics is the natural and structural process of acting in line with moral 
judgments, standards and rules. (p. 24) 
European company or societas europaea (SE) is governed by European 
regulations and, for SE having their registered office in France, the legal 
regime applicable to the SA. (p. 51) 
Fiduciary duty is the highest financial duty under American law. (p. 30) 
Formal governance arrangements are based on established structures and 
processes. (p. 7) 
Independent audit is an important tool for owners of all types of companies, 
since the auditors’ main role is to verify whether the financial statements 
adequately reflect the real situation of the company. (p. 38) 





Informal governance arrangements stem from the culture and values of the 
organization and are often influenced by the leaders of the organization. (p. 7) 
ISO 26000 (Guidance on Social Responcibility) is the international standard 
intended to assist organizations in assessing effectively and addressing social 
responsibilities while respecting cultural, societal, environmental, and legal 
differences and economic development conditions. (p. 6) 
Kabushiki kaisha (KK) is a stock company, the most common corporate 
entity form in Japan. (p. 51) 
Moral hazard arises where it is difficult or costly for owners to observe or 
infer the amount of effort exerted by managers. (p. 40) 
Proxy statement is a document containing the information the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies to provide to shareholders 
so they can make informed decisions about matters that will be brought up at 
an annual or special stockholder meeting. (p. 31) 
Rating agency is a company that devises credit rating – assessments of the 
risk involved – for various financial instruments and their issuers. (p. 41) 
Société à responsabilité limitée (SARL) is a traditional corporate form for 
closely held companies in France (e.g., familybusinesses). (p. 51) 
Société anonyme (SA) is the most common corporate form for the largest 
companies (whether listed or not) in France. (p. 50) 
Société en commandite par actions (SCA) is a much less common corporate 
form. (p. 50) 
Société par actions simplifiée (SAS) is a very common corporate form for 
small and large non-listed companies (an SAS may not be listed) in France. 
(p. 50) 
Stakeholders are such groups or individuals without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist and who can affect or is affected by the 








Stock buyback program is a process when a company choose to buy back 
shares of its stock. (p. 30) 
Stock split is a decision by a company's board of directors to increase the 
number of shares that are outstanding by issuing more shares to current 
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